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INTRODUCTION
Wrongful	conviction	has	for	decades	been	a	subject	of	academic	
study,	 litigation,	and	policy	reform,	but	its	more	recent	reach	into	
popular	culture	 is	 reflected	 in	an	array	of	books,1	documentaries,2 
podcasts,3	movies,4	and	TV	shows.5	In	both	non-fiction	and	fiction,	
the	theme	of	wrongful	conviction	marries	a	traditionally	American	
revulsion	 of	 profound	 injustice	with	 the	 captivation	 of	 the	 police	
procedural,	dirty	cops,	forensic	evidence,	and	the	relentless	fortitude	
of	incarcerated	innocents	and	their	heroic	lawyers.
The	innocence	movement	lies	at	this	intersection	between	law	
and	popular	imagination.	As	the	attendance	at	the	2018	Innocence	
Network	Conference6	attests,	the	energy	of	the	innocence	movement	
over	the	last	twenty-five	years	has	not	flagged.	It	continues	to	secure	
exonerations	and	to	publicize	them,	to	advocate	for	the	appropriate	
use	 of	 scientifically	 sound	 forensic	 science,	 to	 press	 for	 improved	
police	and	investigative	procedures,	and	to	support	the	creation	of	
conviction	integrity	units	to	revisit	potential	wrongful	convictions.7
1 See, e.g.,	Sarah	Burns,	The	Central	Park	Five (2012); Gillian	Flynn,	
Dark	 Places (2009); John	 Grisham,	 The	 Innocent	 Man (2006); 
Tayari	 Jones,	 An	 American	Marriage (2018); Bryan	 Stevenson,	
Just	 Mercy (2014); Jennifer	 Thompson-Cannino	 and	 Ronald	
Cotton,	Picking	Cotton:	Our	Memoir	of	Justice	and	Redemption 
(2009).
2 See, e.g.,	The	Central	Park	Five	(WETA	&	Florentine	Films	2012);	West	
of	Memphis	(WingNut	Films	&	Disarming	Films	2012);	Southwest	of	
Salem:	The	Story	of	the	San	Antonio	Four	(Sam	Tabet	Pictures	2016);	
Time	Simply	Passes	(Tanman	Films	2016).	See also Innocence	Project,	
Must-See Wrongful Conviction Films and TV Shows,	Innocence	Project	(Oct.	
28,	2016),	www.innocenceproject.org/wrongful-conviction-media/.
3 See, e.g.,	In the Dark: Season 2: Curtis Flowers,	APM	Reports	(2018),	https://
www.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/season-two;	 Accused: The Unsolved Murder 
of Elizabeth Andes,	 Cincinnati	 Enquirer	 (Sep.	 7,	 2016),	 https://www.
cincinnati.com/series/accused;	 Empire	 on	 Blood,	 Panoply	 (Feb.	 28,	 2018),	
(available	on	iTunes);	Wrongful Conviction with Jason Flom,	Revolver	Podcasts 
(Oct.	 3,	 2016),	 https://wrongfulconvictionpodcast.com;	Serial,	Nat’l	 Pub.	
Radio	(Oct.	3,	2014),	https://serialpodcast.org;	Actual Innocence,	Borrowed	
Equip.	Podcasts	(Apr.	24,	2016),	https://www.borrowedequipmentpods.
com/actual-innocence/;	Misconduct: A True Crime Podcast,	 Stitcher	 (Jan.	 2,	
2017),	https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/misconduct-a-true-crime-podcast.
4 Conviction	(Fox	Searchlight	Pictures	2010);	Thin	Blue	Line	(Miramax	
Films	1988);	The	Hurricane	(Beacon	Pictures	1999).
5 Rectify (SundanceTV	Apr.	22,	2013);	Making a Murderer (Netflix	Dec.	18,	2015).
6	 A	version	of	this	article	was	presented	as	part	of	the	2018	Innocence	Network	
Conference	in	Memphis,	Tennessee	on	March	23–24,	2018.
7 See Robert	 J.	Norris,	Exonerated:	A	History	of	the	 Innocence	
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During	 an	 evening	 of	 the	 2018	 Conference,	 dozens	 of	
exonerees	 were	 introduced	 and	 welcomed,	 while	 a	 slideshow	 of	
photographs	of	the	wrongly	convicted	was	displayed.	That	moving	
tribute	compels	me	to	start	this	article	with	an	apology.	My	empirical	
study	of	wrongful	conviction	compensation,	described	in	Section	I	
of	this	Article,	turns	people	into	categories,	tags,	codes,	numbers,	
and	 statistical	 units,	 a	 necessary	 but	 dehumanizing	 contrast	 to	
the	 Conference’s	 celebration	 of	 real	 people,	 and	 their	 suffering,	
humanity,	and	freedom.
The	stories	told	at	the	Conference	of	the	exonerated	do	not	end	
in	a	DNA	laboratory	or	when	the	prison	cell	opens.	Understandably,	
compensation	 for	 wrongful	 conviction	 has	 attracted	 less	 public	
attention	 than	 the	 efforts	 to	 free	 the	 innocent	 and	 to	 prevent	
wrongful	convictions.	But	it	is	hardly	invisible.	The	press	frequently	
reports	 on	 lawsuits	 seeking	 relief,	 verdicts	 and	 settlements	 in	
wrongful	conviction	compensation	cases,8	and	unsuccessful	efforts	
to	compensate	victims	of	wrongful	convictions.9
Movement	(2017).
8 See. e.g.,	 Pam	 Kragen,	Carlsbad Man Exonerated After Nearly 39 Years in Prison 
Receives $21 Million Settlement,	San	Diego	Union-Trib.	(Feb.	25,	2019,	6:05	
PM),	 https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/north-county/
sd-no-coley-settlement-20190225-story.html;	Eric	Heisig,	Three East Cleveland 
Men Each Awarded $5 Million for Wrongful Murder Convictions,	 Cleveland	
Com.	 (Nov.	 15,	 2018),	 https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2018/11/
three-east-cleveland-men-each-awarded-5-million-for-wrongful-murder-
convictions.html;	George	Hunter,	Lawsuit: Evidence Fake in ‘92 Murder; After 25 
Years In Prison, Man Goes After City, Pair Of Detectives,	 The	Detroit	News,	
July	 13,	 2018,	 at	 A1;	 Ian	 Duncan,	 Baltimore Poised To Pay $9M To Man Who 
Spent 20 Years In Prison On Wrongful Murder Conviction,	 Balt.	 Sun	 (Apr.	 30,	
2018,	3:45	PM),	https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-
city/bs-md-ci-wrongful-conviction-settlement-20180430-story.html;	 Logan	
Bogert,	Gov. Northam OKs Paying “Norfolk Four” $3.5M For Wrongful Rape, Murder 
Convictions,	 The	 Virginian-Pilot	 (Apr.	 2,	 2018),	 https://pilotonline.
com/news/government/politics/virginia/article_94afa7b8-36d6-11e8-a34e-
b3006a8c7d94.html;	 Melissa	 Etehad,	 L.A. County To Pay $15 Million To Man 
Wrongfully Convicted Of Murder,	L.A.	Times	(Nov.	21,	2017,	7:00	PM),	https://
www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-frank-oconnell-settlement-
20171121-story.html.
9 See, e.g.,	 Sam	 Friedman,	 Judge Dismisses Fairbanks Four’s Lawsuit Against City 
In Hartman Killing,	 Fairbanks	 Daily	 News-Miner	 (Oct.	 23,	 2018),	
http://www.newsminer.com/fairbanks_four/judge-dismisses-fairbanks-
four-s-lawsuit-against-city-in-hartman/article_7edd1bd0-d728-11e8-998b-
8fd1e1a28b55.html;	 Kansas man wrongfully imprisoned for 23 years receives no 
compensation from state,	CBS	News:	CBS	This	Morning	(Mar.	3,	2018,	1:36	
PM),	 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kansas-man-wrongfully-imprisoned-
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Few	would	disagree	 that	wrongful	conviction	 is	one	of	 the	
most	grievous	harms	a	member	of	society	can	suffer	and	that	those	
who	are	wrongfully	convicted	deserve	to	be	compensated	for	those	
injuries.10	Yet,	large	numbers	of	exonerees	do	not	seek	compensation	
and,	 as	 explained	 in	 Section	 II,	 many	 file	 unsuccessful	 claims	 or	
lawsuits	for	compensation.	An	empirical	study	of	wrongful	conviction	
compensation	 can	 teach	 us	 valuable	 lessons	 about	whether,	 how,	
and	why	our	remedial	aspiration	falls	short	and	how	we	can	improve	
our	country’s	civil	justice	response	to	criminal	justice	failure.
The	first	part	of	that	study	was	described	in	my	2017	article,	
“An	Empirical	Reexamination	of	State	Statutory	Compensation	for	
the	Wrongly	Convicted.”11	 There,	 I	 examined	 how	 the	 first	 1,900	
persons	 convicted	 in	 state	 courts	 listed	 in	 the	 National	 Registry	
of	Exonerations	 fared	under	 the	patchwork	of	state	compensation	
statutes	that	exist	in	this	country.12	Based	on	that	empirical	study,	
I	proposed	reforms	that	would	improve	these	statutes’	distributive	
fairness	in	ways	sensitive	to	state	budgetary	concerns.13
Using	 the	 research	 methodology	 described	 in	 Section	
I,	 this	Article	 expands	 that	 study	 in	 several	ways.	 First,	 the	 state	
compensation	data	published	in	2017	is	updated,	as	new	cases	have	
been	filed	and	prior	claims	decided.	One	hundred	more	exonerees	
were	 added	 to	 the	 database,	 now	 consisting	 of	 the	 first	 2,000	
individuals	exonerated	following	state	court	convictions	recorded	in	
the	Registry,	and	data	for	those	exonerees	was	updated	to	September	
16,	2018.	
Second,	 this	 Article	 looks	 beyond	 the	 percentages	 of	
exonerees	 filing	 for	 and	 winning	 or	 losing	 those	 claims	 that	 I	
addressed	in	2017.	Using	data	gathered	by	the	Registry	and	provided	
23-years-no-compensation-from-state/;	 Reshad	 Hudson,	 Man Who Spent 30 
Years On Death Row Has Not Received Compensation Following Wrongful Conviction,	
RocketCityNow.com	(Jun.	14,	2018,	6:43	AM),	https://www.rocketcitynow.
com/news/local-news/man-who-spent-30-years-on-death-row-has-not-
received-compensation-following-wrongful-conviction/1239276752:	
Geraldine	Sealey,	Not Every Exonerated Man Gets Repaid,	ABC	News	(Aug.	8,	
2017),	https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90978&page=1.
10 See	 Erik	 Encarnacion,	 Backpay for Exonerees,	 29	 Yale	 J.L.	 &	 Human. 245 
(2017).
11	 Jeffrey	S.	Gutman,	An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for 
the Wrongly Convicted,	82	Mo.	L.	Rev.	369	(2017).
12 Id.	 Hereafter,	 the	 National	 Registry	 of	 Exonerations	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
“Registry.”	 Nat’l	 Registry	 of	 Exonerations,	 http://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx.
13	 Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	421–37.
699Vol. 11, No. 2 Northeastern University Law Review
by	states,	we	explore	another	meaningful	measure	of	the	fairness	of	
these	statutes:	the	proportion	of	years	lost	in	prison	for	which	state	
compensation	was	awarded.	In	popular	imagination,	the	exonerated	
are	 viewed	 as	 spending	decades	 in	 prison;	 the	 reality	 is	 different.	
Significant	numbers	of	those	listed	on	the	Registry	were	incarcerated	
for	 no	 or	 relatively	 little	 time.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 ask,	 then,	what	
proportion	of	that	lost	time	was	subject	to	a	compensatory	award.	
As	described	 in	detail	 in	Section	 III,	 as	of	 the	 time	of	 this	
writing,	the	state	statutory	compensation	data	shows	the	following:
• Just	 under	 53%	 of	 exonerees	 convicted	 in	 states	 with	
compensation	statutes	filed	for	compensation.
• Of	those	filers,	73.5%	prevailed	on	their	claims,	17.6%	
lost,	and	the	remaining	8.9%	of	claims	are	pending.
• Since	 1989,	 states	 have	 paid	 $545	million	 in	wrongful	
conviction	 compensation	pursuant	 to	 state	 statutes,	 an	
average	of	less	than	$20	million	annually.
• The	average	annual	amount	paid	to	prevailing	exonerees	
is	 just	 over	 $70,000	 per	 year,	 an	 amount	 that	 would	
be	 considerably	 lower	were	 it	 not	 for	Connecticut,	 the	
District	of	Columbia,	and	New	York,	which	had	or	still	
have	statutes	which	do	not	cap	damages.14
• Nearly	half	 of	 the	 years	 lost	 by	 exonerees	 convicted	 in	
states	with	compensation	statutes	were	uncompensated.
Third,	this	Article	examines	federal	civil	rights	and	state	tort	
cases	 arising	 from	wrongful	 conviction.	 It	 analyzes,	 also	 by	 state,	
whether	the	same	set	of	2,000	exonerees	filed	such	cases	and,	if	so,	
the	results	of	 them.	With	respect	to	the	1,802	of	 those	exonerees	
who	were	incarcerated,	that	data	reveals	the	following:
• Almost	45%	of	the	exonerees	(808	in	total)	filed	federal	
civil	rights	and/or	state	tort	lawsuits15	arising	out	of	their	
wrongful	conviction.
14	 Only	Maryland,	New	York,	and	West	Virginia	have	statutes	that	are	entirely	
uncapped.	M.D.	Code	Ann.,	State	Fin.	&	Proc.	§	10-501	(West	2019);	
N.Y.	Court	of	Claims	Act	§	8-b	(McKinney	2019);	W.	Va.	Code	Ann. § 
14-2-13a	(West	2019).	If	the	exoneree	files	a	judicial	claim	for	damages	rather	
than	petitions	the	District	administratively,	the	damages	are	uncapped.	D.C.	
Code	Ann.	§§	2-421(1),	2-423	(West	2019).
15	 For	convenience,	these	will	be	referred	to	as	“civil	compensation”	suits.
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• Of	 those	 filers,	 448,	 or	 55%,	 received	 some	monetary	
recovery;	217	(or	27%)	were	unsuccessful.	The	remaining	
143	lawsuits	are	pending.
• Since	 1989,	 those	 wrongly	 convicted	 who	 were	
incarcerated	recovered	over	$1.7	billion	from	governments	
or	state	actors	(or	their	insurers)	as	a	result	of	verdicts	or	
settlements	in	civil	compensation	suits.
• The	 average	 amount	 awarded	 for	 each	 year	 of	
imprisonment	was	just	under	$305,000.
• Exonerees	were	compensated	in	civil	compensation	suits	
for	only	32%	of	the	total	years	lost.
Fourth,	this	Article	combines	state	statutory	compensation	
and	civil	compensation	filings	for	those	incarcerated	and	draws	the	
following	conclusions	regarding	the	overall	compensatory	landscape:
• Of	the	1,802	incarcerated	exonerees,	62%	(1,210)	sought	
some	form	of	compensation.
• Of	those	who	sought	compensation,	70%	(846)	received	
it.
• In	sum,	42%	of	the	1,802	incarcerated	exonerees	studied	
received	compensation.
• Over	$2.2	billion	has	been	paid	by	states	and	municipalities	
in	wrongful	conviction	compensation	to	those	exonerees.
• Just	 under	 60%	 of	 all	 years	 lost	 were	 compensated	
through	state	statutory	or	civil	compensation	recoveries.
Fifth,	having	sketched	the	big	picture,	our	study	asks	a	more	
fundamental	 question:	 what	 particular	 factors	 or	 characteristics	
appeared	to	be	associated	with	higher	rates	of	filing	for	and	receiving	
state	statutory	and	civil	compensation	and	with	higher	amounts	of	
compensation	received	per	year	of	incarceration	in	civil	compensation	
cases?	Fortunately,	many	of	those	characteristics	are	recorded	by	the	
Registry.	The	ones	we	tested	are	detailed	in	Section	I.D	and	include	
race	and	gender,	whether	the	exoneree	was	aided	post-conviction	by	
a	conviction	integrity	unit	or	an	innocence	organization,	whether	the	
exoneree	pled	guilty,	was	sentenced	to	death	or	exonerated	by	DNA	
evidence,	the	causes	of	the	wrongful	conviction,	the	crime	for	which	
they	were	wrongly	convicted,	the	state	and	region	of	the	country	of	
conviction	and	the	number	of	years	lost	to	wrongful	imprisonment.	
This	Article	sets	forth	the	results	of	regression	analyses	of	the	data	
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to	reveal	the	sometimes	expected	and	sometimes	surprising	truths	
behind	the	factors	that	drive	wrongful	conviction	compensation.
As	a	threshold	matter,	one	might	expect	that	the	likelihood	
of	filing	a	state	statutory	compensation	claim	or	a	civil	compensation	
lawsuit	would	turn,	at	least	in	part,	on	the	likelihood	of	prevailing	
and	the	range	of	expected	awards.	The	data	shows	that	to	be	true-
to	a	point.	The	percentage	of	exonerees	wrongly	convicted	in	states	
with	a	no-fault	compensation	statute	was	higher	than	the	percentage	
of	exonerees	filing	more	costly	and	difficult	federal	civil	rights	cases	
requiring	proof	of	unconstitutional	government	misconduct,	and	the	
likelihood	of	prevailing	on	a	state	compensation	claim	was	higher	
than	 on	 civil	 compensation	 claims.	 The	 duration	 of	 the	wrongful	
incarceration	was	positively	associated	with	rates	of	filing.
At	the	same	time,	because	most	state	statutes	have	annual	or	
total	compensatory	caps,	or	both,	the	expected	outcome	in	successful	
state	statutory	compensation	cases	is	generally	more	certain	and,	as	
it	turns	out,	much	lower	than	that	in	civil	compensation	cases.	And,	
somewhat	counterintuitively,	there	seems	no	particular	correlation	
between	 the	 rates	 of	 filing	 state	 compensation	 cases	 and	 the	
generosity	of	the	state’s	statute.
We	supposed	that	there	could	be	a	correlation	between	gender	
and	race	and	the	likelihood	of	filing	and	prevailing	on	state	statutory	
compensation	and	civil	compensation	claims	and	the	average	annual	
amount	received	in	successful	civil	compensation	cases.	Within	the	
2,000-person	database,	there	were	far	higher	numbers	of	exonerated	
men	 than	 women	 and	 larger	 numbers	 of	 exonerated	 African-
Americans	 than	other	 racial	groups.	The	average	number	of	years	
lost	to	wrongful	conviction	was	higher	for	African-Americans	than	
whites,	and	double	for	males	than	females.	
We	 found	 that	 males	 consistently	 filed	 and	 won	 claims	
at	 higher	 rates	 than	 women	 and	 received	 higher	 average	 civil	
compensation	awards,	but	the	regression	analyses	show	that	gender	
does	not	explain	those	differences.	Interestingly,	African-Americans	
filed	 and	won	 state	 and	 civil	 compensation	 claims	 at	higher	 rates	
than	whites,	but	received	lower	civil	compensation	awards	per	year	
of	incarceration.	But,	the	regression	analyses	also	showed	that	these	
differences	were	not	associated	with	 race,	 except	 that	we	 found	a	
positive	association	between	being	Hispanic	and	higher	annual	civil	
compensation	awards	compared	to	whites	and	African-Americans.	In	
a	criminal	justice	system	marred	by	racial	disparity,	there	is	perhaps	
some	comfort	to	be	taken	that	race	appears	not	to	affect	the	rates	
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of	filing	and	prevailing	in	cases	seeking	compensation	for	wrongful	
conviction	and	the	results	of	those	efforts.
We	 did,	 however,	 find	 a	 consistent	 and	 clear	 statistical	
association	between	two	particular	factors	and	the	likelihood	of	filing	
and	prevailing	on	state	and	civil	compensation	claims.	Those	exonerees	
who	were	 assisted	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 obtain	 post-conviction	 relief	
and	exonerations	by	innocence	organizations	and	those	exonerated	
as	a	result	of	DNA	analysis	were	substantially	more	likely	to	file	and	
win	state	statutory	compensation	and	civil	compensation	cases	than	
those	unaffiliated	with	innocence	organizations	or	those	exonerated	
by	evidence	other	than	DNA.	In	addition,	as	one	might	expect	from	
the	 legal	 requirement	 in	 civil	 rights	 cases	 that	 unconstitutional	
government	 conduct	 cause	 the	wrongful	 conviction,	we	 found	 an	
association	between	cases	involving	official	misconduct	and	higher	
rates	of	filing	and	winning	civil	rights	cases.
Geography	plays	an	extremely	important	and	troubling	role	
in	 understanding	 wrongful	 conviction	 compensation.	 The	 rates	
of	 filing	 and	 prevailing	 in	 both	 state	 statutory	 compensation	 and	
civil	 compensation	 cases	 vary	widely	by	 state.	 Similarly,	 there	 are	
substantial	differences	by	state	in	the	average	annual	amounts	received	
per	year	of	incarceration	in	both	state	statutory	compensation	and	
civil	compensation.	The	result	is	significant	state-by-state	differences	
in	the	amount	that	a	year	of	lost	freedom	is	valued.
Dividing	the	map	into	regions	(South,	West,	Midwest,	and	
Northeast)	 and	 politically	 (blue	 states	 voting	 for	Clinton	 and	 red	
states	 voting	 for	 Trump	 in	 2016)	 reveals	 statistical	 associations	
between	 those	 geographic	 realities	 and	 the	 compensation	 factors	
studied.	Very	generally,	states	in	the	South	and	West	and	red	states	
are	associated	with	lower	rates	of	filing,	lower	rates	of	winning	and	
of	lower	civil	compensatory	outcomes.	In	a	very	real	and	unsettling	
way,	the	likelihood	and	extent	of	compensation	turns	on	geographic	
fortuity-the	state	of	wrongful	conviction.
Finally,	 we	 offer	 another	 way	 of	 considering	 the	 fairness	
of	 this	 compensatory	 system.	Rather	 than	 looking	 at	 comparative	
generosity	by	 state,	 the	 focus	 instead	 is	 to	 consider	 the	 extent	 to	
which	substantial	numbers	seek	either	 form	of	compensation,	 the	
extent	to	which	substantial	numbers	of	claimants	are	awarded	some	
compensation	and	the	extent	to	which	a	substantial	percentage	of	
years	lost	to	wrongful	conviction	is	compensated.
In	 this	way,	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	 system	 is	 viewed	 from	 the	
perspective	of	what	we	call	compensatory	coverage-the	notion	that	
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it	is	better	for	a	system	to	compensate	a	greater	percentage	of	injured	
persons,	and	within	that	group,	the	most	seriously	harmed,	than	to	
compensate	a	smaller	group	more	generously.	Because	make-whole	
compensation	 in	 cases	 of	 wrongful	 conviction	 is	 impossible,	 an	
award	reflects	society’s	acknowledgement	of	the	harm	and	its	moral	
obligation	to	provide	at	least	some	measure	of	compensation.	When	
one	looks	at	those	elements	of	fairness,	there	is	a	good	argument	to	
be	made	that	the	best	state	to	be	exonerated	in	is	Mississippi.
I. The Data Set and Data Gathering
A. The National Registry of Exonerations
The	data	set	 for	 this	analysis	 is	 the	2,000	people	 listed	on	
the	National	Registry	of	Exonerations16	as	of	September	16,	2018,	
who	were	wrongly	convicted	in	a	state	or	territorial	court17	between	
January	 1,	 1989	 and	 May	 3,	 2017.18	 It	 is	 generally	 premature	 to	
evaluate	compensation	to	those	later	exonerated.19	The	compensation	
data	used	in	this	Article	is	accurate	as	of	October	1,	2018.
The	Registry,	created	in	2012,	is	a	 joint	research	project	of	
the	University	of	California	at	Irvine	Newkirk	Center	for	Science	and	
Society,	 the	University	of	Michigan	Law	School,	and	the	Michigan	
State	University	College	of	Law.20	Registry	staff	study,	analyze,	and	
report	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 trends	 of	 wrongful	 convictions.	Widely	
quoted	 and	 cited,	 the	 Registry	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	 country’s	most	
authoritative	source	of	data	on	the	subject.21
16 Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx	(last	visited	Aug	8,	2018).
17	 The	2,000	includes	16	persons	exonerated	in	the	District	of	Columbia,	6	in	
Puerto	Rico	and	1	in	Guam.	For	convenience,	we	refer	to	these	collectively	as	
state	court	convictions.
18	 The	 database	 used	 here	 excludes	 those	 109	 persons	 who	 were	 wrongly	
convicted	in	a	federal	or	military	court.	Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	
Milestone:	 Exonerated	 Defendants	 Spent	 20,000	 Years	 in	
Prison	3	n.5,	http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
NRE.20000.Years.Report.pdf.
19	 After	September	16,	2018,	a	small	number	of	people	exonerated	prior	to	May	
3,	2017,	were	added	to	the	Registry.	By	necessity,	they	are	excluded	from	the	
database.
20 Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	supra	note	16.
21	 Jessica	Pishko,	No County for Innocent Men,	D	Magazine	(May	15,	2018,	11:30	
AM)	 https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2018/05/dallas-county-
exonerations-innocent-conviction-integrity-unit/	 (describing	 the	 Registry’s	
data	as	the	“gold	standard.”).	See	Radley	Balko,	Report: Wrongful convictions have 
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The	 Registry	 employs	 a	 definition	 of	 exoneration	 which	
requires	 that	 an	 individual	 be	 officially	 declared	 innocent	 by	 an	
authorized	 government	 official	 or	 agency	 or	 be	 relieved	 of	 the	
consequences	 of	 a	 conviction	by	 pardon,	 acquittal	 or	 dismissal	 of	
charges	on	the	basis,	at	least	in	part,	of	newly	discovered	evidence	
of	innocence:
Exoneration—A	person	has	been	exonerated	if	he	or	
she	was	convicted	of	a	crime	and	.	.	.	was	either:	(1)	
declared	 to	 be	 factually	 innocent	 by	 a	 government	
official	 or	 agency	 with	 the	 authority	 to	 make	 that	
declaration;	 or	 (2)	 relieved	 of	 all	 the	 consequences	
of	the	criminal	conviction	by	a	government	official	or	
body	with	the	authority	to	take	that	action.	The	official	
action	may	be:	(i)	a	complete	pardon	by	a	governor	
or	 other	 competent	 authority,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	
pardon	 is	designated	as	based	on	 innocence;	(ii)	an	
acquittal	of	all	charges	factually	related	to	the	crime	
for	 which	 the	 person	 was	 originally	 convicted;	 or	
(iii)	a	dismissal	of	all	charges	related	to	the	crime	for	
which	the	person	was	originally	convicted,	by	a	court	
or	 by	 a	 prosecutor	with	 the	 authority	 to	 enter	 that	
dismissal.	 The	 pardon,	 acquittal,	 or	 dismissal	must	
have	been	the	result,	at	least	in	part,	of	evidence	of	
innocence	that	either	(i)	was	not	presented	at	the	trial	
at	which	the	person	was	convicted;	or	(ii)	if	the	person	
pled	guilty,	was	not	known	to	the	defendant	and	the	
defense	attorney,	and	to	the	court,	at	the	time	the	plea	
stolen over 20,000 years from innocent defendants,	Wash.	Post	(Sept.	10,	2018),	
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/10/report-
wrongful-convictions-have-stolen-at-least-20000-years-from-innocent-
defendants/;	Niraj	Chokshi,	Black People More Likely to Be Wrongfully Convicted 
of Murder, Study Shows,	 N.Y.	 Times	 (Mar.	 7,	 2017),	 https://www.nytimes.
cim/2017/03/07/us/Wrongful-convictions-race-exoneration.html;	 David	 G.	
Savage,	 Registry tallies over 2,000 wrongful convictions since 1989,	 L.A.	 Times 
(May	 20,	 2012),	 https://www.latimes.com/World/la-xpm-2012-may-20-la-
na-dna-revolution-20120521-story.htm.	 The	 Registry	 was	 cited	 in	 Justice	
Breyer’s	 dissent	 from	 the	 denial	 of	 certiorari	 in	 Jordan v. Mississippi,	 138	 S.	
Ct.	2567,	2571	(2018)	(Breyer,	J.,	dissenting),	and	in	his	dissent	in	Glossip v. 
Gross,	135	S.	Ct.	2726,	2757	(2015)	(Breyer,	J.,	dissenting).	It	has	been	cited	
in	well	over	200	 law	review	articles.	See also In The News,	Nat’l	Registry	
of	Exonerations,	http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
inthenews.aspx.
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was	entered.	The	evidence	of	innocence	need	not	be	
an	explicit	basis	for	the	official	action	that	exonerated	
the	 person.	 A	 person	 who	 otherwise	 qualifies	 has	
not	been	exonerated	if	there	is	unexplained	physical	
evidence	of	that	person’s	guilt.22
In	 short,	 except	 for	 those	 cases	 in	 which	 one	 has	 been	
declared	factually	innocent	by	a	government	official	or	agency	with	
authority	to	do	so,	such	as	through	an	award	of	a	pardon	on	express	
grounds	 of	 innocence	 or	 the	 grant	 of	 a	 certificate	 of	 innocence,	
without	some	new	evidence	of	innocence,	there	is	no	exoneration.	
The	 post-conviction	 disclosure	 of	 unlawfully	 withheld	 Brady 
material,	the	recantation	of	trial	testimony,	or	new	DNA	analysis	of	
forensic	evidence	may	be	new	evidence	of	innocence	not	presented	
at	trial.	An	acquittal	following	a	reversal	or	vacatur	of	a	conviction	
on	procedural	grounds,	 in	 contrast,	may	not	 serve	as	 the	basis	of	
an	exoneration	 if	no	new	evidence	of	 innocence	was	presented	at	
retrial.23
The	Registry	does	not	 include	 those	 cleared	of	 an	offense,	
but	 who	 participated	 in	 “a	 lesser	 crime	 that	 involved	 the	 same	
conduct.”24	It	excludes	any	case	in	which	a	defendant	pled	guilty	to	
any	charge	that	is	factually	related	to	the	original	vacated	conviction.25 
The	Registry	also	excludes	“mass”	or	“group”	exonerations,	which	
are	typically	cases	of	large-scale	police	perjury	or	corruption	which,	
when	uncovered,	result	in	non-individualized	vacaturs	of	convictions	
22 Glossary,	 Nat’l	 Registry	 of	 Exonerations,	 https://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx	(last	visited	March	14,	2019).
23	 Obviously,	those	who	fail	to	satisfy	the	Registry’s	definition	of	exoneration	
are	not	precluded	from	seeking	compensation.	An	unintended	byproduct	of	
researching	claims	or	lawsuits	filed	by	those	on	the	Registry	was	finding	both	
successful	and	unsuccessful	efforts	to	obtain	compensation	by	others	not	listed.	
When	found,	I	alerted	the	Registry.	Its	subsequent	review	resulted	in	some	
additional	cases	being	added	to	the	Registry;	others	did	not	satisfy	its	criteria.	
There	are	some	people	who	have	obtained	state	statutory	compensation	or	
civil	compensation	who	are	not	in	the	Registry	because	they	do	not	satisfy	its	
criteria,	but	those	people	are	not	included	in	this	analysis.
24 Samuel	 R.	 Gross	 &	 Michael	 Shaffer,	 Exonerations	 in	 the	
United	 States,	 1989–2012	 Report	 by	 the	National	 Registry	 of	
Exonerations,	1989–2012	Report,	Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations 
7	 (2012),	 http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf.
25 Id.
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of	the	apparent	victims	of	such	misconduct.26
The	 Registry	 acknowledges	 that	 it	 has	 not	 listed	 all	
exonerations	because	it	does	not	learn	about	all	of	them.27	It	largely	
relies	 on	 public	 and	media	 reporting,	 information	 from	 potential	
exonerees	or	their	attorneys,	and	reports	from	the	Innocence	Project	
and	 local	 innocence	 network	 members.28	 The	 extent	 to	 which	
exonerations	 are	 uncovered	 in	 particular	 states	 depends	 on	 the	
length	and	depth	of	reporting	by	sources	in	those	states.	Many	other	
exonerations	likely	result	from	the	work	of	prosecutor’s	offices	rather	
than	professional	exonerators	and	are	less	likely	to	be	publicized.29
Moreover,	 exonerations	of	 serious	 crimes,	 like	murder	 and	
rape,	and	the	subsequent	release	of	those	who	served	many	years	in	
prison	are	more	likely	to	be	reported	by	the	press	or	to	the	Registry	
than	 less	 dramatic	 cases	 involving	 lesser	 crimes	 and	 less	 time	 of	
unjust	imprisonment.30	Even	so,	as	innocence	programs	have	grown	
and	 publicized	 their	 work,	 and	 as	 the	 press	 increasingly	 covers	
wrongful	conviction	stories,	the	“capture	rate”	of	exonerations	has	
likely	increased	over	time.	The	database	used	for	this	study	is	that	of	
the	Registry,	even	though	the	Registry’s	recorded	exonerations	are	a	
subset	of	all	exonerations	and	not	a	representative	sample	of	them.31
 
26	 The	 Registry	 has	 uncovered	 fifteen	 group	 exonerations	 involving	 at	 least	
1,840	 people,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 whom	 were	 framed	 for	 drug	 offenses. 
Samuel	R.	Gross	et	al.,	Race	and	Wrongful	Convictions	in	the	
United	States	20–26 (Mar.	7,	2017),	http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf.
27 Gross	&	Shaffer,	supra	note	24,	at	91–101.
28 See Samuel	 Gross,	 Conviction	 Integrity	 Units,	 Innocence	
Organizations	 and	 the	 Time	 It	 Takes	 the	 Registry	 to	 List	
Exonerations	 (Sept.	 11,	 2017),	 http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/Conviction%20Integrity%20Units,%20
Innocence%20Organizations%20and.pdf	 (attributing	 the	 growing	 number	
of	 cases	 the	Registry	 learns	 about	promptly	 to	 innocence	organization	 and	
conviction	integrity	unit	publicity).
29 Id.	at	2.	See	Samuel	Gross,	What We Think, What We Know and What We Think 
We Know About False Convictions,	14	Ohio	St.	J.	Crim.	L.	753,	758-63	(2017)	
(explaining	why	it	is	impossible	to	uncover	all	wrongful	convictions	and	why	
many	are	not	publicized).
30 See	 Gross,	 supra	 note	 29,	 at	 762–67	 (the	 numbers	 of	 known	 exonerations	
increase	as	the	severity	of	the	crime	and	sentence	does).
31 Gross	&	Shaffer,	supra	note	24,	at	96–101	(the	exonerations	the	Registry	
finds	out	about	are	the	ones	with	the	most	press	publicity;	“Judging	from	the	
few	exonerations	we	happened	to	learn	about	despite	their	near-invisibility,	
there	are	many	others	that	we	have	missed.”).
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B. Methods of Compensation
There	are	two	principal	ways	the	wrongly	convicted	may	be	
compensated,	which,	in	eight	states,	are	at	least	partially	mutually	
exclusive.32	First,	an	exoneree	can	seek	compensation	pursuant	to	a	
state	statute,	which	exists	in	thirty-three	states	and	the	District	of	
Columbia.33	These	statutes	do	not	require	the	plaintiff	or	claimant	
to	 demonstrate	 that	 their	 wrongful	 conviction	 was	 the	 result	 of	
government	 misconduct;	 they	 are	 no-fault	 statutes.34	 However,	
they	 generally	 require	 the	 plaintiff	 or	 claimant	 to	 show	 factual	
innocence.35	How	that	may	be	done	and	the	burden	of	proof	required	
to	demonstrate	innocence	varies	widely	among	the	states.	
Following	 post-conviction	 relief,	 some	 of	 these	 statutes	
require	a	civil	suit	to	be	filed	in	a	state	trial	court,36	while	others	call	on	
32	 In	eight	states,	receipt	of	state	compensation	requires	a	waiver	of	other	claims	
arising	from	wrongful	conviction	against	states,	state	instrumentalities,	and	
state	 employees.	 Conn.	Gen.	 Stat.	 §	 54-102uu(g)	 (2019);	 Fla.	 Stat. § 
961.06	 (2019);	 Haw.	 Rev.	 Stat.	 §	 661B-7	 (2018);	 Iowa	 Code	 §	 669.8	
(2018); Mo.	Rev.	Stat.	§	650.058	(2018);	Tex.	Civ.	Prac.	&	Rem.	Code	
Ann.	§	103.153(b)	(West	2017);	Va.	Code	Ann.	§	8.01-195.12(B)	(2018);	
Wash.	Rev.	Code	§	4.100.080	(2019).	In	Colorado	and	Michigan,	a	recipient	
of	state	compensation	must	reimburse	the	state	if	there	is	a	subsequent	civil	
compensation	 award.	 Colo.	 Rev.	 Stat.	 §	 13-3-114	 (6)	 (2019);	 Mich.	
Comp.	Laws	§	691.1755	(13)	(2018).	In	Minnesota,	the	converse	is	true-a	
subsequent	civil	compensation	award	is	to	be	offset	by	the	amount	received	
from	the	state	pursuant	 to	 the	state	compensation	statute.	Minn.	Stat. § 
611.365	Subd.	5	(2019).	No	state	statute	bars	the	award	of	state	compensation	
if	there	is	an	initial	civil	compensation	award.
33 Compensation Statutes: A National Overview,	 Innocence	 Project	 (2007),	
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Adeles_
Compensation-Chart_Version-2017.pdf.	 The	 most	 recent	 state	 to	 have	
adopted	 a	 compensation	 statute	 is	 Kansas,	which	 passed	 a	 statute	 in	May	
2018.	 H.B.	 2579,	 Kan.	 State	 Leg.,	 2017-2018	 Sess.	 (Kan.	 2018),	 http://
www.kslegislature.org/li_2018/b2017_18/measures/hb2579/.	 Because	 it	
is	 so	 recent,	 I	 have	 not	 included	Kansas	 exonerees	 in	my	 analysis	 of	 state	
compensation	claims.
34	 Gutman, supra	note	11,	at	370.
35 See id.	at	371.
36	 Colorado,	 Hawaii,	 Iowa,	 Louisiana,	 Maine,	 Massachusetts,	 Mississippi,	
Missouri,	 New	 Jersey,	 Ohio,	 Vermont,	 Washington,	 and	 West	 Virginia.	
The	 District	 of	 Columbia	 has	 a	 procedure	 whereby	 a	 petitioner	may	 seek	
compensation	from	a	state	trial	court	or	from	an	administrative	agency.	D.C.	
Code	§	2-421	 (2017).	Florida	has	a	hybrid	 system	 in	which	a	petition	 for	
status	as	a	wrongfully	incarcerated	person	is	filed	with	the	original	sentencing	
court,	but	certain	claims	are	heard	by	an	administrative	law	judge,	subject	to	
court	review.	Fla.	Stat.	§	961.03	(2017).
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claimants	to	file	claims	with	a	state	court	of	claims	or	claims	board.37 
Other	states	require	a	filing	with	a	state	administrative	entity.38	In	yet	
others,	particular	forms	of	post-conviction	relief,	sometimes	issued	
in	a	civil	proceeding,	such	as	an	award	of	a	certificate	of	innocence	or	
a	finding	of	being	a	wrongfully	convicted	person,	yield	an	essentially	
automatic	compensatory	award	made	by	a	court	or	administrative	
body	without	 an	 explicit	 requirement	 to	 bring	 a	 separate	 civil	 or	
administrative	 action	 in	which	 factual	 innocence	must	 be	 proven	
again.39	 In	 a	 small	 number	 of	 states,	 awards	 by	 such	 entities	 are	
subject	to	 legislative	review	and/or	an	affirmative	 legislative	grant	
of	compensation.40
Second,	 the	wrongly	 convicted	may	 file	 federal	 civil	 rights	
cases	 pursuant	 to	 42	 U.S.C.	 §	 1983	 against	 counties,	 other	
municipalities,	and	state	actors	such	as	prosecutors,	police	officers,	
and/or	state	experts	or	others	alleged	to	have	engaged	in	forms	of	
unconstitutional	misconduct	that	caused	the	wrongful	conviction.41 
In	addition,	or	alternatively,	some	exonerees	have	filed	state	common	
law	tort	claims	on	theories	such	as	false	arrest,	false	imprisonment,	
or	 malicious	 prosecution.42	 I	 have	 separately	 recorded	 and	 coded	
claims	 for	 state	 statutory	 compensation	 and	 for	 suits	 under	 civil	
rights	or	tort	theories.
37	 Connecticut,	Michigan,	Nebraska,	Tennessee,	and	Wisconsin.
38	 Alabama	 (Division	 of	 Risk	 Management),	 Maryland	 (Board	 of	 Public	
Works),	Montana	 (Department	 of	Corrections),	North	Carolina	 (Industrial	
Commission),	 Oklahoma	 (Office	 of	 Management	 and	 Enterprise	 Services,	
Risk	Management	Division),	Texas	(Comptroller).
39	 California,	Illinois,	and	Utah.	In	Minnesota,	once	a	court	declares	the	petitioner	
eligible	for	compensation,	the	person	then	files	a	claim	for	compensation	with	
the	state	Supreme	Court.	Minn.	Stat.	Ann.	§	611.363	(West	2017);	Back	v.	
State,	902	N.W.2d	23,	26–27	(Minn.	2017)	(describing	statutory	scheme).
40	 Alabama,	California,	Connecticut,	Illinois,	Minnesota,	and	Utah.	A	relatively	
small	 number	 of	 exonerees	 in	 a	 state	without	 state	 compensation	 statutes	
received	compensation	through	private	legislative	bills	or	through	state	tort	
claims	procedures.	Virginia	has	a	compensation	statute,	but	the	mechanism	
by	 which	 compensation	 is	 award	 is	 purely	 legislative.	 Va.	 Code	 Ann. § 
8.01-195.10,	11	(2010).	The	database	records	known	unsuccessful	legislative	
efforts	to	receive	compensation	in	Virginia	and	elsewhere	as	denials.
41	 A	small	number	of	exonerees	filed	Federal	Tort	Claims	Act	cases	against	the	
United	States	or	Bivens	cases	against	officials	arising	from	federal	involvement	
in	the	wrongful	conviction.
42	 A	fair	number	of	malpractice	cases,	some	successful,	were	filed	by	exonerees	
against	 their	 attorneys.	Although	some	of	 those	were	filed	against	 state	or	
county	public	defenders’	offices	or	attorneys,	those	malpractice	claims	were	
excluded	from	this	study	because	most	did	not	involve	a	government	entity.
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A	 few	 people	 have	 been	 compensated	 in	 other	 ways.	 I	
identified	one	exoneree	who	received	compensation	(and	one	who	
did	not)	through	a	general	state	tort	claims	process	in	Arkansas,	a	
state	that	does	not	have	a	compensation	statute.	A	few	people	have	
received	compensation	 through	a	 legislative	process	 in	states	 that	
did	not	have	relevant	statutes	at	the	time	of	compensation-five	in	
Georgia	 and	 one	 in	Kansas	 (which	now	has	 a	 statute).43	 In	 other	
states,	 legislatures	 compensated	 exonerees	 by	 private	 bill	 before	
the	state	enacted	a	state	compensation	statute.	 In	such	cases,	 the	
legislative	awards	were	included	with	statutory	awards.
C. Research Methodology
Data	 reflecting	 the	 claims	made	under	 state	 compensation	
statutes	 and	 the	 results	 of	 those	 claims	 are	 relatively	 accessible.	
Some	 states	 post	 online	 decisions	made	 by	 administrative	 bodies	
or	courts	of	claims	that	resolve	claims	for	state	wrongful	conviction	
compensation	or	the	amounts	paid	to	particular	exonerees.44	Other	
states	responded	to	informal	or	formal	public	records	requests	for	
such	 information.45	 In	 some	 states,	 such	 as	 Alabama,	 California,	
Massachusetts,	 Mississippi,	 Nebraska,	 Oklahoma,	 and	 Texas,	
academic	 researchers	 and	 investigative	 journalists	 have	 published	
articles	 on	 state	 compensation.46	 In	 addition,	 one	 can	 track	 bill	
histories	in	states,	such	as	Alabama,	California,	Illinois,	and	Virginia,	
which	 require	 legislative	 action	 to	 pay	 compensation	 claims	 (or	
decide	not	to	do	so).	Over	time,	there	also	has	been	increased	press	
reporting	of	the	award	or	denial	of	state	compensation	claims.	All	
told,	while	I	may	have	missed	some	older	claims,	I	believe	that	the	
data	set	is	substantially	complete	and	accurate.
Determining	 whether	 a	 federal	 civil	 rights	 or	 state	 tort	
43	 I	have	noted	those	eight	claims	in	brackets	in	Spreadsheet	1,	but	did	not	add	
them	in	the	totals.	I	included	them	in	overall	Spreadsheet	2.	As	a	result,	you	
will	 see	a	minor	difference	 in	between	Spreadsheet	1,	 infra,	Column	P	and	
Spreadsheet	2, infra,	Column	D.
44	 These	 include	 California,	 Louisiana,	 Michigan,	 North	 Carolina,	 Ohio,	 and	
Wisconsin.	Among	those,	a	small	number	of	states	may	not	post	the	results	
of	cases	going	back	to	1989.	California’s	online	records	dates	from	2005	and,	
while	efforts	were	made	to	obtain	older	records,	it	is	possible	that	some	claims	
were	missed.
45	 Connecticut,	 Florida,	 Illinois,	 Iowa,	 Maryland,	 Minnesota,	 Mississippi,	
Missouri,	 Montana,	 New	 Jersey,	 New	 York,	 Oklahoma,	 Tennessee,	 Texas,	
Washington,	and	West	Virginia.
46 See	Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	388	n.122.
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claim	was	filed	was	more	challenging	because	 that	effort	 required	
an	 exoneree-by-exoneree	 approach	 rather	 than	 a	 state-by-state	
study.	The	Registry,	the	Innocence	Project,	Witness	to	Innocence,47 
and	media	 reporting	provided	substantial	 amounts	of	 information	
about	whether	such	a	 lawsuit	had	been	filed	and	the	results	of	 it.	
Some	 records	 of	 settlements	 and	 verdicts	 were	 found	 on	 LEXIS.	
Some	settlements	were	located	by	reviewing	county	or	city	council	
meeting	action	documents	in	cases	requiring	settlement	approval.	I	
filed	dozens	of	Freedom	of	Information	Act	and	other	public	records	
requests	and	contacted	many	of	the	attorneys	litigating	these	cases.
These	 efforts	 uncovered	 most,	 but	 not	 all,	 settlements.	
Some	states,	 like	Louisiana,	and	certain	counties	have	particularly	
restrictive	 laws	 and	 policies	 regarding	 the	 release	 of	 confidential	
settlement	agreements.	In	others,	the	relevant	municipality	did	not	
have	the	agreement	because	a	private	firm,	under	contract	with	the	
insurer,	 represented	 it.	 In	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 there	was	 evidence	
of	an	agreement,	but	it	had	been	destroyed	by	the	municipality	or	
plaintiff’s	 counsel	 in	 accordance	 with	 record	 retention	 practices,	
generally	 making	 older	 settlements	 harder	 to	 get	 than	 newer	
ones.	When	 possible,	 inquiries	 were	made	 of	 counsel,	 but	 many	
attorneys	have	left	practice,	did	not	keep	a	file,	or	stated	that	they	
could	 not	 discuss	 the	 matter.	 Despite	 that,	 only	 22	 settlements	
were	undisclosed	and,	of	those,	six	were	associated	with	exonerees	
incarcerated	for	two	years	or	less.
Finding	filed	 cases	was	one	 thing,	but	 concluding	 that	 the	
exoneree	had	not	filed	a	lawsuit	is	a	less	certain	enterprise.	There	is	
no	question	that	the	substantial	majority	of	exonerees	who	filed	non-
statutory	claims	brought	federal	civil	rights	claims	under	42	U.S.C.	
§	 1983	 rather	 than	 state	 tort	 claims,	 although	many	filed	 Section	
1983	claims	and	supplemental	state	claims	together.	Virtually	all	of	
the	civil	rights	claims	were	filed	in	federal	court,	or	were	removed	
to	federal	court.
As	a	result,	PACER,	LEXIS,	and	Bloomberg	searches	within	
the	federal	 judicial	district	encompassing	the	county	of	conviction	
permitted	 reasonable	 conclusions	 that	 federal	 cases	were	 unfiled.	
When	possible,	state	and	county	online	docket	searches	were	made	
to	determine	whether	a	relevant	case	had	been	filed	in	state	court.	At	
the	same	time,	online	searches	of	this	kind	have	inherent	limitations.	
PACER	dockets	frequently	do	not	extend	prior	to	1999.	State	court	
47 Witness	to	Innocence,	https://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/.
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docket	searches	are	sometimes	spottier.	Some	dockets	do	not	extend	
as	far	back	as	1989.	A	few	states	and	counties	lack	free	online	search	
options	 and	 demand	high	 fees	 for	 searches.	 In	 cases	 of	 uncertain	
filing,	Google	searches	for	press	reporting	were	performed.
Moreover,	 online	 searches	 are	 highly	 name	 sensitive.	 If	 an	
exoneree	 changed	 their	 name,	 if	 different	 spellings	 were	 used,	 if	
the	name	was	unusually	common,	or	if	the	lawsuit	were	brought	by	
an	estate	executor	or	other	fiduciary,	a	case	might	be	missed.	It	is	
entirely	possible	that	some	cases	were	in	fact	filed	by	exonerees	but	
were	coded	as	“unfiled.”
D. The Coding
I	adopted	a	fairly	simple	coding	method	for	each	exoneree.	
For	exonerees	wrongly	convicted	in	a	state	which	has	a	compensation	
statute,	I	recorded	whether	the	individual	filed	a	state	compensation	
claim	under	the	state	statute.48	If	not,	I	identified	the	case	as	falling	
within	one	of	three	categories:	(1)	the	exoneree	was	not	incarcerated,49 
(2)	the	individual	might	yet	file	a	claim	as	the	applicable	statute	of	
limitations	had	yet	to	run	(labelled	“premature”),	or	(3)	the	exoneree	
did	not	file	a	claim.
For	those	who	did	file	a	claim,	three	results	were	possible:	
(1)	the	claim	was	dismissed	or	denied,	(2)	the	claim	was	granted,	
or	 (3)	 the	 claim	 remained	 pending	 for	 judicial	 or	 administrative	
determination.50	 If	 the	 claim	was	 granted,	 I	 recorded	 the	 amount	
awarded.51	On	occasion,	conflicting	or	uncertain	data	regarding	the	
48	 As	noted,	a	 few	exonerees	received	compensation	by	states	without	a	state	
compensation	 statute,	 typically	 through	 a	 general	 state	 claims	 statute	 or	
by	 private	 legislative	 bill.	 I	 excluded	 those	 awards	 from	my	 study	 of	 state	
statutory	compensation,	but	included	them	in	evaluating	total	compensation.
49	 I	 labeled	 them	 as	 “0	 timers.”	 Generally,	 state	 statutes	 do	 not	 permit	 “0	
timers”	to	recover	compensation.	There	 is,	however,	one	exoneree	 in	Texas	
who	served	no	time	and	was	compensated	for	the	time	listed	on	the	state’s	
sex	offender	 registry.	There	 is	 also	one	 exoneree	 in	 Illinois	who	 served	no	
time,	but	received	a	certificate	of	innocence	and,	thus,	an	entitlement	to	some	
non-monetary	assistance.	For	consistency,	I	excluded	those	awards	from	the	
calculations.
50	 For	purposes	of	this	study,	I	did	not	distinguish	among	involuntary	dismissals	
or	denials,	such	as	those	decided	on	the	merits,	those	dismissed	on	procedural	
grounds	and	those	dismissed	voluntarily	for	strategic	or	other	reasons.	It	was	
sometimes,	 but	not	 always,	 possible	 to	discern	 the	basis	 or	 reason	 for	 the	
denial	or	dismissal.
51	 Texas	exonerees	receive	monthly	annuity	amounts	in	addition	to	a	lump	sum	
award.	The	Texas	data	includes	annuity	payments	received	until	February	1,	
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amount	of	 the	award	required	a	measure	of	 judgment.	My	 typical	
approach	was	to	err	on	the	side	of	the	more	generous	award	in	cases	
of	uncertainty	and,	when	clearly	stated	in	the	award,	to	deduct	the	
amount	awarded	as	attorney’s	fees	or	costs.	The	resulting	amounts,	
to	the	extent	possible,	track	the	money	received	by	exonerees,	rather	
than	amount	paid	by	states,	but	it	is	likely	that	many	of	the	other	
awards	recorded	included	attorney’s	fees.	They	were	not	deducted	
because	there	was	no	clear	statement	of	the	amount.52
Naturally,	over	time,	the	number	of	premature	and	pending	
claims	will	decline	and	 the	number	of	unfiled	and	decided	 claims	
will	 increase.	 The	 numbers	 that	 are	 compiled	 in	 Spreadsheet	 1	
are	 therefore	a	snapshot,	but	one	with	the	substantial	majority	of	
codings	being	determinate	rather	than	subject	to	future	decision.
The	coding	for	federal	civil	rights	or	torts	cases	was	nearly	
identical.	 Each	 of	 the	 2,000	 cases	were	 coded,	 including	 those	 of	
exonerees	 who	 were	 not	 incarcerated	 after	 wrongful	 conviction.	
Of	 the	2,000	exonerees,	198	 served	no	prison	 time.	Of	 those	not	
incarcerated	 after	 wrongful	 conviction,	 only	 35	 filed	 federal	 civil	
rights	and/or	state	tort	cases	and	17	were	successful.	They	recovered	
about	$6.5	million.	To	reduce	the	size	and	complexity	of	Spreadsheet	
2,	 I	have	excluded	data	about	non-incarcerated	exonerees	 from	it.	
They	 are,	 however,	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 that	
follows.
If	 there	was	no	evidence	 that	a	 federal	 civil	 rights	or	 state	
tort	claim	was	filed,	one	of	two	codes	was	used:	that	the	case	was	
“unfiled”	 because	 I	 could	 conclude	 with	 some	 certainty	 that	 the	
statute	of	 limitations	had	 run	on	any	 claim	arising	 from	an	order	
vacating	 or	 reversing	 a	 criminal	 conviction,	 or	 that	 the	 case	 was	
“premature”	because	 the	applicable	 statute	of	 limitations	had	not	
2018.
52	 I	 have	 obtained	 some	 anecdotal	 information	 regarding	 particular	 state	
statutory	awards	that	were	not	fully	paid.	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	that	
this	might	occur.	In	a	small	number	of	states,	Alabama	being	an	example,	the	
legislature	has	the	authority	to	appropriate	payments	over	time	and	budgetary	
issues	may	prevent	or	delay	certain	out-year	payments.	 In	other	cases,	also	
typically	involving	installment	payments,	payments	may	be	discontinued	when	
particular	eligibility	requirements	are	no	longer	met,	such	as	if	the	exoneree	
dies	or	is	convicted	of	a	subsequent	crime.	Nonetheless,	it	was	not	possible	
to	 track	whether	 full	payments	were	made	 to	each	exoneree	awarded	state	
statutory	compensation.	Thus,	the	entire	amount	was	recorded	as	the	award.	
As	a	result,	 it	 is	more	accurate	to	say	that	the	database	 lists	compensatory	
awards,	 rather	 than	compensatory	 receipts.	This	may	slightly	overstate	 the	
amount	of	compensation	actually	paid.
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yet	expired.
If	a	case	had	been	filed,	it	was	coded	in	one	of	three	ways:	
(1)	 dismissal	 or	 verdict	 for	 defendant,	 (2)	 settlement	 or	 verdict	
for	plaintiff,	 or	 (3)	pending.	On	occasion,	 judgment	was	 required	
to	 determine	 whether	 the	 civil	 compensation	 claim	 arose	 from	 a	
wrongful	conviction.	In	a	small	number	of	cases,	almost	exclusively	
those	brought	by	people	who	served	very	little	or	no	time,	the	case	
focused	on	physical	injuries	suffered	during	the	course	of	the	arrest.53 
I	 excluded	 such	 cases,	 although	 in	 a	 few	 of	 them,	 damages	were	
claimed	(and	awarded)	for	the	arrest	through	wrongful	conviction.	
In	case	of	doubt,	and	without	a	means	for	apportioning	a	judgment	
or	 settlement	between	 injuries	 suffered	during	 arrest	 and	 injuries	
arising	from	wrongful	conviction,	I	erred	on	the	side	of	recording	the	
entire	judgment	amount.54
Dismissals	were	coded	as	a	denial	regardless	of	whether	the	
dismissal	 was	 the	 result	 of	 a	 judicial	 determination	 of	 the	 claim	
on	 the	merits,	 a	 verdict	 for	 the	 defendant	 or	 defendants	 at	 trial,	
or	a	dismissal	of	the	civil	case	on	procedural	grounds.	A	voluntary	
dismissal	was	a	signal	that	there	might	have	been	a	settlement	and	
that	possibility	was	researched,	but	when	no	evidence	of	a	settlement	
was	uncovered	 (often	 following	a	 conversation	with	 counsel),	 the	
voluntary	 dismissal	 was	 coded	 as	 a	 denial.	 When	 federal	 claims	
were	 dismissed	 and	 supplemental	 state	 claims	 dismissed	without	
prejudice	or	remanded	to	state	court,	efforts	were	made	to	determine	
whether	 there	were	 further	 state	 court	 proceedings	 and,	 if	 so,	 to	
record	the	results	of	them.
Many	 cases	 involved	 some	mixed	 result.	 Not	 surprisingly,	
with	 significant	 frequency,	 courts	 dismiss	 certain	 claims	 but	 not	
others,	 and/or	 dismiss	 claims	 against	 certain	 defendants	 but	 not	
others.	I	coded	a	single	case	status	as	follows:
• If	there	was	a	judgment	for	the	plaintiff	or	the	defendant,	
and	the	result	was	on	appeal	but	still	undecided,	the	case	
53 See, e.g.,	 Brandon	 Lewis,	 Other Arizona Cases,	 Nat’l	 Registry	 of	
Exonerations	 (Jun.	 25,	 2014),	 https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4450.
54	 Again,	 I	 heard	 anecdotally	 of	 a	 small	 number	 of	 cases	 in	which	 there	was	
evidence	that	a	judgment,	sometimes	a	default	judgment,	was	entered	against	
a	 state	 actor,	 but	 that	 the	 judgment	was	 not	 paid,	 often	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
failure	 or	 refusal	 of	 the	 relevant	 municipal	 entity	 to	 indemnify	 the	 state	
employee.	Nevertheless,	I	recorded	the	full	amount	of	the	award	or	judgment	
given	difficulties	in	accurately	determining	which	were	fully	paid.
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was	coded	as	“pending.”
• If	 there	 was	 a	 dismissal	 of	 some	 claims	 or	 some	
defendants,	 but	 the	 litigation	 continues,	 the	 case	 was	
coded	as	“pending”	not	a	“denial.”
• If	 there	 was	 a	 dismissal	 of	 some	 claims	 and/or	 some	
defendants,	 but	 the	 litigation	 concluded	 with	 a	 partial	
settlement	 for	 the	 plaintiff,	 the	 case	 was	 coded	 as	 an	
award	for	the	plaintiff,	not	a	“denial.”
• If	there	was	a	settlement	on	some	claims	or	a	settlement	
with	 some	 defendants,	 but	 the	 litigation	 continues,	
the	case	was	coded	as	an	award	for	the	plaintiff,	rather	
than	“pending,”	and	the	settlement	amount	to	date	was	
recorded,	but	with	a	note	to	continue	to	follow	the	case.
• A	small	number	of	cases,	particularly	in	New	York,	were	
settled	before	filing.	Nonetheless,	I	coded	those	cases	as	
filed	with	an	award	to	the	plaintiff.55
• Some	 federal	 civil	 rights	 cases	 are	brought	by	multiple	
defendants	 wrongly	 convicted	 in	 the	 same	 incident.	
When	 a	 verdict	 or	 settlement	 was	 reached	 in	 favor	 of	
the	 plaintiffs,	 it	 was	 sometimes	 possible	 to	 learn	 the	
per-plaintiff	amounts	and	those	were	recorded.	In	other	
cases,	that	distribution	is	confidential	and	I	divided	the	
total	award	equally	by	the	number	of	plaintiffs.
In	 addition,	 I	 recorded	 for	 each	 exoneree	 four	 categories	
of	data	maintained	by	the	Registry.	First,	 the	Registry	records	the	
race	 and	gender	of	 the	exoneree.56	We	will	 call	 these	Bio	Factors.	
Second,	 because	 I	 hypothesized	 that	 they	 might	 be	 relevant	 to	
compensation,	I	noted	the	presence	or	absence	of	three	of	several	of	
the	characteristics	that	the	Registry	calls	“Tags”57:
55	 Obviously,	prefiling	settlements	are	hard	to	find	unless	there	is	some	publicity	
about	them.
56	 When	reviewing	case	documents	and	researching	potential	exonerations,	the	
Registry	attempts	to	determine	the	race	of	the	exoneree.	Racial	classifications	
are	often	difficult	and,	here,	particularly	so	in	properly	classifying	whether	an	
exoneree	is	Hispanic.	Despite	potential	inaccuracies,	we	have	adhered	here	to	
the	Registry’s	racial	categorizations.
57	 The	 Registry	 has	 a	 defined	 set	 of	 characteristics	 that	 it	 calls	 “Tags.”	 The	
Registry’s	“Tags”	are	listed	on	its	website	and	defined	there	as	well.	Nat’l	
Registry	 of	 Exonerations,	 http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx	(last	visited	Apr.	7,	2019).
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• Whether	 the	 exoneree	 was	 helped	 by	 a	 prosecutor’s	
office’s	conviction	integrity	unit	(CIU);
• Whether	the	exoneree	pled	guilty	to	the	crime	for	which	
they	were	wrongly	convicted;
• Whether	the	exoneree	had	the	assistance	of	an	innocence	
organization	during	their	effort	to	obtain	post-conviction	
relief	(IO).58
In	 addition,	 I	 recorded	 two	 additional	 potentially	 relevant	
characteristics	noted	by	the	Registry:
• Whether	 DNA	 analysis	 was	 central	 in	 securing	 the	
exoneration	 and,	 thus,	 recorded	 on	 the	 Innocence	
Project’s	website;59
• Whether	the	exoneree	was	sentenced	to	death.60
Third,	the	Registry	records	and	we	noted	the	worst	crime	for	
which	 each	 exoneree	was	wrongly	 convicted.	 The	Registry	 places	
these	crimes	in	one	of	six	“crime”	categories:	murder,	sexual	assault,	
drugs,	child	sexual	abuse,	robbery,	and	other.	Fourth,	we	used	the	
Registry’s	identification	of	“Contributing	Factor	Codes.”	The	study	
of	 each	 exoneree’s	 case	 led	 the	 Registry	 to	 determine	 whether	
any	of	 the	 following	 factors	(some	exonerees	had	more	than	one)	
contributed	to	the	wrongful	conviction:
• Whether	the	exoneree	made	a	false	confession;
• Whether	there	was	a	mistaken	witness	identification;
• Whether	 false	 or	 misleading	 forensic	 evidence	 was	
58	 The	 Registry’s	 2017	 Report	 notes	 that	 for	 the	 last	 several	 years,	 most	
exonerations	were	produced	by	“professional	exonerators,”	attorneys	working	
in	CIUs	and	those	associated	with	IOs,	often	 in	tandem.	Nat’l	Registry	
of	 Exonerations,	 Exonerations	 in	 2017	 1,	 http://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf.	As	noted,	this	
reality	will	skew	the	complexion	of	the	database	as	states	with	active	IOs	and	
state	 counties	with	 active	CIUs	 record	more	exonerations	 than	 states	with	
fewer	or	no	IOs	and	CIUs.
59	 The	 Innocence	 Project	 has	 documented	 365	 exonerations	 through	 DNA	
analysis.	DNA Exonerations in the United States,	Innocence	Project	https://
www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/	 (last	
visited	Apr.	12,	2019).
60	 A	DNA	exoneration	or	a	death	sentence	are	recorded	as	“Tags”	in	the	Registry.	
For	 convenience,	 they	 are	 added	 among	 our	 five	 “Tags”	 as	 a	 shorthand	
recognizing	that	that	term	is	not	true	to	the	Registry’s	list.
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employed;
• Whether	 witnesses	 perjured	 themselves	 or	 made	 false	
allegations;
• Whether	there	was	official	misconduct;
• Whether	there	was	an	inadequate	legal	defense.	
The	 Registry	 is	 mindful	 that	 some	 of	 these	 factors	 are	
easier	 to	discern	 than	others.	False	confessions	are	almost	always	
mentioned	in	a	report	about	the	case,	but	because	case	reviews	may	
not	 surface	 other	 causes	 not	 explicitly	 raised	 in	 efforts	 to	 obtain	
post-conviction	relief,	other	hidden	causes	may	be	missed.	This	is	
particularly	true	of	inadequate	legal	defense,	the	frequency	of	which	
cannot	be	accurately	quantified.61	For	that	reason,	the	tables	below	
exclude	this	particular	contributing	factor.
In	addition,	since	the	Registry	records	the	state	of	wrongful	
conviction,	 we	 coded	 “Geo	 Factors”	 by	 dividing	 the	 states	
geographically	 in	 terms	used	by	 the	Census	Bureau:	South,	West,	
Northeast,	and	Midwest,62	and	also	noted	each	state	as	“red”	(voting	
for	Trump	in	2016)	or	“blue”	(voting	for	Clinton	in	2016).63
Finally,	the	Registry	records	“years	lost”	for	each	exoneree.	
Years	 lost	 is	 generally	 the	 period	 of	 wrongful	 incarceration	
calculated	from	the	day	of	conviction	to	the	day	of	release.64	Pre-trial	
61 See	Gross,	supra	note	29,	at	773.
62	 The	 Census	 Bureau	 groups	 all	 states	 into	 either	 the	 South,	 the	West,	 the	
Northeast,	 and	 the	 Midwest.	 The	 South	 contains	 Delaware,	 District	 of	
Columbia,	 Florida,	 Georgia,	 Maryland,	 North	 Carolina,	 South	 Carolina,	
Virginia,	West	Virginia,	Alabama,	Kentucky,	Mississippi,	Tennessee,	Arkansas,	
Louisiana,	 Oklahoma,	 and	 Texas.	 The	 West	 contains	 Arizona,	 Colorado,	
Idaho,	New	Mexico,	Montana,	Utah,	Nevada,	Wyoming,	Alaska,	California,	
Hawaii,	 Oregon,	 and	 Washington.	 The	 Northeast	 contains	 Connecticut,	
Maine,	 Massachusetts,	 New	 Hampshire,	 Rhode	 Island,	 Vermont,	 New	
Jersey,	New	York,	 and	Pennsylvania.	Finally,	 the	Midwest	 contains	 Indiana,	
Illinois,	Michigan,	Ohio,	Wisconsin,	Iowa,	Nebraska,	Kansas,	North	Dakota,	
Minnesota,	 South	 Dakota,	 and	 Missouri.	 Census Regions and Divisions of the 
United States,	United	States	Census	Bureau,	https://www2.census.gov/
geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf.	 Exonerees	 from	 Guam	
and	Puerto	Rico	are	excluded	from	these	geographic	categories.
63	 Because	Puerto	Rico	 and	Guam	are	 absent	 from	 the	Electoral	College,	 the	
seven	 exonerees	 from	 those	 territories	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 “red”/“blue”	
analysis.
64 Longest Incarcerations,	Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/longestincarceration.aspx	(last	visited	
Apr.	12,	2019).	For	a	small	number	of	exonerees	who	remain	incarcerated	after	
exoneration	on	other	crimes,	the	“years	lost”	ends	on	the	date	of	exoneration.
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incarceration	and	post-release	parole,	probation,	or	time	on	a	state	
sexual	offender	registry	is	not	counted.65
II. Why Do the Wrongly Convicted Lose Compensation Claims?
The	focus	of	this	empirical	research	has	been	to	determine	
how	frequently	the	wrongly	convicted	are	compensated,	to	catalog	
the	 amounts	 received	 through	 settlement	 or	 adjudication	 and	 to	
assess	 whether	 any	 particular	 factors	 explain	 the	 frequency	 and	
extent	 of	 compensation.	 It	 is	worth	 first	 flipping	 the	 question	 to	
ask	why-perhaps	counter	to	one’s	intuition-some	exonerees	seek	
compensation	but	fail.	The	data	shows	that	146	state	compensation	
claims	have	been	denied	and	that	217	incarcerated	exonerees	have	
lost	their	civil	compensation	cases.
As	 noted,	 there	 are	 two	 paths	 to	 compensation-no-fault	
state	statutes	and	civil	rights	or	tort	claims.	The	potential	roadblocks	
between	 filing	 and	 compensation	 are	 very	 different	 in	 each.	 It	 is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	catalog	and	analyze	the	cause	of	
failure	in	each	case,	but	a	general	background	can	offer	some	insight	
into	why	some	are	unsuccessful,	why	some	might	not	be	filed	in	the	
first	place	and	why	some	civil	compensation	cases	settle	for	modest	
amounts.
A. Why Do Claimants Lose State Statutory Claims?
In	 my	 2017	 article,	 I	 canvassed	 the	 enormous	 variation	
among	state	statutes,	both	in	terms	of	determining	eligibility	and	in	
65	 Because	 this	Article’s	 analysis	 accounts	 for	 “years	 lost,”	 it	 is	 important	 to	
understand	 whether	 the	 Registry’s	 conviction	 to	 exoneration	 calculation	
matches	 that	 of	 the	 state	 when	 it	 awards	 state	 statutory	 compensation.	
Whether	the	state	must	calculate	the	exact	amount	of	time	a	successful	state	
statutory	 compensation	 claimant	 served	 in	 prison	 depends	 on	 the	 metric	
the	 state	 uses	 for	 deriving	 a	 calculation	 award.	 In	 many	 states,	 a	 precise	
calculation	 is	 not	made	 and	 the	Registry’s	 “years	 lost”	 figure	was	 used.	A	
number	of	states	explicitly	or	implicitly	include	pre-conviction	incarceration	
time	as	part	of	their	compensation	calculus	and	thus	could	have	a	larger	time	
lost	period	than	the	Registry.	Other	states	may	use	the	same	metric	as	the	
Registry,	 but	 arrive	 at	 a	 different	 number.	When	 the	 state’s	 compensation	
award	 rested	on	 a	precise	 calculation	 and	 it	 differed	 from	 the	Registry’s,	 I	
used	 the	state’s	calculation.	 In	short,	 the	Registry’s	 lost	years	amount	was	
used	unless	the	record	showed	a	carefully	calculated	alternative	amount.	This	
resulted	 in	small	adjustments	 for	exonerees	with	state	awards	 in	Alabama,	
California,	District	of	Columbia,	Florida,	Maryland,	Missouri,	North	Carolina,	
Ohio,	and	Texas.
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awarding	compensation.66	Newer	compensation	statutes	and	recent	
amendments	to	existing	statutes	tend	to	include	fewer	disqualifying	
provisions	and	are	more	generous.67	The	most	recent	statute	adopted,	
by	Kansas,	follows	that	trend	and	has	been	called	a	model	statute.68
In	Kansas,	 claimants	file	 suit	 in	 state	 trial	 court	 and	must	
prove,	by	a	preponderance	of	the	evidence,	four	elements:	that	(1)	
they	were	convicted	of	a	felony	and	imprisoned,	(2)	the	conviction	
was	reversed	or	vacated	and	either	 the	charges	were	dismissed	or	
the	claimant	was	retried	and	found	not	guilty,	(3)	that	the	claimant	
did	not	 commit	 the	 crimes	 for	which	 they	were	 charged,	 and	 (4)	
that	they	did	not	cause	or	bring	about	their	conviction,	such	as	by	
suborning	 perjury	 or	 fabricating	 evidence.69	 A	 guilty	 plea	 or	 false	
confession	does	not	preclude	a	showing	of	the	last	element.70
If	 these	 elements	 are	 satisfied	 (and	 the	 court	 is	 expressly	
afforded	discretion	to	consider	the	difficulties	of	proof	caused	by	the	
passage	of	time,	death	or	unavailability	of	witnesses	and	destruction	
of	 evidence71),	 then	 the	 court	must	 award	 $65,000	 for	 each	 year	
of	incarceration	and	not	less	than	$25,000	per	year	of	post-release	
parole,	supervision	or	registration	as	a	sex	offender.72
Describing	the	Kansas	statute,	as	comparatively	progressive	
as	it	is,	offers	insight	into	why	at	least	some	of	the	17.5%	of	applicants	
66	 Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	385–97.
67	 There	are	exceptions	to	that	general	trend.	As	noted,	id.	at	382–84,	Connecticut	
and	the	District	of	Columbia	which	had	two	of	the	most	progressive	statutes	
recently	 amended	 them	 in	 ways	 that	 make	 them	 less	 generous	 and	 more	
restrictive,	but	nevertheless	remain	among	the	best	statutes.
68	 Innocence	Staff,	Governor Signs Gold-Standard Wrongful Conviction Compensation 
Law in Kansas,	 Innocence	 Project	 (May	 15,	 2018).	 https://www.
innocenceproject.org/governor-signs-wrongful-conviction-compensation-
law-kansas/.
69 Kan.	 Stat.	 Ann.	 §	 60-5004(c)(1)	 (2019).	 The	 Nebraska	 Supreme	 Court	
has	described	elements	(2)	and	(3)	as	requiring	a	showing	of	legal	innocence	
and	factual	innocence,	respectively.	Hess	v.	State,	843	N.W.2d	648,	653	(Neb.	
2014).
70 Kan.	Stat.	Ann.	§	60-5004(c)(1)(D)	(2019).
71 Id.	§	60-5004(c)(2).
72 Id.	§	60-5004((e)(1).	In	addition,	the	court	must	award	attorney’s	fees	and	
may	 award	 non-monetary	 relief,	 including	 counseling,	 housing	 assistance	
and	 personal	 financial	 literacy	 assistance.	 Id.	 §	 60-5004(e)(4)(A)–(B).	 The	
claimant	is	also	entitled	to	tuition	assistance	and	state	health	care	benefits.	Id. 
§	60-5004(e)(4)(C)–(D).	The	state	is	to	be	reimbursed	from	money	received	
in	 any	 earlier	 or	 later	 civil	 rights	 or	 tort	 claim	arising	 from	 their	wrongful	
conviction.	Id.	at	§	60-5004(f).	If	the	court	concludes	that	the	claimant	qualifies	
for	compensation,	a	certificate	of	innocence	is	issued.	Id.	§	60-5004(g).
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for	state	statutory	compensation	lose	their	cases.	Given	that	these	
are	 no-fault	 statutes	 which	 do	 not	 require	 proof	 of	 misconduct,	
the	 number	 of	 unsuccessful	 claims	may	 seem	 surprising.	 Part	 of	
the	answer	lies	with	the	basis	upon	which	one	may	be	listed	in	the	
National	Registry	of	Exonerations.
Simply	because	one	has	met	the	Registry’s	definition	of	an	
“exoneree”	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 one	 automatically	 satisfies	 state	
statutory	 requirements	 that	 they	 demonstrate	 factual	 innocence.	
Recall	that	one	qualifies	for	the	Registry	on	one	of	two	grounds:	if	
one	has	been	declared	factually	innocent	or	has	been	relieved	of	all	
the	consequences	of	the	criminal	conviction	by	pardon,	acquittal	or	
dismissal	of	charges73	and	the	pardon,	acquittal,	or	dismissal	was	the	
result,	at	least	in	part,	of	new	evidence	of	innocence.	With	respect	
to	 the	 latter	 ground,	 a	 demonstration	 of	 factual	 innocence	 is	 not	
required.74
A	 showing	 of	 factual	 innocence	 is	 a	 non-issue	 for	 those	
seeking	compensation	who	were	earlier	declared	innocent	by	a	court	
or	pardoning	authority.	Without	such	a	pre-existing	declaration,	the	
vast	majority	of	state	statutes	that	are	specific	on	this	point	require	
applicants	for	compensation	to	show	by	either	clear	and	convincing	
evidence75	 or	 a	 preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence76	 not	 only	 that	 the	
charges	against	them	were	reversed,	vacated,	or	dismissed,	but	also	
that	they	were	factually	innocent	of	them.	In	Kansas	and	many	other	
73	 This	is	similar	to	the	Kansas	element	(2)	described	above.
74	 The	 Registry’s	 definition	 is,	 thus,	 similar	 to	 that	 of	West	 Virginia,	 which	
permits	 compensation	 if	 the	 claimant’s	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 has	 been	
reversed	or	vacated,	and	the	accusatory	instrument	dismissed,	or	if	a	new	trial	
is	ordered,	he	or	she	was	found	not	guilty	or	ultimately	not	retried.	W.	Va.	
Code	§	14-2-13(a)(c)(2)(C)	 (2019).	Factual	 innocence,	or	 even	new	post-
trial	evidence	of	innocence,	is	not	required.	In	Minnesota,	one	is	eligible	for	
compensation	if	the	conviction	is	vacated	or	reversed	on	grounds	“consistent	
with	innocence”	or	if	a	new	trial	were	ordered	“consistent	with	innocence	and	
the	charges	were	dismissed	or	the	claimant	was	found	not	guilty.	Minn.	Stat. 
§	590.11,	subd.	1	(2017);	see also Ala.	Code	§	29-2-157	(2019).	Connecticut’s	
statute	 appears	 to	 depart	 most	 liberally	 from	 the	 Registry’s	 definition	 by	
permitting	compensation	to	persons	whose	convictions	have	been	vacated	or	
reversed	 because	 of	 cited	 acts	 or	 omissions	 that	 constitute	malfeasance	 or	
other	serious	misconduct	without	requiring	a	showing	of	innocence.	Conn.	
Gen.	Stat.	§	54-102uu(a)(2)(B)	(2019).	In	such	states,	then,	it	is	possible	
that	state	compensation	can	be	paid	to	persons	not	on	the	Registry.
75	 Colorado,	 District	 of	 Columbia,	 Iowa,	 Louisiana,	 Maine,	 Massachusetts,	
Michigan,	 Nebraska,	 New	 Jersey,	 New	 York,	 Oklahoma,	 Utah,	 Vermont,	
Washington,	Wisconsin.
76	 California	(by	case	law),	Hawaii,	Illinois,	Mississippi.
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states,	an	acquittal	after	retrial	is	alone	not	enough	to	show	that.
Almost	 half	 of	 those	 who	 lost	 state	 compensation	 claims	
had	sought	relief	in	just	two	states:	California	and	New	York.	The	
substantial	majority	of	 those	California	denials	 issued	at	 the	 time	
of	this	writing77	rested	in	whole	or	in	part	on	the	claimant’s	failure	
to	 show	 factual	 innocence.78	 Of	 the	 available	New	 York	 Court	 of	
Claims	opinions	denying	claims,	a	fair	number	also	faltered	on	the	
innocence	prong.79	A	significant	number	of	denials	 in	other	states	
also	 followed	 a	 determination	 that	 the	 petitioner	 failed	 to	 prove	
factual	 innocence;	such	was	the	case,	 for	example,	 in	every	denial	
in	 Louisiana	 and	 Wisconsin.	 In	 short,	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	
people	satisfy	the	Registry’s	exoneration	definition	but	are	denied	
compensation	because	 they	are	 found	not	 to	have	met	 the	 state’s	
statutory	requirement	of	factual	innocence.	
Some	 other	 state	 compensation	 denials	 can	 be	 attributed	
to	quirks	 in	 state	 law	or	 the	 interpretation	of	 them.	 In	Michigan,	
for	 example,	 the	 statute	 provides	 that	 wrongful	 conviction	
compensation	 claims	may	 be	 filed	 in	 the	 state’s	 Court	 of	 Claims	
within	eighteen	months	of	the	enactment	of	the	statute.80	The	Court	
of	Claims,	however,	has	in	several	cases	applied	a	six-month	notice	
deadline	generally	applicable	to	Court	of	Claims	filings,	resulting	in	
several	dismissals.81	In	Ohio,	the	state	Supreme	Court	interpreted	a	
somewhat	idiosyncratic	provision	requiring	a	person	seeking	to	be	
designated	as	a	“wrongfully	imprisoned	individual”	to	show	an	error	
in	procedure	resulting	in	release	to	have	occurred	after	sentencing	
77 Cal.	 Victim	 Comp.	 Bd.,	 Proposed Decisions,	 https://victims.ca.gov/board/
pc4900.aspx	(as	of	Aug	8,	2018).	The	Board	has	posted	a	small	number	of	
new	decisions	on	its	website	since	I	completed	this	study.
78	 As	applied,	the	California	Victim	Compensation	Board	enforces	the	innocence	
requirement	rigorously,	or,	some	would	argue,	overzealously.	See	Justin	Brooks	
&	Alexander	Simpson,	Find the Cost of Freedom: The State of Wrongful Conviction 
Compensation Statutes Across the Country and the Strange Legal Odyssey of Timothy 
Atkins,	49	San	Diego	L.	Rev.	627,	644	(2012).
79	 Like	some	other	states,	both	California	and	New	York	deny	compensation	to	
those	 found	 to	have	caused	or	 contributed	 to	 their	 convictions	and	several	
denials	were	based	on	that	rationale.
80 Mich.	Comp.	Laws	§	691.1757.7	(2019).
81	 Rusha	v.	Dep’t	of	Corr.,	859	N.W.2d	735	(Mich.	Ct.	App.	2014)	(interpreting	
the	six-month	notice	requirement);	Summary	Disposition,	Sadowski	v.	State	
of	Michigan,	No.	18-00051-MZ	(Mich.	Ct.	Cl.	Jul.	30,	2018);	see	Ken	Kolker,	
‘Miscarriage of justice’: State fights wrongful conviction payments,	WOOD-TV	(May	
16,	 2018,	 6:13	 PM),	 https://www.woodtv.com/news/target-8/-miscarriage-
of-justice-state-fights-wrongful-conviction-payments/1183315375.
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or	during	or	after	imprisonment,	rather	than	before	or	during	trial.82 
The	claims	of	several	of	the	heirs	of	the	“Wilmington	10”	in	North	
Carolina	 were	 denied	 because	 the	 eventual	 exoneree	 died	 before	
exoneration.83
All	that	said,	many	denials	were	based	on	procedure,	rather	
than	substance.	Wrongful	conviction	compensation	claims	are	not	
immune	 from	dismissal	 for	 pleading	 errors,	 statute	 of	 limitations	
problems,	and	other	avoidable	procedural	mistakes.	Some	run	into	a	
post-filing	statutory	bar,	such	as	the	claimant’s	death	or	subsequent	
criminal	conviction.	In	addition,	some	dismissals	were	voluntary	and	
rested	on	grounds	 that	 compensation	advocates	would	not	 regard	
as	worrisome.	For	 instance,	 there	are	cases	 that	appeared	 to	have	
been	dismissed	as	a	part	of	a	global	settlement	of	parallel	civil	rights	
claims.
B. Why Do Civil Rights Plaintiffs Lose?
The	vast	majority	of	cases	filed	outside	the	context	of	state	
statutory	 compensation	 are	 brought	 under	 federal	 civil	 rights	
theories.	Obviously,	both	procedurally	and	doctrinally,	federal	civil	
rights	cases	arising	from	wrongful	conviction	are	far	more	complex	
and	uncertain	than	claims	under	no-fault	state	wrongful	conviction	
compensation	 statutes.84	 These	 cases	 typically	 involve	 multiple	
legal	theories	against	multiple	defendants,	including	municipalities,	
prosecutors,	police	officers,	forensic	experts,	and	defense	attorneys.85 
82	 Mansaray	v.	State,	6	N.E.3d	35,	37	(Ohio	2014).	See	Editorial,	Do right, Ohio, 
by those wrongfully convicted,	Akron	Beacon	J.	(May	16,	2018),	https://www.
ohio.com/akron/editorial/editorials/beacon-journal-ohio-com-editorial-
board-do-right-ohio-by-those-wrongfully-convicted.	 This	 glitch	 has	 been	
corrected.	Ohio	Rev.	Code	Ann.	§	2743.48(A)(5)	(West	2019).
83	 Estate	of	Jacobs	v.	State,	775	S.E.2d	873,	874–75	(N.C.	Ct.	App.	2015).
84 See	Encarnacion,	supra	note	10,	at	248;	Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	372	n.11.	
Indeed,	 this	 Article	 shows	 that	 a	 significantly	 higher	 percentage	 of	 those	
seeking	state	statutory	compensation	were	successful	than	those	filing	federal	
civil	rights	or	torts	claims.
85	 The	substantial	majority	of	these	cases	are	filed	against	state	municipalities	
and	 employees.	 Some,	 however,	 advance	 claims	 against	 the	 United	 States	
or	 federal	 employees	 because	 of	 their	 alleged	 involvement	 in	 the	wrongful	
conviction.	See	Bunch	v.	United	States,	880	F.3d	938	(7th	Cir.	2018)	(describing	
Federal	Tort	Claims	Act	 case	 against	United	States	 arising	 from	claim	 that	
federal	 forensic	 chemist	was	 alleged	 to	 have	 fabricated	 evidence);	 Engel	 v.	
Buchan,	 710	 F.3d	 698	 (7th	 Cir.	 2013)	 (concerning	 a	 Bivens	 claim	 against	
FBI	agent	alleged	to	have	fabricated	evidence	and	violated	Brady);	Limone	v.	
United	States,	579	F.3d	79	(1st	Cir.	2009)	(discussing	FTCA	claims	against	
the	 United	 States	 for	 suppressing	 evidence	 undermining	 key	 prosecution	
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Commonly,	 these	 claims	 are	narrowed	as	motions	 to	dismiss	 and	
motions	 for	summary	 judgment	result	 in	rulings	dismissing	some	
(or	 all)	 of	 the	 claims	 and	parties.	Doctrinally,	 these	 cases	 involve	
the	complicated	intersection	of	civil	claims	for	damages	arising	from	
unconstitutional	acts	or	omissions	during	a	criminal	prosecution.86 
From	a	 coding	 perspective,	when	 a	 civil	 rights	 case	 is	 coded	 as	 a	
denial,	it	means	that	the	case	failed	in	its	entirety.	Conversely,	when	
it	is	coded	as	one	in	which	there	was	a	recovery,	either	at	trial	or,	
more	commonly,	in	settlement,	that	does	not	exclude	the	likelihood	
that	 some	 claims	 and/or	parties	were	dismissed	 voluntarily	 or	 by	
court	order	prior	to	the	resolution	of	the	litigation.	In	short,	coding	
of	 plaintiff	 recoveries	 in	 civil	 rights	 cases	 lacks	nuance;	 it	 fails	 to	
reflect	the	dismissals	of	some	claims	and/or	parties	that	preceded	
the	recovery.
It	 is	outside	the	purview	of	this	article	to	comprehensively	
survey	 each	 of	 the	 civil	 rights	 theories	 raised	 in	 these	 cases,	 the	
many	defenses	to	them,	or	to	catalog	why	some	succeed	and	others	
fail.	But,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	 generally	understand	 the	 typical	 theories	
and	 the	 defenses	 to	 them.	That	 understanding	 offers	 insight	 into	
why	many	exonerees	do	not	file	them,	why	a	significant	number	fail	
and	why,	in	some	cases,	arguable	weakness	in	these	claims	results	in	
relatively	modest	settlements.	
As	lawyers	think	through	whether	and	how	to	frame	federal	
civil	rights	theories	for	exonerated	clients,	their	point	of	departure	is	
the	innocence	of	their	clients.	The	strategic	focus	then	is	to	determine	
why	their	clients	were	wrongly	found	guilty.	In	some	cases,	guilt	was	
established	 by	 plea	 and	may,	 for	 example,	 have	 been	 the	 product	
of	a	coerced	confession	or	the	withholding	of	exculpatory	evidence.	
In	others,	a	finding	of	guilt	followed	a	trial	and	lawyers	may	trace	
the	 source	 of	 important	 evidence	 presented	 to	 the	 jury	 to	 police	
fabrication,	suggestive	identification	procedures,	or	other	forms	of	
police	misconduct.	In	yet	other	cases,	exculpatory	or	impeachment	
evidence	known	to	the	government	was	concealed	from	the	defense.
To	 be	 sure,	 not	 every	 wrongful	 conviction	 is	 the	 result	
of	 unconstitutional	 misconduct.87	 In	 a	 number	 of	 sexual	 assault	
witness).
86	 Brandon	Garrett,	 Innocence, Harmless Error and Wrongful Conviction Law,	 2005	
Wis.	L.	Rev.	35,	38	(2005).
87 Innocence	 Project,	 Making	 Up	 for	 Lost	 Time:	 What	 the	
Wrongfully	 Convicted	 Endure	 and	 How	 to	 Provide	 Fair	
Compensation	 12	 (2009)	 (“In	 most	 cases,	 there	 is	 no	 intentional	
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cases,	for	example,	the	only	evidence	against	the	defendant	was	an	
erroneous	cross-racial	witness	identification	by	the	victim	and	flawed	
forensic	evaluation	of	hair	samples.	Without	evidence	that	the	error	
was	the	result	of	unconstitutionally	suggestive	police	identification	
procedures,	or	that	the	forensic	analysis	was	intentionally	fabricated	
or	mischaracterized	at	trial,	there	is	no	basis	for	a	federal	civil	rights	
claim.88	It	also	goes	without	saying	that	a	wrongful	conviction	may	
have	been	the	result	of	unconstitutional	acts	or	omissions,	but	as	
years	pass	evidence	is	lost	and	proving	it	may	become	increasingly	
challenging.
It	is	very	difficult,	and	perhaps	impossible,	to	know	whether	
those	 exonerees	 who	 did	 not	 file	 a	 compensation	 claim	 did	 not	
do	 so	 because	 a	 competent	 lawyer,	 reviewing	 the	 record,	 found	
no	 existing	 evidence	 of	 unconstitutional	 or	 tortious	 misconduct	
causing	the	conviction	and	thus	no	basis	to	bring	such	a	suit.89	The	
non-filing	may,	alternatively,	be	the	result	of	any	number	of	other	
reasons:	 lack	of	access	to	an	attorney,	an	erroneous	conclusion	by	
counsel	that	no	viable	claim	existed,	a	reluctance	of	the	exoneree	to	
litigate,	post-exoneration	criminal	activity	resulting	in	incarceration	
and	 attendant	 difficulties	 in	 bringing	 suit,90	 statute	 of	 limitations	
problems,	post-exoneration	death	and	a	disinclination	of	the	estate	
to	pursue	a	claim,	or	a	short	wrongful	incarceration	suggesting,	at	
best,	a	modest	recovery.
misconduct	that	caused	the	wrongful	conviction,	or	at	least,	none	that	can	be	
proven.”).
88	 Official	misconduct	was	not	found	to	be	a	contributing	factor	to	the	wrongful	
conviction	in	nearly	half	of	the	exonerations	listed	in	the	National	Registry.	See 
Exonerations in the United States Map,	Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-
United-States-Map.aspx	 (last	 updated	 Mar.	 22,	 2019).	 To	 see	 the	 number	
of	 state	 exonerees	whose	wrongful	 convictions	were	 due	 in	 part	 to	 official	
misconduct,	click	the	“non-federal”	toggle	and	then	the	“present”	button	next	
to	official	misconduct	on	the	right	side	of	the	page.
89	 In	contrast,	in	those	states	in	which	receipt	of	state	statutory	compensation	
requires	 the	 waiver	 of	 all	 other	 claims	 against	 any	 prospective	 defendant	
arising	from	the	wrongful	conviction,	the	reason	for	non-filing	is	obvious.
90	 While	the	popular	impression	of	an	exoneration	features	an	innocent	person	
leaving	prison	for	good,	there	are,	 in	 fact,	a	substantial	number	of	cases	 in	
which	 an	 exoneree	 remains	 incarcerated	 as	 a	 result	 of	 an	 unchallenged	
conviction	 on	 other	 crimes	 or,	 sadly,	 is	 imprisoned	 as	 a	 result	 of	 post-
exoneration	 crimes.	 Neither	 necessarily	 precludes	 a	 compensation	 claim	
arising	from	the	wrongful	conviction,	but	continued	incarceration	may	make	
finding	counsel	more	difficult	and	may	reduce	both	the	chances	of	prevailing	
and	the	monetary	value	of	the	case.
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Generally,	federal	Section	1983	civil	rights	claims	are	premised	
on	 the	 twin	notions	 that	certain	acts	or	omissions	of	government	
actors,	rising	to	the	 level	of	 the	violation	of	constitutional	norms,	
deprived	the	exonerated	plaintiff	of	a	 fair	criminal	trial,91	and	that	
this	 official	misconduct	was	 the	 cause	 of	 the	wrongful	 conviction	
and	 subsequent	 damages.92	 So	 understood,	 these	 types	 of	 claims	
spawn	 obvious	 potential	 defenses	 on	 the	 merits:	 that	 the	 record	
lacks	plausible	evidence	of	misconduct,	that	the	alleged	misconduct,	
if	it	occurred,	did	not	rise	to	the	level	of	a	due	process	violation	or	
that	it	was	not	the	factual	or	legal	cause	of	the	conviction	because	
other	facts,	evidence	or	witnesses,	untainted	by	misconduct,	explain	
why	the	conviction	occurred.93
Professor	Brandon	Garrett	has	 categorized	 several	 types	of	
constitutional	violations	that	have	been	claimed	to	cause	a	wrongful	
conviction.	In	practice,	however,	there	are	often	not	sharp	boundaries	
between	them.	How	they	are	articulated	in	court	decisions	depends	
on	how	lawyers	frame	them.	There	is	also	some	blur	in	how	they	are	
defended;	for	instance,	there	is	frequently	overlap	between	defenses	
on	the	merits	and	immunity	defenses.
First,	 wrongly	 convicted	 plaintiffs	 have	 claimed	 that	 the	
government’s	 violations	 of	 Brady v. Maryland,94	 which	 held	 that	
principles	of	due	process	require	that	favorable	and	material	evidence	
91	 Garrett,	supra	note	86,	at	54–55.
92	 Framing	the	issue	at	this	level	of	generality	ignores	the	complex	and	largely	
unresolved	 questions	 regarding	 the	 nature	 and	 definition	 of	 the	 required	
causal	 connection	between	 the	wrongful	 act	 or	 omission	 and	 the	wrongful	
conviction.	See	Teressa	Ravenell,	Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in 
§ 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims,	 81	Temp.	 L.	Rev.	 689	 (2008).	 Professor	
Ravenell’s	 article	 describes	 and	 anticipates	 part	 of	 the	 causation	 question	
later	 decided	 in	Drumgold v. Callahan,	 707	 F.2d	 28,	 48–54	 (1st	 Cir.	 2013).	
There,	the	First	Circuit	overturned	a	jury	award	in	a	Section	1983	claim	based	
on	 a	Brady	 violation.	 It	 held	 that	 the	 district	 judge	 erred	 in	 issuing	 a	 jury	
instruction	permitting	the	jury	to	find	liability	if	the	suppression	of	evidence	
was	a	“substantial	factor”	or	concurrent	cause	of	the	wrongful	conviction.	Id. 
at	53–54.	Instead,	the	Court	held	that	the	district	judge	should	have	given	the	
jury	a	“but	for”	factual	causation	instruction,	a	more	difficult	standard	for	the	
plaintiff	to	meet.
93	 Of	course,	other	defenses	are	made	in	many	of	these	cases.	A	fairly	common	
one	 is	 the	 statute	 of	 limitations.	 As	 a	 threshold	matter,	Heck v. Humphrey,	
512	U.S.	477	(1994)	requires	the	civil	rights	plaintiff	to	prove	that	his	or	her	
criminal	conviction	or	sentence	has	been	set	aside.	See also	Poventud	v.	City	of	
New	York,	750	F.3d	121	(2d	Cir.	2014).
94	 373	U.S.	83	(1963).
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known	to	prosecutors	or	police	be	furnished	to	criminal	defendants,95 
caused	their	wrongful	conviction.96	Generally,	to	prevail	on	a	Brady 
claim	in	this	context,	“a	plaintiff	must	show	that	(1)	the	evidence	
was	favorable	to	him;	(2)	the	officer	concealed	the	evidence97;	and	
(3)	the	concealment	prejudiced	him.”98 
Favorable	 evidence	 may	 be	 exculpatory,	 such	 as	 evidence	
suggesting	the	criminal	involvement	of	a	third	party,	or	impeachment	
evidence,	 such	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 unreliability	 of	 a	 prosecution	
witness.99	 Evidence	 is	 material	 when	 there	 is	 “any	 reasonable	
likelihood”	 it	 could	 have	 “affected	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 jury.”100 
The	plaintiff	does	not	need	to	show	it	is	more	likely	than	not	that	
they	could	have	been	acquitted	at	trial	had	the	suppressed	evidence	
been	disclosed.	Instead,	they	must	show	that	failure	to	disclose	the	
evidence	is	sufficient	to	“undermine	confidence”	in	the	verdict.101
As	 a	 matter	 of	 practice,	 Brady	 claims	 are	 often	 added	 to	
lawsuits	 challenging	 specific	 forms	 of	 police	misconduct,	 such	 as	
overly	 suggestive	witness	 identification	 techniques	or	 fabrications	
of	 inculpatory	 evidence.102	 The	 Brady	 claim	 is	 that	 these	 acts	
95 See	Strickler	v.	Greene,	527	U.S.	263,	280–81	(1999)	(quoting	Kyles	v.	Whitley,	
514	U.S.	419,	438	(1995)).
96	 Garrett,	supra	note	86,	at	70;	Drumgold,	707	F.3d	at	38.	The	Circuits	are	split	
on	whether	and	to	what	extent	there	is	a	Brady	right	to	exculpatory	evidence	
prior	to	a	guilty	plea.	Alvarez	v.	City	of	Brownsville,	904	F.3d	382,	392–93	(5th	
Cir.	2018)	(collecting	cases	from	the	circuits).
97	 Generally,	there	is	no	Brady	claim	for	suppression	of	evidence	if	the	evidence	
is	known	to	the	defendant.	See	Avery	v.	City	of	Milwaukee,	847	F.3d	at	443,	
443–44.
98	 Gill	v.	City	of	Milwaukee,	850	F.3d	335,	343	(7th	Cir.	2017)	(citation	omitted);	
see	Poventud,	750	F.3d	at	133;	see also	Mills	v.	Barnard,	869	F.3d	473,	485–86	
(6th	Cir.	2017).
99	 United	States	v.	Bagley,	473	U.S.	667,	676	(1985).
100	 Wearry	v.	Cain,	136	S.	Ct.	1002,	1006	(2016)	(internal	quotations	omitted)	
(quoting	Giglio	v.	United	States,	405	U.S.	150,	154	(1972)).
101	 Smith	v.	Cain,	565	U.S.	73,	75	(2012);	Owens	v.	Balt.	City	State’s	Att’ys	Office,	
767	F.3d	379,	397	(4th	Cir.	2014).
102 See	Gates	v.	District	of	Columbia,	66	F.	Supp.	3d	1,	23	(D.D.C.	2014)	(if	the	
police	fabricated	a	confession	to	a	snitch	and	failed	to	disclose	it	to	prosecutors,	
they	would	have	violated	Brady);	Avery,	847	F.3d	at	443	(police	violate	Brady 
when	they	withhold	the	coercive	techniques	employed	to	threaten	witnesses);	
see	Gregory	v.	City	of	Louisville,	444	F.3d	725,	744	(6th	Cir.	2006)	(separating	
claims	of	fabrication	from	Brady	claim	as	to	forensic	scientist);	see also Mills,	
869	F.3d	 at	473.	But see	 Saunders-El	 v.	Rohde,	778	F.3d	556,	562	 (7th	Cir.	
2015) (Brady	 does	 not	 require	 police	 to	 create	 exculpatory	 evidence	 by	
requiring	them	to	disclose	fabrication	of	evidence	to	the	prosecutor);	Ajamu	
v.	City	of	Cleveland,	2017	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	123362,	at	*12–13	(finding	Avery 
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of	 misconduct,	 known	 to	 the	 police,	 were	 not	 disclosed	 to	 the	
prosecutor.	 It	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 bring	 civil	 Brady	 claims	 against	
prosecutors	 because	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 in	 a	 line	 of	 cases	 since	
Imbler v. Pachtman,	 has	 held	 that	 absolute	 immunity	 shields	 them	
against	claims	challenging	conduct	“within	the	scope	of	his	duties	in	
initiating	and	pursuing	a	criminal	prosecution.”103
Absolute	 immunity	 does	 not	 apply	 when	 the	 prosecutor	
is	 sued	 for	 investigative	 or	 administrative	 acts.104	 However,	 that	
exception	 has	 been	 held	 inapplicable	 to	 claims	 that	 managing	
prosecutors	failed	to	train	and	supervise	prosecutors	on	their	Brady 
obligations	and	failed	to	establish	an	information	database	recording	
impeachment	material	on	jailhouse	informants.105
In	addition	to	proving	a	violation	of	Brady,	the	plaintiff	must	
demonstrate	by	a	preponderance	of	the	evidence	a	causal	connection	
between	it	and	the	conviction.	Common	law	tort	principles	generally	
inform	 the	 causation	 inquiry.106	 In	 this	 context,	 materiality	 and	
and	Saunders-El difficult	to	reconcile).
103	 Imbler	v.	Pachtman,	424	U.S.	409,	410	(1976).	See	Kalina	v.	Fletcher,	522	U.S.	
118	(1997)	(holding	prosecutor	absolutely	immune	from	claims	that	affidavit	
supporting	application	for	arrest	warrant	contained	false	statements);	Buckley	
v.	 Fitzsimmons,	 509	 U.S.	 259,	 277	 (1993)	 (holding	 prosecutor	 absolutely	
immune	from	claims	arising	from	statements	made	to	press);	Burns	v.	Reed,	
500	 U.S.	 478	 (1991)	 (holding	 prosecutor	 absolutely	 immune	 from	 claims	
arising	 from	 application	 for	 search	 warrant	 and	 presentation	 of	 evidence	
before	grand	jury).	See	Karen	McDonald	Henning,	The Failed Legacy of Absolute 
Immunity Under Imbler: Providing a Compromise Approach to Claims of Prosecutorial 
Misconduct,	 48	 Gonz.	 L.	 Rev.	 219	 (2012)	 (arguing	 for	 modification	 of	
doctrine);	Margaret	Z.	Johns,	Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity,	2005	
B.Y.U.	L.	Rev.	53	(2005)	(same).
104	 The	courts	are	split	on	whether	absolute	or	qualified	 immunity,	or	neither,	
may	apply	to	claims	that	the	prosecutor	knowingly	used	fabricated	evidence	
at	trial.	Buckley	v.	Fitzsimmons,	20	F.3d	789,	797	(7th	Cir.	1994);	Michaels	
v.	New	Jersey,	222	F.3d	118,	123	(3d	Cir.	2000)	(absolute	immunity	applies);	
Zahrey	 v	 Coffey,	 221	 F.3d	 342,	 354	 (2d	 Cir.	 2000)	 (qualified	 immunity	
applies);	Fields	v.	Wharrie,	740	F.3d	1107,	1114	(7th	Cir.	2014)	(holding	that	
a	prosecutor	did	not	have	absolute	or	qualified	immunity	where	he	fabricated	
evidence).
105	 Van	 de	 Kamp	 v.	 Goldstein,	 555	 U.S.	 335	 (2009);	 see	 Martin	 A.	 Schwartz,	
The Supreme Court’s Unfortunate Narrowing of the Section 1983 Remedy for Brady 
Violations,	37	The	Champion	58,	59–61	(May	2013).	In	Connick v. Thompson,	
563	U.S.	51	(2001),	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	a	municipality	may	be	liable	
for	 damages	under	 Section	1983	only	when	 it	 is	 deliberately	 indifferent	 to	
actual	or	constructive	knowledge	that	its	prosecutors	have	been	inadequately	
trained	on	their	Brady	obligations.
106	 Drumgold	v.	Callahan,	707	F.3d	28,	48	(1st	Cir.	2013).
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causation	 are	 closely	 connected.	 Materiality	 requires	 a	 showing	
of	 a	 reasonable	probability	 that	 the	plaintiff	would	not	have	been	
convicted	but	 for	 the	withholding	of	evidence.	Causation	requires	
the	plaintiff	to	make	the	same	“but	for”	showing	by	a	preponderance	
of	the	evidence,	a	heightened	burden	of	proof.107
Some	Circuits	apply	a	more	stringent	standard	for	plaintiffs	to	
meet	in	making	Brady-based	civil	rights	claims.	In	the	Fourth	Circuit,	
the	plaintiff	must	show,	among	other	factors,	that	the	officer’s	failure	
to	disclose	Brady	material	to	the	prosecutor	was	in	bad	faith.108	In	the	
Eighth	Circuit,	plaintiffs	must	show	that	 the	officer	both	knew	of	
the	exculpatory	value	of	the	evidence	and	suppressed	it	in	bad	faith	
with	the	intention	of	depriving	the	defendant	of	a	fair	trial.109	In	the	
Eleventh	Circuit,	plaintiffs	must	show	that	the	Brady	violation	was	
more	than	the	product	of	negligence.110
Noting	inter-Circuit	differences	in	 just	this	one	area	of	the	
law	underscores	a	broader,	and	obvious	reality.	While	it	is	impossible	
to	 quantify,	 differences	 in	 the	 legal	 standards,	 and	 how	 they	 are	
applied	from	district	to	district	and	circuit	to	circuit,	surely	have	an	
important	but	indeterminate	role	in	the	empirical	data.	The	state	of	
the	law	in	a	particular	district	or	circuit,	when	not	uniform	across	the	
country,	naturally	influences	whether	potential	civil	rights	plaintiffs	
bring	particular	claims,	which	they	bring,	and	how	successful	they	
are.
Whether	a	plaintiff’s	Brady	 claim	can	 survive	a	motion	 for	
summary	 judgment	 depends	 largely	 on	 the	 facts.	 The	 standards	
articulated	above	suggest	reasons	why	a	plaintiff	may	fail	to	prevail	
on	 such	 claims.	 The	 court	 may	 conclude,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	
suppressed	 evidence	 was	 immaterial,111	 that	 it	 was	 cumulative	 of	
107 Id.	 at	 48–54	 (reversing	 verdict	 based	 on	 jury	 instruction	 that	 erroneously	
incorporated	notions	of	both	but	for	and	concurrent	causation).
108	 Owens	v.	Balt.	City	State’s	Attys.	Office,	767	F.3d	379,	396–97	(4th	Cir.	2014)	
(reversing	dismissal	of	such	claims).
109	 Briscoe	v.	Cty.	of	St.	Louis,	690	F.3d	1004,	1013	 (8th	Cir.	 2012)	 (granting	
motion	for	summary	judgment	on	Brady claim);	Villasana	v.	Wilhoit,	368	F.3d	
976,	979–81	(8th	Cir.	2004)	(same).
110	 Porter	v.	White,	483	F.3d	1294,	1305–08	(11th	Cir.	2007).	The	Ninth	Circuit	
requires	 the	officer	 to	have	 failed	 to	disclose	Brady	material	 to	prosecutors	
with	deliberate	 indifference	or	 reckless	disregard	of	 the	defendant’s	 rights.	
Tennison	v.	City	&	Cty.	of	San	Francisco,	570	F.3d	1078,	1089	(9th	Cir.	2009)	
(finding	standard	satisfied).
111 See	Lefever	v.	Ferguson,	645	F.	App’x.	438,	443–44	(6th	Cir.	2016)	(holding	
forensic	scientist’s	lie	about	graduation	date,	combined	with	other	matters,	
was	not	material	as	nondisclosure	did	not	undermine	confidence	in	the	trial).
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known	evidence,112	that	its	nature	did	not	permit	a	reasonable	jury	
to	draw	a	causal	 connection	 to	 the	wrongful	 conviction,113	or	 that	
it	 failed	to	meet	the	enhanced	standards	in	the	Fourth,	Eighth,	or	
Eleventh	Circuits.114
Unlike	prosecutors,	police	officers	are	subject	to	civil	Brady 
claims,115	but	such	a	claim	may	fail	on	qualified	immunity	grounds.	
The	doctrine	of	qualified	 immunity	was	 crafted	 to	 “balance[]	 two	
important	 interests-the	need	 to	hold	public	 officials	 accountable	
when	 they	 exercise	 power	 irresponsibly	 and	 the	 need	 to	 shield	
officials	 from	 harassment,	 distraction,	 and	 liability	 when	 they	
perform	 their	 duties	 reasonably.”116	 Qualified	 immunity	 shields	
the	government	actor	 from	liability	when	their	conduct	“does	not	
violate	clearly	established	statutory	or	constitutional	rights	of	which	
a	reasonable	person	would	have	known.”117	Overcoming	a	qualified	
immunity	defense	is,	therefore,	a	tall	order;	as	the	Supreme	Court	
has	said,	immunity	protects	“all	but	the	plainly	incompetent	or	those	
who	knowingly	violate	the	law.”118
Determining	the	applicability	of	qualified	immunity	involves	
a	 two-part	 analysis.	 Officials	 are	 entitled	 to	 qualified	 immunity	
unless	they	violated	a	federal	statutory	or	constitutional	right	and	the	
unlawfulness	of	their	conduct	was	“clearly	established	at	the	time.”119 
“Clearly	established”	means	that,	at	the	time	that	the	government	
112	 Hernandez	v.	Terrones,	397	F.	App’x.	954,	970–74	(5th	Cir.	2010);	Lefever,	645	
F.	App’x.	438.
113	 Johnson	v.	Mahoney,	424	F.3d	83,	91	(1st	Cir.	2005).
114 See Porter,	483	F.3d	at	1305.
115 See	 Strickler	 v.	 Greene,	 527	 U.S.	 263,	 at	 280–81	 (1999);	 Whitlock	 v.	
Brueggemann,	682	F.3d	567,	587–88	(7th	Cir.	2012);	Johnson	v.	Dossey,	515	
F.3d	778,	781	(7th	Cir.	2008);	Steidl	v.	Fermon,	494	F.3d	623,	627–32	(7th	
Cir.	 2007);	Porter	 v.	White,	 483	F.3d	1294,	1304	 (11th	Cir.	 2007);	Gibson	
v.	Superintendent	of	N.J.	Dep’t	of	Law	&	Pub.	Safety,	411	F.3d	427,	442–43	
(3d	Cir.	2005)	(“Several	courts	have	recognized	that	police	officers	and	other	
state	 actors	may	 be	 liable	 under	 §	 1983	 for	 failure	 to	 disclose	 exculpatory	
material	to	the	prosecutor.”),	cert. denied,	547	U.S.	1035	(2006);	Villasana	v.	
Wilhoit,	368	F.3d	976,	978	(8th	Cir.	2004),	cert. denied,	543	U.S.	1183	(2005);	
Newsome	v.	McCabe,	256	F.3d	747,	752	(7th	Cir.	2001);	Schwartz,	supra note	
105,	at	61.
116	 Pearson	v.	Callahan,	555	U.S.	223,	231	(2009).
117	 White	v.	Pauly,	137	S.	Ct.	548,	551	(2017)	(per	curiam)	(quoting	Mullenix	v.	
Luna,	136	S.	Ct.	305,	308	(2015)).
118 Mullenix,	 136	 S.	 Ct.	 at	 308	 (quoting	 Malley	 v.	 Briggs,	 475	 U.S.	 335,	 341	
(1986)).
119	 District	of	Columbia	v.	Wesby,	138	S.	Ct.	577,	589–90	(2018)	(quoting	Reichle	
v.	Howards,	566	U.S.	658,	664	(2012)).
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official	acted,	or	chose	not	to	act,	the	law	was	“‘sufficiently	clear’	that	
every	‘reasonable	official	would	understand	that	what	he	is	doing’”	
is	unlawful.120	The	law	at	issue	must,	therefore,	be	clear	enough	to	
be	defined	at	a	high	degree	of	specificity	and	that	it	admits	to	only	
one	reasonable	interpretation	within	the	circumstances	faced	by	the	
official.
Thus,	in	the	context	of	Brady,	the	qualified	immunity	question	
turns	on	whether	the	protection	was	violated,	an	issue	that	may	well	
have	been	resolved	during	post-conviction	proceedings,	and	whether	
the	obligation	to	disclose	the	evidence	was	“clearly	established”	at	
the	 time.	 Naturally,	 that	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 particular	 nature	 of	
the	alleged	suppression	of	evidence	and	when	it	occurred.	Varying	
factual	scenarios	have	led	to	different	results.121
Second,	plaintiffs	have	alleged	that	their	due	process	rights	
to	a	fair	trial	were	violated	when	the	police	used	unduly	suggestive	
witness	identification	techniques	that	resulted	in	witnesses	wrongly	
identifying	the	plaintiff	as	the	perpetrator	of	a	crime.122	The	Supreme	
Court	 has	 held	 that	 due	 process	 concerns	 may	 be	 implicated	
when	particular	 identification	procedures	 are	 both	 suggestive	 and	
unnecessary.123	Even	when	that	threshold	is	met,	however,	automatic	
exclusion	does	not	follow.	
Instead,	 courts	 will	 assess	 whether	 improper	 procedures	
created	a	“substantial	likelihood	of	misidentification.”124	Where	the	
120	 Ashcroft	v.	Al-Kidd,	563	U.S.	731,	741	(2012)	(quoting	Anderson	v.	Creighton,	
483	U.S.	635,	640	(1987)).
121	 Mellen	v.	Winn,	900	F.3d	1085	(9th	Cir.	2018)	(reversing	dismissal	of	Brady 
claims);	Drumgold	v.	Callahan,	707	F.3d	28,	43–45	(1st	Cir.	2013)	(rejecting	
defense);	compare	Haley	v.	City	of	Boston,	657	F.3d	39,	46–49	(1st	Cir.	2011)	
(accepting	defense	in	part	because	in	1972	it	was	not	clearly	established	that	
Brady	applied	to	officers)	with	Owens	v.	Balt.	City	State’s	Attorney’s	Office,	
767	F.3d	379,	399–401	(4th	Cir.	2014)	(rejecting	defense);	Carrillo	v.	Cty.	of	
L.A.,	798	F.3d	1210	(9th	Cir.	2015)	(affirming	rejection	of	qualified	immunity	
defense);	Tennison	v.	City	&	Cty.	of	San	Francisco,	570	F.3d	1078,	1093–95	
(9th	Cir.	2009)	(same).
122	 Garrett,	supra	note	86,	at	78–87.	To	some	degree,	this	claim	may	overlap	with	
Brady.	The	plaintiff	may	allege	that	the	police	failed	to	disclose	to	prosecutors	
that	 they	 employed	 suggestive	 techniques.	 Cf. Carrillo,	 798	 F.3d	 at	 1228	
(denying	qualified	immunity).
123	 Perry	v.	New	Hampshire,	565	U.S.	228,	238–39	(2012)	(citing	Neil	v.	Biggers,	
409	U.S.	188,	198	(1972)	and	Manson	v.	Brathwaite,	432	U.S.	98,	107	(1977)).
124 Biggers,	409	U.S.	at	201.	In	Good v. Curtis,	601	F.3d	393,	399	(5th	Cir.	2010),	
cert denied,	 562	 U.S.	 840	 (2010),	 however,	 the	 Fifth	 Circuit	 held	 that	 the	
“substantial	 likelihood	 of	 misidentification”	 prong	 is	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	
analysis	because	the	wrongly	convicted	are,	by	their	nature,	misidentified.
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“indicators	of	[a	witness’]	ability	to	make	an	accurate	identification”	
are	 “outweighed	 by	 the	 corrupting	 effect”	 of	 law	 enforcement	
suggestion,	 the	 identification	 should	 be	 suppressed.125	 Thus,	
courts	 will	 determine,	 based	 on	 a	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances,	
whether	a	suggestive	and	unnecessary	identification	procedure	was	
nevertheless	reliable,126	or,	 instead,	made	the	trial	unfair.127	Again,	
whether	the	plaintiff	bringing	such	a	claim	can	surmount	a	motion	
for	 summary	 judgment	will	 depend	 on	 how	 the	 court	 frames	 the	
question	and	the	evidence	developed	through	discovery.128
Third,	 plaintiffs	 have	 alleged	 that	 their	 due	 process	 rights	
were	violated	when	police	coerced	their	confessions.	Of	the	2,308	
state	 wrongful	 conviction	 cases	 in	 the	 Registry	 of	 Exonerations	
recorded	as	of	 the	spring	of	2019,	292	 involved	 false	confessions.	
Exoneration	makes	clear	 that	 the	 confession	was	 false,	but	a	 civil	
rights	 plaintiff	 must	 show	 that	 the	 confession	 was	 a	 result	 of	
unconstitutional	 coercion.129	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 held	 that	
principles	 of	 due	 process	 and	 the	 Fifth	 Amendment	 privilege130 
against	self-incrimination	require	a	confession	to	be	voluntary	before	
it	 may	 be	 admitted	 into	 evidence.131	 The	 Court’s	 focus	 has	 been	
on	due	process	and	 it	has	held	 that	 the	question	of	voluntariness	
depends	on	“whether	a	defendant’s	will	was	overborne,”	requiring	
an	evaluation	of	the	totality	of	circumstances,	 including	“both	the	
characteristics	of	the	accused	and	the	details	of	the	interrogation.”132
125 Perry,	565	U.S.	at	229	(quoting	Braithwaite,	432	U.S.	at	114).
126	 Lee	v.	Foster,	750	F.3d	687,	691	(7th	Cir.	2014).	Whether	the	identification	
was	potentially	reliable	in	the	criminal	context	should	have	no	bearing	in	a	
civil	rights	case	based	on	the	innocence	of	the	plaintiff.	Innocence	should	take	
reliability	out	of	the	civil	liability	equation.	Garrett,	supra	note	86,	at	88.
127	 Alexander	v.	City	of	South	Bend,	433	F.3d	550,	555	(7th	Cir.	2006).
128 Id.	at	552	(granting	summary	judgment);	Hicks	v.	City	of	New	York,	232	F.	
Supp.	3d	480,	494	(S.D.N.Y.	2017)	(granting	motion	to	dismiss),	aff ’d in part, 
vacated in part,	719	F.	App’x	61	(2d	Cir.	2018)	(affirming	the	dismissal	on	the	
basis	of	Brady	but	vacating	the	dismissal	of	defendant’s	malicious	prosecution	
claims).	Hicks	v.	Marchman,	719	F.	App’x.	61	(2d	Cir.	2018)	(granting	motion	
to	dismiss);	Hampton	v.	City	of	Chicago,	No.	12-cv-5150,	2017	WL	2985743	
at	*23–24	(N.D.	Ill.	July	13,	2017).
129	 Garrett,	supra	note	86,	at	90.
130	 Tinney	 v.	Richland	Cty.,	 678	F.	App’x.	 362,	 365	 (6th	Cir.	 2017)	 (affirming	
dismissal	 of	 self-incrimination	 claim	 on	 qualified	 immunity	 grounds	when	
it	was	unclear	whether	a	violation	of	the	right	against	self-incrimination	can	
occur	without	a	trial).
131	 Dickerson	v.	United	States,	530	U.S.	428,	433	(2000).
132 Id.	at	433–34	(quoting	Schenkcloth	v.	Bustamonte,	412	U.S.	218,	226	(1973));	
see	Halsey	v.	Pfeiffer,	750	F.3d	273,	304	(3d	Cir.	2014).
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This	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances	 test	 is	 an	uncertain	 one	
because	 “the	 line	 between	 proper	 and	 permissible	 police	 conduct	
and	techniques	and	methods	offensive	to	due	process	is,	at	best,	a	
difficult	one	to	draw,	particularly	.	.	.	where	it	is	necessary	to	make	
fine	judgments	as	to	the	effect	of	psychologically	coercive	pressures	
and	 inducements	 on	 the	 mind	 and	 will	 of	 an	 accused.”133	 Not	
surprisingly,	then,	the	success	of	such	a	claim	depends	largely	on	the	
facts.134
Fourth,	plaintiffs	have	argued	that,	in	violation	of	principles	
of	 due	 process,	 prosecutors,135	 police	 or,	 less	 commonly,	 forensic	
scientists	 testifying	 for	 the	state,	 fabricated	evidence	which	 led	to	
their	 wrongful	 conviction.	 The	 language	 describing	 the	 required	
causal	connection	between	the	fabrication	and	the	conviction	is	not	
entirely	consistent,	but	is	reasonably	forgiving.136
Uncovering	evidence	of	 fabrication,	often	decades	after	 the	
misconduct,	is	challenging.	But,	when	it	is	found,	fabrication	can	form	
the	basis	of	a	powerful	claim	and	render	qualified	immunity	defenses	
difficult.	 Fabrication	 violates	 clearly	 established	 constitutional	
rights:	“[w]e	emphatically	reject	the	notion	that	due	process	of	law	
permits	the	police	to	frame	suspects.”137	The	unconstitutionality	of	
fabrication	is	typically	found	to	have	been	well-established	prior	to	
133 Halsey,	750	F.3d	at	304	(quoting	Haynes	v.	Washington,	373	U.S.	503,	515	
(1963)).
134 Id. at	306–09	(reversing	summary	judgment	for	defendants);	Livers	v.	Schenck,	
700	F.3d	340,	352–54	(8th	Cir.	2012)	(affirming	denial	of	qualified	immunity);	
Tinney,	678	F.	App’x.	at	367	(affirming	judgment	against	plaintiff	alleging	that	
police	knowledge	of	his	mental	illness	when	obtaining	a	confession	shocked	
the	conscience).	The	Seventh	Circuit	has	held	that	coercive	interrogation	of	
witnesses	or	 inducing	 them	to	 lie	 is	not	a	violation	of	 the	defendant’s	due	
process	rights	because	their	 testimony	may	be	true;	 the	violation,	 if	any,	 is	
one	 resting	on	Brady-the	 failure	 to	disclose	 the	 tactics	used	 to	obtain	 the	
testimony.	See	Avery	v.	City	of	Milwaukee,	847	F.3d	433,	439	(7th	Cir.	2017).
135	 In	Fields v. Wharrie,	740	F.3d	1107	(7th	Cir.	2014),	the	Seventh	Circuit	affirmed	
the	denial	 of	 absolute	 immunity	 to	 a	prosecutor	 alleged	 to	have	 fabricated	
evidence	as	an	investigator	prior	to	indictment.
136 Halsey,	750	F.3d	at	294	n.19	(“reasonably	likely”);	Mills	v.	Barnard,	869	F.3d	
473,	 484	 (6th	 Cir.	 2017)	 (“a	 reasonable	 likelihood	 that	 the	 false	 evidence	
could	have	affected	the	judgment	of	the	jury”)	(citation	omitted);	Avery,	847	
F.3d	 at	 439	 (convictions	 “premised”	 on	 fabricated	 evidence	 always	 violate	
Due	Process).	In	Massey v. Ojanlit,	759	F.3d	343,	354–56	(4th	Cir.	2014),	the	
Fourth	Circuit	employed	a	“but	for”	standard	of	causation	and,	affirming	the	
dismissal	by	the	trial	court,	held	that	it	was	not	met.
137 Halsey,	750	F.3d	at	293;	see	Whitlock	v.	Brueggerman,	682	F.3d	567,	580–87	
(7th	Cir.	2012)	(denying	qualified	immunity	defense).
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the	fabrication	at	issue	in	these	cases.138
It	 is	 appropriate	 at	 this	 point	 to	make	 another	 simple	 but	
important	 observation.	 Civil	 rights	 law	 in	 the	 area	 of	 wrongful	
conviction	changes	over	time;	claims	that	were	not	viable	in	1990	
may	be	more	viable	today,	or	vice	versa.	For	example,	a	number	of	
cases	were	dismissed	in	the	Seventh	Circuit	when	courts	held	that	
police	fabrication	of	evidence	does	not	violate	a	defendant’s	federal	
civil	rights,	but	that	is	no	longer	the	law	of	the	circuit.139	In	contrast,	
Connick v. Thompson	made	future	Monell	claims	much	more	difficult	in	
the	Brady	context.140	Just	as	the	law	is	not	the	same	from	circuit	to	
circuit,	it	changes	over	time	and	necessarily	influences	which	cases	
are	brought	and	which	are	successful.
Fifth,	plaintiffs	have	brought	what	are	traditionally	tort	claims	
for	malicious	prosecution	as	Section	1983	claims	arising	under	the	
Fourth	Amendment.	Generally,	the	elements	of	such	a	claim	are	(1)	
“that	a	criminal	prosecution	was	initiated	against	the	plaintiff	and	
that	 the	 defendant	 ‘ma[d]e,	 influence[d],	 or	 participate[d]	 in	 the	
decision	to	prosecute’”,	(2)	“that	there	was	a	lack	of	probable	cause	
for	the	criminal	prosecution”,	(3)	“that,	‘as	a	consequence	of	a	legal	
proceeding,’	the	plaintiff	suffered	a	‘deprivation	of	liberty’	.	.	.	apart	
from	the	initial	seizure”,	and	(4)	that	“the	criminal	proceeding	must	
have	 been	 resolved	 in	 the	 plaintiff’s	 favor.”141	On	 the	merits,	 the	
difficulty	in	some	of	these	cases	is	in	satisfying	the	lack	of	probable	
cause	prong.142
Last,	in	addition	to	suing	individuals,	wrongfully	convicted	
138 Mills,	869	F.3d	at	486–87.	The	Seventh	Circuit	has	held,	 for	example,	 that,	
since	1988,	it	has	been	well-established	in	that	Circuit	that	police	fabrication	
of	 evidence	which	 is	 later	 used	 to	 convict	 a	 defendant	 is	 unconstitutional.	
Whitlock,	682	F.3d	at	580.
139 See	Saunders-El	v.	Rohde,	778	F.3d	556,	560	(7th	Cir.	2015).
140	 Connick	v.	Thompson,	563	U.S.	51	(2011).
141 Mills,	869	F.3d	at	479–80	(quoting	Sykes	v.	Anderson,	625	F.3d	294	(6th	Cir.	
2010))	(reversing	dismissal	of	such	claims);	cf.	Black	v.	Montgomery	Cty.,	835	
F.3d	358,	364	(3d	Cir.	2016)	(adding	requirement	that	the	“defendant	acted	
maliciously	 for	 a	 purpose	 other	 than	 bringing	 the	 plaintiff	 to	 justice”);	 see 
Montoya	v.	Vigil,	898	F.3d	1056,	1066–68	(10th	Cir.	2018)	(holding	that	the	
termination	of	criminal	proceedings	in	plaintiff’s	favor	was	not	satisfied	when	
vacatur	of	conviction	was	the	result	of	compromise	unrelated	to	innocence).
142 See	Tinney	v.	Richland	Cty.,	678	F.	App’x.	362	(6th	Cir.	2017)	(noting	that	
an	indictment	satisfies	probable	cause,	court	affirms	summary	judgment	on	
grounds	that	officers	had	absolute	immunity	from	claims	of	false	testimony	
at	grand	jury);	Massey	v.	Ojanlit,	759	F.3d	343,	357	(grand	jury	had	probable	
cause	to	indict	notwithstanding	officer’s	false	statements).
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civil	 rights	 plaintiffs	 frequently	 sue	 municipalities	 or	 other	 local	
governments.	Typically	called	“Monell”	claims	after	Monell v. New York 
City Dept. of Social Services,143	these	claims	are	not	subject	to	qualified	
or	 absolute	 immunity	 defenses.144	 However,	 local	 governments	
are	not	vicariously	liable	for	the	misconduct	of	their	employees.145 
Instead,	 the	municipality	 itself	must	 cause	 the	 deprivation	 of	 the	
plaintiff’s	constitutional	rights.146
To	show	that,	the	plaintiff	must	identify	an	action	or	custom	
rising	 to	 the	 level	 of	 official	municipal	 policy	 that	 caused	 or	was	
the	“moving	force”147	behind	their	injury.148	The	Supreme	Court	has	
held	 that	 an	 official	municipal	 policy	 “includes	 the	 decisions	 of	 a	
government’s	lawmakers,	the	acts	of	its	policymaking	officials,	and	
practices	 so	 persistent	 and	 widespread	 as	 to	 practically	 have	 the	
force	of	law.”149	Moreover,	the	plaintiff	“must	show	that	the	policy	
was	 implemented	 with	 ‘deliberate	 indifference’	 to	 the	 ‘known	
or	 obvious	 consequences’	 that	 constitutional	 violations	 would	
result.”150 
These	alleged	policies	or	customs	can,	in	effect,	be	affirmative	
or	negative151	in	nature.	For	example,	in	the	Brady	context,	plaintiffs	
may	contend	that	the	prosecutor’s	office	had	a	policy	or	custom	of	
failing	 to	disclose	Brady	material,	 that	 the	office	had	 a	practice	of	
failing	to	train	employees	on	their	Brady	obligations	or	that	it	failed	
to	 supervise	 them	 in	 efforts	 to	 comply	with	 them.152	 In	 any	 case,	
143	 Monell	v.	N.Y.C.	Dep’t	of	Soc.	Servs.,	436	U.S.	658	(1978).
144	 Owen	v.	City	of	Independence,	445	U.S.	622,	657,	(1980).
145 Connick,	563	U.S.	at	60	(1991)	(citing	Monell,	436	U.S.	at	691).
146 Monell,	436	U.S.	at	692.
147	 City	of	Canton	v.	Harris,	489	U.S.	378,	388–89	(1989).
148 Monell,	436	U.S.	at	691.
149	 Connick	 v.	 Thompson,	 563	 U.S.	 51,	 60–61.	 Sometimes,	 this	 requires	 a	
determination	 of	whether	 the	 government	 actor	 is	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
municipality	or	the	state,	a	decision	that	is	based	on	state	law.	McMillian	v.	
Monroe	County,	520	U.S.	781,	797	(1997).	If	the	actor	is	making	policy	for	the	
state,	rather	than	for	a	municipality,	the	actor	is	not	susceptible	to	suit	under	
Section	1983.
150	 Alvarez	v.	City	of	Brownsville,	904	F.3d	382,	390	(5th	Cir.	2018)	(en	banc)	
(finding	no	deliberate	indifference);	see also	Bd.	of	Cty.	Comm’rs	v.	Brown,	520	
U.S.	397,	407	(1997).
151	 Lisker	v.	City	of	Los	Angeles,	No.	CV09-09374,	2013	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	48184	
(C.D.	Cal.	 2013),	aff ’d	 780	F.3d	1237	 (9th	Cir.	 2015)	 (denying	motion	 for	
summary	 judgment	on	Monell	 claims	 that	 LAPD	had	 a	 policy	 of	 failing	 to	
respond	to	citizen	police	complaints	and	disciplining	police,	thereby	enabling	
officers	to	fabricate	evidence	against	the	plaintiff).
152 See, e.g.,	 Bryson	 v.	 City	 of	 Oklahoma	 City,	 627	 F.3d	 784	 (10th	 Cir.	 2010)	
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these	claims	are	often	very	difficult	to	win.	The	plaintiff	must	show	
not	 only	 that	 unconstitutional	 misconduct	 caused	 their	 wrongful	
conviction,	but	that	the	misconduct	was	part	of	a	broader	custom	
or	policy	which,	presumably,	resulted	in	other	wrongful	convictions	
as	well.
Some	 Monell	 claims	 rest	 not	 on	 affirmative	 and	 unconsti-
tutional	 policies,	 but	 on	 the	 municipalities’	 failure	 to	 train	 or	
supervise	officers	on	proper	ones.	The	Court	has,	however,	described	
as	“tenuous”	claims	that	a	failure	to	train	amounts	to	an	official	policy	
or	custom.153	To	make	that	showing,	the	plaintiff	must	demonstrate	
that	municipal	decision	makers	either	knew	or	should	have	known	
that	training	was	inadequate	but	were	“deliberately	indifferent”	to	
the	effect	 that	 inadequacy	might	have	on	the	constitutional	rights	
of	 citizens.154	Deliberate	 indifference	 can	generally	 only	be	 shown	
when	 the	 government	 policymaker	 is	 aware	 or	 should	 be	 aware	
of	 a	pattern	of	 similar	 violations	 caused	by	 the	 failure	 to	 train	or	
supervise.155	 If	 the	plaintiff	can	surmount	 that	 formidable	burden,	
he	or	she	must,	of	course,	also	prove	that	the	wrongful	conviction	
would	not	have	occurred	had	the	municipality	properly	 trained	or	
supervised	its	employees.	
III. What Is The Data and What Does It Tell Us?
Having	 explained	our	 research	methodology	 and	 the	bases	
upon	which	claimants	or	plaintiffs	may	not	win	wrongful	conviction	
compensation	 claims,	we	have	 a	 context	 for	 better	understanding	
(affirming	summary	judgment	for	municipality	on	claim	that	it	failed	to	train	
forensic	scientist);	Alexander	v.	City	of	South	Bend,	433	F.3d	550,	557	(7th	
Cir.	 2006)	 (granting	 defendant’s	motion	 for	 summary	 judgment	 on	Monell 
claim	regarding	policy	of	suggestive	identifications);	Reasonover	v.	St.	Louis,	
447	F.3d	569,	584	(8th	Cir.	2006)	(granting	defendants’	motion	for	summary	
judgment	on	Monell	claim	alleging	failure	to	train	on	Brady	obligations);	Bailey	
v.	City	of	New	York,	79	F.	Supp.	3d	424,	443,	454	(E.D.N.Y.	2015)	(denying	
motion	for	summary	judgment	on	Monell	claim	involving	failure	to	train	on	
Brady	obligations).
153 Thompson,	563	U.S.	at	61.
154	 City	 of	 Canton	 v.	Harris,	 489	U.S.	 378,	 390	 (1989).	See also Bd. of the Cty. 
Comm’rs,	520	U.S.	at	410	(“’deliberate	indifference’	is	a	stringent	standard	of	
fault,	requiring	proof	that	a	municipal	actor	disregarded	a	known	or	obvious	
consequence	of	his	action.”)
155 Compare Thompson,	 563	U.S.	 at	 61,	 63	 (rejecting	 a	 single	Brady	 violation	 as	
establishing	 deliberate	 indifference)	 with City of Canton,	 489	 U.S.	 at	 391	
(hypothesizing	 a	 scenario	 in	 which	 deliberate	 indifference	 can	 be	 inferred	
after	a	single	incident).
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the	 data.	 Any	 exoneree,	 whether	 incarcerated	 or	 not,	 can	 file	 a	
federal	 civil	 rights	or	 state	 tort	 claim.	Of	 the	2,000	potential	 civil	
compensation	filers	in	the	database,	1,802	were	incarcerated	and	198	
were	not	imprisoned.156	All	are	reflected	in	the	first	two	data	columns	
in	Tables	1	and	2.	In	contrast,	only	those	wrongly	convicted	in	states	
with	compensation	statutes	and	subsequently	incarcerated	may	file	
for	 state	 statutory	 compensation.	 The	 third	 and	 fourth	 columns	
in	Tables	1	and	2	reflect	that,	of	the	1,802	incarcerated	exonerees,	
1,572	were	convicted	in	states	that	now	have	compensation	statutes	
(except	 Kansas)	 and	 230	 were	 convicted	 in	 states	 without	 them	
(including	Kansas).
Table	1	lists	the	numbers	and	percentages	of	total	exonerees,	
total	incarcerated	exonerees,	and	incarcerated	exonerees	convicted	in	
states	with	and	without	compensation	statutes	by	race	and	gender.157 
156	 The	wrongfully	convicted	who	are	not	sentenced	to	prison	are	a	somewhat	
surprising	 percentage	 of	 those	 on	 the	 Registry.	 Cf.	 Samuel	 R.	 Gross,	
Contributions: Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudications,	98	B.U.	L.	Rev. 999 (2018) 
(discussing	 exonerations	 of	 those	 convicted	 of	misdemeanors).	 Because	 of	
its	size	and	the	possibility	that	readers	might	be	less	concerned	about	them,	
compared	 to	 those	wrongly	 imprisoned,	we	 have	 tried	 in	 several	 tables	 to	
separate	this	subgroup	out	from	the	full	cohort	of	2000.
157	 The	percentages	have	remained	quite	constant	according	to	the	most	recent	
data	from	the	National	Registry.	Exonerations in the United States Map,	supra	note	
88.
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Table 1 (Exonerees by Race and Gender)
Bio 
Factors
Total 
Exonerees
Incarcerated 
Exonerees
Incarcerated 
Exonerees 
in States 
with Com-
pensation 
Statutes
Incarcerated 
Exonerees 
in States 
without 
Compensa-
tion Statues
Race Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
Asian 16 0.80 13 0.72 11 0.70 2 0.87
Black 952 47.60 893 49.56 805 51.21 88 38.26
Caucasian 771 38.55 678 37.62 561 35.69 117 50.87
Hispanic 240 12.00 200 11.10 182 11.58 18 7.83
Native	
American
12 0.60 10 0.55 6 0.38 4 1.74
Other 9 0.45 8 0.44 7 0.45 1 0.43
Total 2000 100 1802 100 1572 100 230 100
Gender Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
Female 186 9.30 134 7.44 116 7.38 18 7.83
Male 1814 90.70 1668 92.56 1456 92.62 212 92.17
Total 2000 100 1802 100 1572 100 230 100
 
	 The	overwhelming	majority	of	exonerees	in	our	database	are	
male,	 and	African-Americans	make	 up	 the	 largest	 racial	 group	 of	
exonerees.	In	contrast,	among	the	population	of	exonerees	convicted	
in	states	without	compensation	statutes,	there	are	more	whites	than	
blacks.158	The	absence	of	compensation	statutes	in	seventeen	states	
thus	affects	more	whites	than	blacks.
Table	2	sets	forth	the	numbers	and	percentages	of	exonerees	
and	 incarcerated	exonerees	by	 the	“Tags,”	“Contributing	Factors,”	
“Worst	Crimes,”	and	“Geo	Factors”	described	above.
158	 The	Registry	has	studied	race	in	wrongful	convictions.	See	Gross	et	al.,	supra 
note	26.
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Table 2 (Exonerees by Other Characteristics)
Total 
Exonerees
Incarcerated 
Exonerees
Incarcerated 
Exonerees 
in States 
with Com-
pensation 
Statutes
Incarcerated 
Exonerees 
in States 
without 
Compensa-
tion Statues
Tags Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
CIU 240 12 160 8.88 158 10.05 2 0.87
No	CIU 1760 88 1642 91.12 1414 89.95 228 99.13
GP 424 21.2 307 17.04 290 18.45 17 7.39
No	GP 1576 78.8 1495 82.96 1282 81.55 213 92.61
IOA 400 20 395 21.92 345 21.95 50 21.74
No	IOA 1600 80 1407 78.08 1227 78.05 180 78.26
DNA	Ex. 346 17.3 345 19.15 303 19.27 42 18.26
No	DNA	
Ex.
1654 82.7 1457 80.85 1269 80.73 188 81.74
DP 117 5.85 117 6.49 96 6.11 21 9.13
No	DP 1883 94.15 1685 93.51 1476 93.89 209 90.87
Contrib-
uting 
Factors
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
FC 248 12.4 239 13.26 211 13.42 28 12.17
No	FC 1752 87.6 1563 86.74 1361 86.58 202 87.83
MWID 611 30.55 596 33.07 527 33.52 69 30
No	MWID 1389 69.45 1206 66.93 1045 66.48 161 70
F/MF 493 24.65 445 24.69 386 24.55 59 25.65
No	F/MF 1507 75.35 1357 75.31 1186 75.45 171 74.35
P/FA 1109 55.45 1040 57.71 898 57.12 142 61.74
No	P/FA 891 44.55 762 42.29 674 42.88 88 38.26
OM 931 46.55 872 48.39 773 49.17 99 43.04
No	OM 1069 53.45 930 51.61 799 50.83 131 56.96
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Worst 
Crime Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
Murder 799 39.95 795 44.12 674 42.88 121 52.61
Sexual	
Assault
301 15.05 291 16.15 255 16.22 36 15.65
Drugs 218 10.9 130 7.21 123 7.82 7 3.04
Child	Sexu-
al	Assault
240 12 228 12.65 201 12.79 27 11.74
Robbery 105 5.25 104 5.77 93 5.92 11 4.78
Other 337 16.85 254 14.1 226 14.38 28 12.17
Geo 
Factors Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%)
South 744 37.2 638 35.41 582 37.02 56 24.35
West 330 16.5 296 16.43 239 15.2 57 24.78
Northeast 413 20.65 386 21.42 322 20.48 64 27.83
Midwest 506 25.3 475 26.36 429 27.29 46 20
Red	State	
(2016) 1071 53.55 941 52.22 752 47.84 189 82.17
Blue	State	
(2016) 922 46.1 854 47.39 820 52.16 34 14.78
Chart Abbreviations
Definition
CIU Conviction	Integrity	Unit
GP Guilty	Plea
IO Innocence	Organization	Aid
Ex. Exoneration
DP Death	Penalty
FC False	Confession
MWID Mistaken	Witness	Identification
F/MF False/Misleading	Forensics
P/FA Perjury/False	Allegation
OM Official	Misconduct
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When	 considering	 the	 association	 between	 these	
characteristics	and	compensatory	outcomes,	it	is	important	to	bear	
in	mind	the	frequency	of	the	characteristics	in	the	database.	Tables	
1	 and	2	provide	 that	 background.	We	will	 soon	 see,	 for	 example,	
that	 exonerees	who	were	 assisted	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 obtain	 post-
conviction	relief	by	 innocence	organizations	and	 those	exonerated	
by	DNA	evidence	are	generally	more	likely	to	seek	and	receive	state	
statutory	compensation	and	civil	compensation.	Yet,	Table	2	shows	
that	innocence	organizations	aided	only	about	20%	of	the	exonerees	
in	our	database	and	DNA	was	responsible	 for	the	exonerations	of	
only	17.3%	of	them.
Of	the	contributing	factors,	more	than	half	of	the	exonerations	
featured	 perjury	 or	 false	 allegations	while	 less	 than	 half	 involved	
official	misconduct.	Murder,	at	40%,	was	the	most	frequent	crime	for	
which	the	exonerated	were	wrongly	convicted.	The	most	wrongful	
convictions	occurred	in	the	South	(37.2%),	by	a	wide	margin,	and	
the	 least	 occurred	 in	 the	West	 (16.5%);	 they	 were	 fairly	 equally	
divided	between	blue	and	red	states.
With	some	exceptions,	 the	 frequency	of	 the	characteristics	
studied	among	the	exonerees	in	the	full	database	generally	mirror	
the	 frequency	of	 those	 features	 among	 those	exonerated	 in	 states	
without	compensation	statutes.	One	exception	is	for	those	sentenced	
to	death.	While	less	than	6%	(117)	of	all	exonerees	were	sentenced	
to	 death,	 9%	 of	 those	 wrongfully	 convicted	 in	 states	 without	
statutes	received	the	death	penalty.	Another	is	that	the	absence	of	
compensation	statues	in	certain	states	disproportionately	impacted	
persons	 convicted	 of	murder:	 about	 40%	 of	 the	 exonerees	 in	 the	
database	were	wrongly	convicted	of	murder,	but	over	half	of	those	
exonerated	 in	 states	 without	 statutes	 were	 convicted	 of	 murder.	
The	opposite	is	true	for	those	wrongly	convicted	of	drug	offenses;	
about	11%	of	all	exonerees	were	wrongly	convicted	of	drug	offenses,	
but	drug	offense	exonerees	accounted	for	only	3%	of	those	wrongly	
convicted	in	states	without	compensation	statutes.	The	absence	of	
those	 statutes	 then	more	 severely	 impacts	 those	with	more	 time	
lost;	the	average	number	of	years	lost	in	state	murder	cases	in	fall	
2018	was	13.3	years	and	only	one	year	in	drug	cases.159
The	 percentages	 of	 exonerees	 from	 states	 without	
compensation	 statutes	 was	 balanced	 among	 geographic	 regions.	
The	 South,	Northeast,	 and	Midwest	 each	 have	 one	 state	without	
159 Exonerations in the United States Map,	supra	note	88.
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a	 compensation	 statute	 with	 substantial	 numbers	 of	 exonerees	
(Georgia,	Pennsylvania,	 and	 Indiana),	while	 the	West	has	a	 larger	
number	of	lower-volume	states	without	compensation	statutes.	And,	
for	those	unable	to	escape	red/blue	politics,	of	all	exonerees	(except	
Puerto	Rico	and	Guam,	which	are	not	represented	in	the	electoral	
college)	convicted	in	states	without	a	compensation	statute,	nearly	
82%	were	convicted	in	states	carried	by	Trump	in	2016,	indicating	
that	 states	 without	 statutes	 may,	 on	 balance,	 be	 more	 politically	
conservative	than	those	that	do.
When	looking	at	this	data	and	that	which	follows,	we	should	
be	mindful	 of	 one	 significant	 quirk	 in	 the	 database.	The	majority	
of	wrongful	convictions	in	drug	cases	arose	from	a	single	county-
Harris	County	(Houston),	Texas.	 In	2014,	 the	conviction	 integrity	
unit	(CIU)	in	Harris	County	started	uncovering	significant	numbers	
of	 guilty	 pleas	 in	 drug	 possession	 cases	 in	which	 the	 confiscated	
evidence	was	not,	 in	fact,	a	controlled	substance.160	There	are	145	
such	 cases	 in	 the	 database	 of	 2,000.	 This	 large	 cluster	 of	 drug	
cases	 from	 a	 single	 state	 has	 several	 common	 characteristics:	
incarcerations	 of	 one	 year	 or	 less	 (with	 two	 exceptions),	 CIU	
involvement,	guilty	pleas,	and	almost	no	state	compensation	filings	
(just	 one	 unsuccessful	 one).	 This	 cluster	 undoubtedly	 skews	 the	
picture.	That	said,	we	have	decided	not	to	exclude	them	from	the	
database;	 they	 and	 others	 like	 them	 in	 other	 counties	 and	 other	
states	are	listed	in	the	Registry.	We	were	reluctant	to	begin	excluding	
arguably	non-representative	clusters	from	the	database	for	want	of	a	
rational	and	consistent	methodology	for	doing	so.	At	the	same	time,	
those	 drawing	 conclusions	 from	 this	 data	 should	 understand	 and	
appropriately	account	for	the	presence	of	these	cases.
As	 noted,	 the	 Registry	 records	 the	 number	 of	 years	 each	
exoneree	was	wrongly	imprisoned.	Table	3	below	lists	the	average	
number	of	years	lost	for	each	racial	group,	for	both	genders,	and	for	
the	 four	geographic	regions.	The	average	number	of	years	 lost	 for	
non-federal	exonerees	in	the	fall	of	2018	was	9.2	years.161	The	data	
show	that	the	average	number	of	years	lost	is	substantially	higher	for	
blacks	than	for	whites,	Asians	and	Hispanics	and	more	than	twice	as	
high	for	men	than	for	women.	Whites	averaged	more	years	lost	than	
Hispanics.	Those	wrongly	convicted	in	the	Northeast	and	Midwest	
160 Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	Exonerations	in	2015	9–11	(Feb.	
3,	 2016),	 http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
Exonerations_in_2015.pdf.
161 Exonerations in the United States Map,	supra	note	88.
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experienced	the	longest	average	years	lost,	amounts	larger	than	the	
national	average.
Table 3 (Mean Years Lost by Race, Gender, and Region)
162,	163
Race Number Mean Standard Deviation P Value
Asian 16 6.63 7.37
<0.0001
Black 952 10.36 8.73
Caucasian 771 7.41 7.42
Hispanic 240 6.78 6.83
Native	
American
12 10.23 6.62
Other 9 6.62 6.24
Gender
Female 186 4.38 5.91
<0.0001
Male 1814 9.20 8.21
Geo Factor
South 744 8.34 8.78
0.0011
West 330 7.59 7.25
Northeast 413 9.61 7.74
Midwest 506 9.35 7.93
A. The State Statutory Compensation Data
We	turn	next	to	data	regarding	claims	made	(or	not	made)	
pursuant	 to	 state	wrongful	 conviction	 compensation	 statutes	 and	
the	 results	 of	 those	 claims.	What	 can	 the	 data	 tell	 us	 about	 the	
characteristics	 of	 those	 more	 likely	 to	 file	 and	 receive	 statutory	
162	 The	standard	deviation	measures	the	amount	of	variation	within	a	set	of	data.	
A	low	standard	deviation	indicates	that	most	the	numbers	are	near	the	mean.	
A	high	standard	deviation	means	that	the	numbers	are	more	spread	out.	If,	for	
example,	the	mean	of	a	set	of	data	were	10	and	the	standard	deviation	were	
4,	68%	of	the	observations	would	lie	between	6	and	14	and	95%	would	be	
between	2	and	18.
163	 The	 P	 value	 from	 analysis	 of	 variance	 (ANOVA)	 tests	 whether	 there	 are	
differences	between	groups.	The	null	hypothesis	of	ANOVA	is	that	all	groups	
have	the	same	mean.	If	the	P	value	is	less	than	or	equal	to	0.05,	we	reject	the	
null	hypothesis	and	conclude	that	not	all	group	means	are	equal.	Such	is	the	
case	here.
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compensation	and	any	trends	observed	in	filing?
In	my	 earlier	 work,	 I	 hypothesized	 about	 why	 exonerated	
incarcerees	 in	 states	 with	 compensation	 statutes	 do	 not	 file	 for	
compensation.164	One	was	that	many	states	adopted	statutes	during	
the	1989–2018	period,	and	that	some	of	those	exonerated	prior	to	
enactment	of	the	statute	do	not	seek	compensation	because,	while	
most	statutes	allowed	such	retroactive	filings,	the	exoneree	is	unaware	
of	their	opportunity	to	so.	Another	 is	that	some	exonerees	whose	
wrongful	 incarceration	was	brief	do	not	file	because	 the	potential	
gains	outweigh	the	costs	associated	with	the	effort.	Objective	data	
permits	us	to	test	these	hypotheses.	
First,	using	a	Cochran-Armitage	trend	test,165	we	wanted	to	
see	if	there	was	a	relationship	between	the	probability	of	filing	for	
state	compensation	and	the	year	of	exoneration	(which	is	recorded	
by	the	Registry).	As	expected,	that	relationship	exists,	as	shown	in	
Figure	1.	The	width	of	the	band	in	each	figure	represents	the	size	of	
the	population	within	the	band.
164	 Gutman,	 supra	 note	 11,	 at	 395–97.	 An	 unfortunate	 reality	 of	 wrongful	
conviction	is	the	number	of	exonerees	who	commit	crimes	after	exoneration.	
A	 number	 of	 exonerees	 are	 also	 not	 released	 after	 exoneration	 because	
they	 continue	 to	 serve	 sentences	 for	 crimes	 actually	 committed.	We	 have	
not	 determined	 the	 numbers	 of	 these	 cases	 or	 whether	 the	 time	 between	
exoneration	 and	 re-conviction	permitted	 a	 claim	or	 suit	 to	be	filed.	Future	
research	is	needed	to	better	assess	how	frequently	subsequent	convictions	or	
continued	incarceration	explains	non-filing,	but	the	anecdotal	evidence	I	have	
seen	of	this	phenomenon	is	considerable.
165	 The	Cochran-Armitage	trend	test	is	a	test	of	linear	trend	in	the	proportions	of	
the	response	of	interest	from	a	binary	response	across	R	ordered	categories.	
For	 example,	 we	 want	 to	 test	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 proportions	 of	
compensation	filings	or	awards	were	the	same	over	several	time	bands	versus	
the	alternative	hypothesis	that	those	proportions	of	awards	increased	across	
the	calendar	time	bands.
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Figure 1 (State Claims Made by Year of Exoneration)
Generally,166	Figure	1	shows	that	the	proportion	of	incarcerated	
exonerees	seeking	state	statutory	compensation	has	increased	over	
time.	One	possible	explanation	for	this	is	that	because	the	number	of	
state	statutes	has	increased	since	1989,	more	people	are	potentially	
eligible	and	apply.167
However,	virtually	all	states	that	have	adopted	statutes	since	
1989	either	expressly	permit	retroactive	compensation	by	allowing	
pre-adoption	 exonerees	 to	 seek	 compensation	 or	 are	 silent	 on	
retroactivity,	but	have	been	implemented	as	though	it	exists.168	Even	
so,	it	stands	to	reason	that	a	long	period	of	time	between	exoneration	
and	 state	 statutory	 adoption	will	 reduce	 the	number	of	 claimants	
as	a	result	of	death,	subsequent	disqualifying	criminal	activity,	lack	
166	 The	proportion	decreased	during	the	most	recent	period	(2013–2017),	perhaps	
because	a	number	of	recent	exonerees	have	not	yet	sought	compensation.
167	 Robert	 J.	Norris,	Exoneree Compensation: Current Policies and Future Outlook,	 in 
Wrongful	 Conviction	 and	 Criminal	 Justice	 Reform:	 Making	
Justice	289,	294–95	(Marvin	Zalman	&	Julia	Carrano	eds.,	2014).
168	 Iowa	and	Minnesota	do	not	expressly	bar	retroactive	claims,	but	none	have	
been	made.
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of	 knowledge	 of	 the	 new	 statute,	 or	 a	 desire	 not	 to	 revisit	 their	
wrongful	conviction	in	a	potentially	adversarial	claim.	Thus,	it	is	not	
surprising	that	the	trend	of	more	filings	is	generally	upward.	
Second,	 Figure	 2	 shows	 a	 strong	 positive	 relationship	
between	 years	 lost	 and	 the	 likelihood	of	 filing.	This	 accords	with	
one’s	intuition	that	as	the	number	of	years	lost	grows,	the	exoneree	
has	a	greater	the	need	for	financial	and	other	support	and	the	prospect	
of	a	higher	potential	award	from	filing.169	Conversely,	there	are	fewer	
filings	of	those	with	relatively	brief	wrongful	incarcerations.
Figure 2 (State Claims Made by Years Lost)
Spreadsheet	 1	 below	 updates	 the	 table	 appended	 to	 my	
previous	 article.170	As	my	 research	 continued,	 I	 learned	 about	 the	
results	 of	 previously	 premature	 or	 pending	 claims,	 uncovered	
previously	 unknown	 claims	 and	 the	 results	 therefrom,	 concluded	
that	 certain	 previously	 premature	 claims	 should	 be	 recoded	 as	
169	 Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	396–97.
170 See id.	at	439–40.
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unfiled	due	to	the	expiration	of	the	applicable	statute	of	limitations	
and	corrected	a	few	errors.	Most	significantly,	a	substantial	number	
of	additional	awards	were	made	in	New	York,	and	I	obtained	updated	
information	about	annual	annuity	payments	paid	to	Texas	exonerees.	
Together,	they	accounted	for	the	majority	of	the	additional	payments	
made.
Otherwise,	 the	 state	 statutory	 compensation	 landscape	
is	 relatively	 unchanged.	 Only	 one	 state,	 Kansas,	 has	 enacted	 a	
new	 statute.171	 Claims	 have	 been	 filed	 and	 decided	 in	 Michigan,	
the	 last	state	 to	adopt	a	statute	prior	 to	Kansas.	Florida	amended	
its	 compensation	 statute	 to	 relieve,	 in	 part,	 a	 prohibition	 on	
compensation	 to	persons	previously	 convicted	of	 a	 felony.	Florida	
exonerees	are	now	eligible	if	they	have	one	prior	non-violent	felony,	
but	 that	 relaxation	 is	 not	 retroactive.172	 Maryland	 exonerees	 no	
longer	require	a	governor’s	pardon	to	qualify	 for	compensation.173 
Massachusetts	made	some	positive	reforms	to	its	statute,	including	
raising	the	compensation	cap	from	$500,000	to	$1	million.174
Yet,	 the	 data	 remains	 concerning.	 Of	 1,572	 incarcerated	
exonerees	wrongly	convicted	in	states	with	a	compensation	statute,	
only	828	have	filed	compensation	claims,	or	about	53%	of	exonerees	
in	 those	 states.	 [Columns	 I	 and	 J].	 That	 number	 will	 rise,	 but	
not	 dramatically	 because	 there	 exist	 only	 76	 premature	 claims	 –	
exonerees	who	might	still	file	for	state	statutory	compensation	prior	
to	running	of	the	statute	of	limitations.175	[Column	F]	About	42.5%	
did	not	file	and	the	applicable	statutes	of	limitation	make	it	too	late	
to	do	so.176	[Column	H].
Of	the	828	filings,	609,	or	about	73.5%,	were	granted,	148	
(almost	18%)	were	denied	and	73	(9%)	remain	pending.	[Columns	
L,	M,	N].	The	total	amount	paid	by	states	now	exceeds	$545	million	
since	 1989,	 or	 an	 average	 of	 $18.8	million	 per	 year.	 [Column	P].	
Compensated	exonerees	received	an	average	of	$69,000	per	year	of	
171 Kan.	Stat.	Ann.	§	60-5004	(West	2019).
172 Fla.	Stat.	Ann.	§	961.04	(West	2019).
173 Md.	Stat.	Ann.	§	10-501(b)(2)	(West	2019).
174 Compare Mass.	Ann.	Laws	ch.	258D,	 §	5	 (West	2019),	with Mass.	Ann.	
Laws	ch.	258D,	§	5	(West	2017)	(amended	2018).
175	 Thirty-one	 of	 those	 premature	 claims	 are	 in	 Texas	 and,	 of	 those,	 the	 vast	
majority	are	associated	with	exonerees	who	were	wrongly	convicted	of	drug	
possession	 in	Harris	County,	 served	 relatively	 little	 time	 in	prison	 and	 are	
unlikely	to	file	claims.
176	 The	remaining	5%	of	exonerees	are	coded	“premature.”
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incarceration.177	[Column	Q].	Those	numbers	would	be	significantly	
lower	were	it	not	for	New	York.	New	York’s	statute	is	uncapped;	the	
average	amount	paid	per	year	of	incarceration	is	over	$148,000.	New	
York	was	the	state	of	conviction	of	14%	of	incarcerated	exonerees,	
but	over	38%	of	all	state	statutory	compensation	paid	in	the	nation	
was	awarded	by	New	York.
Overall,	only	38.7%	of	exonerees	convicted	in	states	with	a	
compensation	 statute	 received	 compensation.	Again,	 that	number	
will	rise	as	pending	claims	are	decided	and	premature	claims	are	filed	
and,	later,	decided.	But,	even	if	all	premature	claims	were	filed	and	all	
of	those	and	all	pending	claims	were	awarded	for	the	claimant,	the	
maximum	percentage	of	exonerees	in	states	with	statutes	who	could	
receive	state	compensation	would	be	48%.	If	one	looks	at	the	nation	
as	a	whole,	rather	than	only	states	with	compensation	statutes,	the	
numbers	drop.	Only	46%	of	all	exonerees	filed	state	compensation	
claims	and	only	one-third	received	compensation.	That	decrease	is	
fairly	small	because,	although	17	states	lack	a	compensation	statute,	
those	 are	 states	 of	 conviction	 of	 only	 one-eighth	 of	 incarcerated	
exonerees.	
As	noted,	 a	 compelling	explanation	 for	 at	 least	 some	non-
filing	is	that	a	significant	number	of	exonerees	served	relatively	little	
time	in	prison.	Of	those	1,572	incarcerated,	177	served	one	year	or	
less.	Given	 the	 relatively	 strict	 compensatory	 caps	and	absence	of	
attorney’s	fees	in	most	states,	many	who	served	comparatively	little	
time	might	not	have	filed	because	 it	was	simply	not	affordable	or	
worth	the	effort.
The	 data,	 reflected	 in	 Figure	 2,	 supports	 that	 hypothesis.	
Generally,	the	longer	the	exoneree	was	imprisoned,	the	more	likely	
they	were	to	file	a	state	compensation	claim.	There	is	also	evidence	of	
a	correlation	between	length	of	wrongful	incarceration	and	likelihood	
of	receipt	of	state	compensation.	Using	the	Registry’s	“years	lost”	
data,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 add	 the	 number	 of	 years	 of	 incarceration	
experienced	by	those	who	received	a	state	compensation	award.	The	
177	 Professor	Encarnacion	argues	 that,	when	 the	state	 incarcerates	a	person,	 it	
employs	that	person’s	body	to	deter	others	from	committing	crimes.	As	he	
puts	 it,	 “the	 state	 in	 effect	 conscripts	 that	 person	 into	 criminal	 deterrence	
services.”	See	Encarnacion,	supra	note	10,	at	261.	When	the	state	does	that	
wrongly,	Professor	Encarnacion	views	the	wages	earned	by	a	person	employed	
in	an	analogous	occupation	as	being	a	reasonable	metric	for	compensation.	
He	views	a	correctional	officer	as	the	closest	analogy	and	observes	that	the	
average	 hourly	 wage	 of	 such	 employees,	 multiplied	 by	 24	 hours/day,	 365	
days/year	comes	to	about	$180,000	per	year.	See id.	at	268.
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results	are	telling.	Although	only	38.7%	of	exonerees	in	states	with	
statutes	received	compensation,	they	accounted	for	over	50%	of	the	
years	lost.	[Columns	O,	T].
It	is	hardly	a	point	of	pride	to	conclude	that	almost	half	of	all	
time	served	in	prison	by	exonerees	convicted	in	states	with	statutes	
was	uncompensated,	as	was	55%	of	 time	served	by	all	exonerees.	
But	 it	 does	 show,	 in	 general,	 that	 exonerees	 who	 were	 unjustly	
incarcerated	 for	 longer	 periods	 were	 relatively	 more	 likely	 to	 be	
awarded	compensation.
The	experience	in	Texas	illustrates	both	points.	Texas	has	one	
of	the	more	generous	compensation	statutes	in	the	country	and	the	
most	exonerees,	but	of	231	incarcerated	Texans	in	our	2,000-person	
database,	 83	 were	 wrongly	 incarcerated	 for	 one	 year	 or	 less.	 As	
noted,	most	 of	 those	wrongful	 convictions	 arose	 from	 arrests	 for	
possession	 of	 harmless	 substances.	 It	 is	 very	 likely	 that,	 because	
of	 the	volume	of	exonerees	with	short	 incarcerations,	Texas	has	a	
below-average	filing	rate	of	43%	and	only	38%	of	Texas	exonerees	
received	an	award.	But,	of	those	who	filed,	nearly	88%	received	an	
award	and	those	awards	covered	nearly	two-thirds	of	the	years	lost	
by	all	Texas	exonerees.	
Previously,	I	observed	that	certain	structural	features	of	past	
or	 existing	 state	 compensation	 statutes	 also	 depress	 filing	 rates	
in	 certain	 states,	 such	 as	 those	 requiring	 a	 gubernatorial	 pardon,	
those	 restricting	eligibility	only	 to	 those	exonerated	as	a	 result	of	
DNA	 testing	 and	 those	 barring	 exonerees	 who	 had,	 before	 their	
wrongful	conviction	been	convicted	of	a	felony.178	These	unwarranted	
restrictions	invariably	reduced	the	filing	rates	in	Florida,	Missouri,	
Montana,	Maryland,	and	Tennessee.179
Another	 possible	 explanation	 for	 non-filing	 could	 be	 the	
modest	 compensation	offered	by	 some	 states.	My	previous	 article	
examined	 at	 some	 length	 the	 caps	 on	 most	 state	 statutes	 and	
demonstrated	how	these	caps	are	far	below	per-year	jury	awards	in	
federal	civil	rights	cases	and	judicial	awards	in	states	without	caps.180 
178	 Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	395–96.
179 Id.
180 Id.	at	397–408.	Since	the	publication	of	my	2017	article,	there	have	been	three	
jury	verdicts	for	plaintiffs.	In	the	Jacques	Rivera	case,	a	federal	jury	awarded	
$17.175	million	to	a	man	wrongly	 imprisoned	for	21.3	years.	Sam	Charles,	
Jury Gives $17M To Man Falsely Imprisoned In Case Tied To Tainted Cop,	Chi.	Sun-
Times	(June	29,	2018),	https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/jury-gives-17m-
to-man-falsely-imprisoned-for-murder-in-case-tied-to-tainted-cop/.	 In	 the	
Jamal	Trulove	case,	a	San	Francisco	 jury	awarded	$10	million	 to	a	wrongly	
748 Gutman and Sun
A	state	legislative	judgment	assigning	a	value	of	a	year	of	lost	liberty	
offers	an	objective	basis	 for	assessing	comparative	generosity.	The	
“grade	sheet”	in	Chart	1	tries	to	do	that.	Uncapped	statutes	or	those	
that	 incorporate	 some	measure	of	 compensatory	flexibility	 are,	 in	
my	view,	more	just	that	those	with	restrictive	annual	caps,	overall	
caps,	or	both.	Using	that	compensatory	metric	alone,181	the	following	
grade	 sheet	 ranks	 the	 state	 statutes	 and	 notes	 the	 percentage	 of	
incarcerated	filers:	
Chart 1 (State Statute Generosity)182
Grade State
A District	of	Columbia	[50%],	Maryland	[22%],	Minnesota	
[54%],	New	York	[77%],	West	Virginia	[60%]
A- Colorado	[33%],	Connecticut	[83%],	Texas	[43%]
B+ Alabama	[35%],	Hawaii	[50%]
B Ohio	[76%],	New	Jersey	[53%]
B- California	[39%],	Michigan	[51%],	Virginia	[63%],	Wash-
ington	[40%]
C+ Florida	[15%],	Tennessee	[17%],	North	Carolina	[52%],	
Utah	[36%]
C Massachusetts	[70%],	Mississippi	[82%],	Nebraska	[78%]
C- Maine	[0%],	Louisiana	[71%]
D+ Iowa	[29%],	Oklahoma	[24%]
D Missouri	[20%],	Illinois	[69%]
D- New	Hampshire	[0%],	Wisconsin	[38%]
F Montana	[0%]
convicted	man	who	was	incarcerated	for	5.1	years,	or	nearly	$2	million	per	
year.	Bob	Egellko,	S.F. Man Awarded $10 Million After Jury Finds Police Framed Him 
For Murder,	S.F.	Chron.,	Apr.	6,	2018,	at	A1.	A	jury	awarded	$5	million	each	
for	three	Cleveland	men	each	wrongly	imprisoned	for	19.2	years.	Heisig,	supra 
note	8.
181	 I	 exclude	 consideration	of	 other	 compensatory	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 social	
and	medical	 services,	 a	waiver	 of	 income	 tax,	 award	of	 attorney’s	 fee,	 and	
refund	of	 costs	 and	penalties	 associated	with	 the	 criminal	 conviction.	Also	
excluded	was	Vermont,	with	only	one	exoneree.
182	 Massachusetts	 amended	 its	 statute	 in	 2018	 to	 raise	 its	 damages	 cap	 from	
$500,000	to	$1	million.	Compare Mass.	Ann.	Laws	ch.	258D,	§	5(A)	(West	
2019) with Mass.	Ann.	Laws	ch.	258D,	§	5(A)	(West	2017).	Because	the	
database	pre-dates	that	legislative	change,	Massachusetts’	“grade”	reflects	its	
old	statute,	not	the	new	one.
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One	might	expect	some	sort	of	correlation	between	filing	rates	
and	generosity.	To	be	sure,	that	correlation	holds	in	some	states.	Filing	
rates	are	relatively	high	in	New	York,	West	Virginia,	and	Connecticut	
and	low	in	Missouri	and	Montana.	But,	relative	parsimony	does	not	
appear	to	have	much	explanatory	power	as	shown	in	the	scatterplot	
below.	The	filing	rates	in	Illinois	and	Louisiana,	for	example,	are	well	
above	 average	 and	 just	 below	 average	 in	Wisconsin.183	 Yet,	 those	
states	rank	very	 low	in	comparative	generosity.	At	 the	same	time,	
the	filing	rate	is	relatively	low	in	several	more	(potentially)	generous	
states,	such	as	Maryland,	Minnesota,	Alabama,	Texas,	New	Jersey,	
and	Washington.
183	 Wisconsin	pays	no	more	than	$5,000	per	year	of	wrongful	incarceration,	up	
to	a	total	maximum	of	$25,000.	Wis.	Stat.	Ann.	§	775.05(4)	(West	2018).	
Recent	attempts	to	compensate	Wisconsin	exonerees	up	to	$50,000	per	year	
with	 a	maximum	 cap	 of	 $1,000,000	 and	 to	 include	 social	 services	 appears	
to	 lack	 support	 in	 the	Wisconsin	 state	 senate.	 See	 Laurel	White,	Wrongful 
Conviction Compensation Bill Likely Dead This Session,	 Wisconsin	 Public	
Radio	(Feb.	8,	2018,	4:00	PM),	https://www.wpr.org/wrongful-conviction-
compensation-bill-likely-dead-session	 (House	 sponsor	 declares	 bill	 dead	 in	
February	2018);	but see	Brooke	Hollingsworth,	Bill looks to change compensation 
law for wrongfully convicted individuals,	 The	 Badger	 Herald	 (Mar.	 6,	
2018),	 https://badgerherald.com/news/2018/03/06/bill-looks-to-change-
compensation-law-for-wrongfully-convicted-individuals/	 (State	 Senator	
expresses	optimism	for	passage	of	2017	Senate	Bill	456	introduced	October	
18,	2017).
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Figure 3 (State Compensation Filing by Generosity Grade)
Having	 now	 offered	 a	 somewhat	 impressionistic	 view	 of	
what	factors	might	affect	state	compensation	filing	rates,	co-author	
Lingxiao	Sun	 ran	a	 logistic	 regression	model184	 and	computed	 the	
184	 Regression	analysis	is	a	statistical	tool	to	determine	the	relationship	between	
variables.	 The	 factor	 or	 variable	 that	 we	 are	 studying	 or	 predicting	 is	 the	
dependent	 variable.	 Here,	 those	 would	 be	 the	 likelihood	 of	 seeking	 and	
receiving	state	and	civil	compensation.	What	factors	impact	that	likelihood?	
The	factors	which	we	hypothesize	might	impact	the	dependent	variable	are	
called	 independent	variables.	The	 independent	variables	 for	which	we	have	
data	 include	 whether,	 for	 example,	 the	 exoneree	 is	 male	 or	 female,	 of	 a	
particular	race	or	geographic	area,	and	so	on.	If	we	were	simply	looking	at	the	
relationship	between	two	variables,	like	gender	and	LSAT	score,	a	chi	square	
test	 between	 only	 two	 variables	would	 be	 appropriate.	 If	we	were	 looking	
at	the	effect	of	multiple	variables	 jointly	on	the	outcome,	and	the	response	
variable	is	a	continuous	variable	(like	amounts	of	money	or	years)	a	simple	
linear	 model	 would	 be	 appropriate.	 Here,	 however,	 we	 are	 looking	 at	 the	
effect	of	multiple	prognostic	variables	jointly	on	the	outcome	–	our	dependent	
variables.	When	there	are	multiple	independent	variables	and	the	outcome	is	a	
binary	event,	like	filing/no	filing	or	receiving/not	receiving,	logistic	regression	
is	the	appropriate	analysis	to	perform.
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marginal	 effects	 of	 each	 explanatory	 or	 prognostic	 variable-the	
“Bio	 Codes,”	 the	 Tags,”	 the	 “Worst	 Crime,”	 the	 “Contributing	
Factors,”	and	the	“Geo	Factors”-on	the	probability	of	filing	for	state	
compensation	and	the	probability	of	prevailing	on	filed	claims.	Here,	
we	do	not	presume	to	attribute	causation	between	the	independent	
variables	and	the	dependent	variable	in	each	model.	Instead,	we	use	
this	approach	as	a	convenient	way	to	summarize	association	between	
the	 variables	while	 holding	 other	 independent	 variables	 constant.	
Prior	 to	presenting	the	results	of	 the	 logistic	models,	Table	4	sets	
forth	the	basic	percentages-the	first	column	being	the	percentages	
of	those	with	the	listed	characteristic	seeking	state	compensation	and	
the	second	being	the	percentages	of	those	with	each	characteristic	
receiving	state	compensation:
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Table 4 (Percentage of Exonerees with Each 
Characteristic Filing for State Compensation and 
Receiving State Compensation)
185, 186
Character-
istic
State	Compensa-
tion	Filed
P	Value
State	Compensa-
tion	Received
P	Value
CIU 89/158=56.33% 0.3316 75/81=92.59% 0.004
No	CIU 739/1414=52.26% 534/674=79.23%
GP 106/290=36.55% <.0001 83/99=83.84% 0.3907
No	GP 722/1282=56.32% 526/656=80.18%
IOA 249/345=72.17% <.0001 212/229=92.58% <.0001
No	IOA 579/1227=47.19% 397/526=75.48%
DNA	Ex. 251/303=82.84% <.0001 233/242=96.28% <.0001
No	DNA	
Ex.
577/1269=45.47% 376/513=73.29%
DP 47/96=48.96% 0.452 34/45=75.56% 0.3711
No	D.P. 781/1476=52.91% 575/710=80.99%
FC 133/211=63.03% 0.0012 103/124=83.06% 0.4588
No	FC 695/1361=51.07% 506/631=80.19%
MWID 354/527=67.17% <.0001 282/329=85.71% 0.002
No	MWID 474/1045=45.36% 327/426=76.76%
F/MF 206/386=53.37% 0.7525 158/186=84.95% 0.0884
185	 As	noted	below,	the	simple	percentages	show	wide	variations	in	some	of	the	
characteristics.	That	gives	a	hint,	but	not	a	statistical	showing,	of	an	association	
between	the	likelihood	of	filing	for	or	receiving	state	compensation	and	the	
characteristic.	The	p	 value	of	 a	 chi	 square	 test	 between	only	 two	variables	
(like	 gender	 and	 likelihood	 of	 filing)	 provides	 that	 showing.	 As	 explained	
below,	 we	 start	 with	 a	 hypothesis	 that	 there	 is	 no	 association	 between	
the	 characteristic	 and	 likelihood	of	filing.	The	p	 value	 is	 the	probability	 of	
observing	a	 random	association	 in	 the	data.	 In	general,	a	p	value	 less	 than	
0.05	 is	considered	unlikely	and	data	thus	provides	evidence	supporting	the	
alternative	hypothesis-that	the	factor	under	study	is	indeed	associated	with	
the	 outcome,	 that	 is,	 increasing	 or	 decreasing	 the	 chance	 of	 the	 outcome	
event.	The	p	value	in	Tables	5,	6,	8	and	9	is	the	result	of	a	different	statistical	
analysis-one	that	accounts	for	all	 factors	examined	rather	than	simply	the	
one	in	Tables	4	and	7.
186	 In	this	Table	and	Table	7,	note	that	the	numerator	of	the	fraction	in	column	
1-claims	filed-is	not	the	same	as	the	denominator	of	the	fraction	in	column	
3-claims	decided.	That	is	because	the	latter	denominator	excludes	pending	
cases.
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Character-
istic
State	Compensa-
tion	Filed
P	Value
State	Compensa-
tion	Received
P	Value
No	F/MF 622/1186=52.45% 451/569=79.26%
P/FA. 460/898=51.22% 0.1848 335/423=79.20% 0.2496
No	P/FA 368/674=54.60% 274/332=82.53%
OM 405/773=52.39% 0.8278 302/378=79.89% 0.5926
No	OM 423/799=52.94% 307/377=81.43%
Male 786/1456=53.98% 0.0002 580/715=81.12% 0.1792
Female 42/116=36.21% 29/40=72.50%
Murder 372/674=55.19% <.0001 281/336=83.63% <.0001
Sexual	
Assault
175/255=68.63% 150/165=90.91%
Drugs 24/123=19.51% 14/22=63.64%
Child	Sexu-
al	Abuse
93/201=46.27% 64/85=75.29%
Robbery 52/93=55.91% 37/50=74.00%
Other	
Crime
112/226=49.56% 63/97=64.95%
Black 476/805=59.13% <.0001 376/438=85.84% <.0001
Caucasian 247/561=44.03% 153/220=69.55%
Hispanic 93/182=51.10% 73/88=82.95%
Other 12/24=50.00% 7/9=77.78%
South 253/582=43.47% <.0001 213/246=86.59% <.0001
West 90/239=37.66% 48/79=60.76%
Northeast 238/322=73.91% 162/212=76.42%
Midwest 247/429=57.58% 186/218=85.32%
Red	State	
(2016) 329/752=43.75% <.0001 249/298=83.56% 0.1039
Blue	State	
(2016) 499/820=60.85% 360/457=78.77%
The	 simple	 percentages	 and	 associated	 p	 values	 support	
some	 findings	 that	 are	 not	 terribly	 surprising:	 the	 percentages	 of	
state	compensation	filing	by	exonerees	who	did	not	plead	guilty,187 
187	 Seven	states-California,	Colorado,	District	of	Columbia,	New	Jersey,	Ohio,	
Oklahoma,	and	Virginia-entirely	or	partly	bar	compensation	to	those	who	
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who	were	exonerated	by	DNA	evidence,	and	who	were	supported	in	
their	exoneration	efforts	by	an	 innocence	organization	were	much	
higher	than	those	with	the	opposite	characteristics.	Predictably,	the	
filing	rate	of	those	wrongly	convicted	of	drug	crimes	was	quite	low;	
that	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 generally	much	 lower	 sentences	 for	
such	crimes	and	thus	fewer	years	lost.
Other	 results	 were	 less	 expected.	 The	 percentage	 of	 filers	
whose	wrongful	conviction	was	at	least	partly	attributable	to	a	false	
confession	 or	 mistaken	 witness	 identification	 was	 much	 higher	
than	for	those	who	did	not	falsely	confess	or	did	not	have	mistaken	
witness	 ID	 issues	 in	 their	 criminal	 cases.	 African-Americans	 had	
much	 higher	 filing	 rates	 than	 whites.	 Filing	 rates	 in	 states	 with	
compensation	statutes	were	highest	in	the	Northeast,	twice	as	high	
as	 in	 the	West.	 And	 filing	 rates	 were	 higher	 in	 blue	 states	 with	
statutes	than	red	states	with	statutes.
With	respect	to	results	of	state	compensation	claims,	because	
state	statutes	are	no-fault	statutes,	one	would	not	expect	particular	
characteristics	to	be	associated	with	a	higher	likelihood	of	success	
except	for	exoneration	by	DNA,	which	is	virtually	unassailable	proof	
of	 factual	 innocence.	Not	surprisingly,	 then,	DNA	exonerees	were	
much	more	likely	to	prevail	than	non-DNA	exonerees	(96%	prevailed	
compared	 to	 73%).	 This	may	 account	 for	 the	 high	 percentage	 of	
prevailing	in	sexual	assault	cases.	As	might	be	expected,	a	greater	
percentage	of	 those	assisted	 in	 their	 exoneration	by	an	 innocence	
organization	prevailed	than	those	who	were	not.	
Interestingly,	 African-Americans	 and	 Hispanics	 had	 much	
higher	rates	of	prevailing	on	state	compensation	claims-about	86%	
and	83%,	respectively-than	whites.	Those	in	the	South,	which	had	a	
relatively	low	rate	of	filing,	had	the	highest	rate	of	success	regionally.	
Although	filing	rates	were	 lower	 in	 red	states,	exonerees	 in	 those	
states	 prevailed	 at	 a	 greater	 rate	 than	 those	 wrongly	 convicted	
claimants	in	blue	states.
The	percentages,	while	interesting,	have	an	obvious	limitation.	
They	 cannot	 offer	 insight	 into	 the	 extent	 to	which	 characteristics	
other	than	the	ones	examined	contribute	to	the	results	found.	We	
plead	guilty	to	a	crime	that	they	did	not	commit.	California	is	an	example	of	
a	partial	bar-prohibiting	compensation	to	those	who	plead	guilty	to	protect	
another.	Cal.	Penal	Code	§	4903(c)	(West	2019).	Ohio,	 in	contrast,	has	
an	outright	bar.	Ohio	Rev.	Code	§	2743.48(A)(2)	(West	2019).	But	these	
states	seem	unlikely	alone	to	account	for	the	wide	variance	in	filing	between	
those	who	pled	guilty	and	those	who	did	not.
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cannot	assume,	for	example,	that	gender	alone	is	responsible	for	the	
differences	between	males	and	females.	Other	factors	might	partially	
drive	 the	 results	 observed.	 For	 example,	 virtually	 no	 females	 are	
exonerated	as	a	result	of	DNA	analysis;	thus,	the	lower	percentages	
of	females	filing	for	state	compensation	may	partially	be	the	result	
of	that	factor.
A	regression	model	permits	us	to	determine	whether	particular	
characteristics	are	associated	 in	a	statistically	significant	way	with	
the	likelihood	of	filing	for	or	receiving	state	or	civil	compensation	
while	accounting	 for	 the	effects	of	 the	other	characteristics	 in	 the	
model.	We	have	four	tables	summarizing	the	results.	Tables	5	and	6	
deal	with	filing	for	and	receiving	state	compensation	(respectively).	
Tables	8	and	9	cover	the	filing	for	and	receiving	of	civil	compensation	
(respectively).
Table 5 (Logistic Regression Analyzing State Filing for 
Compensation)
Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
CIU 0.0201 1.765 1.093 2.848
GP 0.0889 0.739 0.521 1.047
IOA 0.0059 1.559 1.137 2.139
DP 0.9283 1.023 0.619 1.691
DNA	Ex. <.0001 4.28 2.811 6.517
FC 0.4237 1.168 0.798 1.71
MWID 0.0746 1.347 0.971 1.87
F/MF 0.513 1.106 0.818 1.495
P/FA 0.7715 1.047 0.77 1.422
OM 0.0271 0.74 0.567 0.967
Sexual	Assault 0.3126 0.902 0.593 1.37
Drugs 0.0118 0.571 0.307 1.063
Child	Sexual	
Abuse
0.4103 1.23 0.833 1.815
Robbery 0.1254 1.499 0.878 2.557
Other	Crimes 0.0039 1.639 1.128 2.382
Asian 0.5411 1.31 0.341 5.031
Caucasian 0.3762 0.721 0.551 0.943
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Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
Hispanic 0.9423 0.887 0.607 1.297
Native	
American
0.3026 1.989 0.345 3.486
Other 0.196 0.33 0.055 1.98
Female 0.8555 1.044 0.659 1.652
Midwest 0.0519 1.654 1.216 2.25
Northeast <.0001 2.89 1.876 4.451
West <.0001 0.678 0.437 1.052
Blue	State	(2016) 0.0024 1.664 1.197 2.313
Years	Lost <.0001 1.056 1.037 1.076
How	 do	 we	 read	 Tables	 5,	 6,	 8,	 and	 9?	 Let’s	 look	 at	 the	
DNA	 exoneration	 line	 in	 Table	 5.	 The	 logistic	 regression	 model	
asks	and	answers	the	following	question:	compared	to	those	whose	
exoneration	did	not	result	from	DNA	analysis,	were	those	exonerated	
by	DNA	more	likely	to	file	for	state	statutory	compensation,	while	
holding	 all	 other	 characteristics	 fixed?	 Where	 there	 are	 binary	
parameters-such	as	conviction	 integrity	unit	 involvement	or	not,	
or	official	misconduct	or	not-the	characteristic	listed	is	presented	
relative	to	 its	opposite.	Where	there	are	multiple	parameters,	 like	
race,	 crime,	 and	 region,	 the	 characteristic	 listed	 is	 compared	 to	
the	one	that	is	left	out.	For	example,	each	of	the	worst	crimes	are	
compared	to	murder,	the	races	are	compared	to	African-Americans	
and	the	regions	are	compared	to	the	South.
We	start	with	a	null	hypothesis:	that	there	 is	no	statistical	
association	 between	 the	 characteristic,	 like	 exoneration	 by	 DNA,	
the	variable	we	are	testing,	and	the	likelihood	of	an	exoneree	filing	
for	 state	 statutory	 compensation.	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	
characteristic	 and	variable	 tested	are	entirely	 independent	of	 each	
other.	 In	 Table	 4,	we	 saw	 a	 pretty	 large	 difference	 between	DNA	
and	 non-DNA	 exonerees	 and	 the	 percentage	 of	 filings	 for	 state	
compensation,	so	we	may	not	believe	our	null	hypothesis.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 perhaps	 a	 good	 part	 of	 that	 percentage	 difference	 is	
better	explained	by	some	other	variable,	like	the	fact	that	only	males	
are	DNA	exonerees.
Using	a	chi-square	test,	we	can	test	the	validity	of	that	null	
hypothesis.	The	 test	 compares	 the	 observed	data	 against	 the	null	
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hypothesis.	We	consider	characteristics	with	a	p	value	of	less	than	
or	equal	to	.05	to	be	statistically	significant,	and	we	shade	those	in	
the	tables.	In	these	cases,	we	reject	the	null	hypothesis	and	conclude	
that	there	is	a	correlation	between	the	characteristic	and	the	variable	
examined.	That	association	is	positive	when	the	odds	ratio	is	greater	
than	one	 and	negative	when	 it	 is	 less	 than	one.	Not	 surprisingly,	
DNA	 exoneration	 reveals	 a	 very	 low	 p	 value,	 indicating	 a	 strong	
association	 between	 being	 a	 DNA	 exoneree	 and	 filing	 for	 state	
compensation,	all	other	factors	held	constant.	And,	that	association	
is	positive-the	odds	ratio	is	greater	than	one.
We	can	also	see	a	positive	association	between	exoneration	
through	the	intervention	of	a	conviction	integrity	unit	and	assistance	
of	 an	 innocence	 organization,	 so-called	 professional	 exonerators,	
and	filing	for	state	compensation.	As	predicted,	there	is	a	negative	
correlation	between	filing	and	wrongful	conviction	for	drug	crimes	
compared	 to	murder.	 Compared	 to	 the	 South,	 there	 is	 a	 positive	
correlation	 with	 filing	 and	 wrongful	 conviction	 in	 states	 with	 a	
statute	in	the	Northeast	and	a	negative	correlation	in	the	West.	There	
is	a	positive	association	between	likelihood	of	filing	and	a	wrongful	
conviction	in	a	blue	state	with	a	compensation	statute	compared	to	
a	red	state.	There	is	also	an	association	between	years	lost	and	filing.	
For	every	additional	year	of	incarceration,	the	odds	of	filing	increase	
by	almost	6%.
Equally	as	important	are	the	characteristics	shown	to	have	no	
association	with	the	likelihood	of	filing.	Table	5	shows	no	association	
between	gender	and	race	and	the	likelihood	of	state	filing.	Thus,	the	
percentage	differences	seen	in	Table	4	with	respect	to	the	likelihood	
of	filing	and	gender	and	race	are	better	attributed	to	other	factors.	
Table	 5	 shows	 no	 association	 between	 any	 of	 the	 “Contributing	
Factors”	and	the	likelihood	of	filing	for	state	compensation.	
What	 can	 we	 say	 about	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 statistically	
significant	 association	 between	 a	 characteristic	 and	 an	 examined	
variable?	That’s	where	the	odds	ratio	comes	in.	Returning	to	Table	
5	 and	DNA	 exoneration,	we	 see	 an	 odds	 ratio	 of	 over	 four.	 That	
means	that	the	odds	of	a	DNA	exoneree	filing	for	compensation	are	
four	times	that	of	a	non-DNA	exoneree.188	We	can	say	that	there	is	
188	 Perhaps	an	example	would	help.	Odds	are	the	probability	of	success	divided	
by	 the	probability	of	 failure	 (or,	here,	 the	probability	of	filing/not	filing	or	
receiving/not	 receiving).	 Assume	 non-DNA	 exonerees	 have	 a	 probability	
of	filing	of	 .5	and	a	probability	of	non-filing	of	 .5.	Assume	further	 that	 the	
probability	of	DNA	exonerees	filing	is	.8	and	the	non-filing	probability	is	0.2.	
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a	strong	association	between	DNA	exoneration	and	filing	for	state	
compensation,	compared	to	those	who	are	not	DNA	exonerees.189
The	 following	 table	 summarizes	 the	 results	 of	 a	 similar	
regression	 analysis	 for	 the	 receipt	 of	 state	 compensation.	 What	
characteristics	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 likelihoods	 of	 receiving	
state	compensation?
Table 6 (Logistic Regression Analyzing State Receipt of 
Compensation)
Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
CIU 0.0469 2.549 1.013 6.415
GP 0.0326 2.161 1.066 4.379
IOA 0.0013 2.791 1.494 5.214
DP 0.0989 0.484 0.204 1.146
DNA	Ex. <.0001 6.773 2.885 15.904
FC 0.1257 0.591 0.301 1.159
MWID 0.6859 1.125 0.636 1.991
F/MF 0.6109 0.866 0.499 1.505
P/FA 0.9521 1.017 0.581 1.781
OM 0.9503 0.985 0.603 1.607
Sexual	Assault 0.9909 0.639 0.292 1.399
Drugs 0.2464 0.377 0.124 1.153
Child	Sexual	
Abuse
0.7638 0.693 0.342 1.407
Robbery 0.7144 0.722 0.305 1.705
In	 that	 case,	 the	 odds	 ratio	 is	 4:	 .8/.2	÷	 .5/.5.	 The	most	 accurate	way	 of	
describing	the	result	is	that	DNA	exonerees	are	much	more	likely	to	file	than	
non-DNA	exonerees,	while	accounting	for	the	effect	of	all	other	characteristics	
in	 the	model.	 It	 is	 less	accurate	 to	 say	 that	DNA	exonerees	are	 four	 times	
more	likely	to	file	than	non-DNA	exonerees.
189	 Notice,	 too,	 that	 the	 tables	 include	 a	 95%	 confidence	 interval.	 A	 95%	
confidence	 interval	means	 if	we	 take	many	 similar	 samples	 from	 the	given	
population,	95%	of	the	computed	confidence	intervals	would	contain	the	true	
odds	ratio.	Put	a	little	more	simply,	but	not	quite	as	accurately,	we	have	95%	
confidence,	with	respect	to	DNA	exonerees,	that	the	true	odds	ratio	is	in	the	
interval	of	2.811	to	6.517.
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Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
Other	Crimes 0.5555 0.551 0.293 1.036
Asian 0.9655 1.012 0.096 1.928
Caucasian 0.9503 0.504 0.318 0.798
Hispanic 0.9688 1.174 0.592 2.326
Native	
American
0.9585 0.733 0.062 1.404
Other 0.9617 >999.999 <0.001 >999.999
Female 0.8654 1.074 0.469 2.462
Midwest 0.6041 0.936 0.497 1.763
Northeast 0.3429 0.451 0.203 1.005
West 0.0003 0.22 0.091 0.534
Blue	State	(2016) 0.269 1.469 0.743 2.903
Years	Lost 0.1792 1.024 0.989 1.059
This	analysis	shows	that	involvement	of	a	conviction	integrity	
unit,	assistance	of	an	innocence	organization,	and	DNA	exoneration	
were	positively	associated	with	receiving	state	compensation.	So	was	
a	guilty	plea	for	reasons	that	are	difficult	to	discern.	DNA	showed	the	
strongest	association-the	odds	of	prevailing	in	a	state	compensation	
claim	 were	 almost	 seven	 times	 higher	 for	 DNA	 exonerees	 than	
non-DNA	exonerees.	The	“worst	crime”	and	“Contributing	Factor”	
characteristics	are	not	associated	with	higher	or	lower	likelihoods	of	
prevailing.	Nor	is	gender,	race,	blue/red	state,	or	years	lost	associated	
with	a	greater	or	lesser	likelihood	of	receiving	compensation.	With	
respect	to	geography,	the	odds	of	receiving	state	compensation	in	the	
West	are	about	one-quarter	of	the	odds	of	receiving	compensation	
in	the	South.
Having	 examined	 the	 statistical	 relationships	 between	
various	characteristics	and	 the	 likelihood	of	seeking	and	receiving	
state	 compensation,	 let’s	 return	 to	 the	data	 in	Spreadsheet	1	 and	
its	state-by-state	comparison	of	percentages	of	filings	and	awards.	
Understanding	that	premature	and	pending	claims	may	change	these	
numbers	in	the	future,	a	scan	through	Columns	H	(the	percentage	
of	incarcerated	non-filers),	Column	J	(the	percentage	of	incarcerated	
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filers),	Column	L	(the	percentage	of	filed	claims	awarded),	Column	
O	 (the	 percentage	 of	 incarcerated	 exonerees	 compensated),	 and	
Column	 T	 (the	 percentage	 of	 lost	 time	 compensated)	 reveals	
considerable	variation	among	the	states.	Obviously,	the	higher	the	
percentages,	the	better.
Putting	aside	the	generosity	of	the	statutes,	these	percentages	
offer	 another	 way	 to	 evaluate	 fairness:	 to	 look	 not	 only	 at	 the	
percentages	of	exonerees	filing	and	receiving	awards	(as	I	had	in	my	
prior	article),	but	also	 the	percentages	of	years	 lost	 compensated.	
For	 example,	 take	 State	A	with	 ten	 exonerees.	 Assume	 that	 nine	
exonerees	file	for	compensation	and	eight	receive	awards.	That	state	
looks	very	good.	Ninety	percent	file,	89%	of	filers	are	compensated,	
and	80%	of	all	exonerees	receive	awards.
How	would	we	 feel,	 though,	 about	 State	 A	 if	 each	 of	 the	
eight	 exonerees	 awarded	 compensation	 served	 only	 one	 year	 in	
prison	as	a	result	of	a	wrongful	conviction	and	the	two	who	were	not	
compensated	(say	one	did	not	apply	and	one	was	denied)	each	spent	
twenty	years	in	prison?	We	might	feel	less	positively	about	State	A,	
which	seems	to	do	an	excellent	job	compensating	those	who	might	
be	regarded	as	 less	harmed	and	a	terrible	 job	compensating	those	
incarcerated	 far	 longer.	 Indeed,	 we	might	 feel	much	 better	 about	
State	A	if	only	the	two	long-serving	exonerees	sought	compensation	
and	 received	 it,	 and	 the	 eight	 serving	only	 one	 year	 did	not	 even	
apply.
In	 this	 sense,	 states	with	 compensation	 statutes,	 however	
they	are	graded	on	my	generosity	chart,	should	strive	to	have	what	
I	will	call	“breadth	of	coverage”:	(1)	high	percentages	of	exonerees	
who	file	 for	 state	 compensation,	 (2)	high	percentages	of	 awarded	
claims,	 (3)	high	percentages	of	 exonerees	with	awards,190	 and	 (4)	
high	percentages	of	lost	years	compensated.191	The	presence	of	these	
characteristics	would	suggest	a	statute	that	is	sufficiently	generous	
to	incentivize	filing,	a	statute	with	low	barriers	to	compensation,	an	
implementation	of	the	statute	that	favors	awards	and	a	system	that	
makes	 awards	 to	 long-serving	 exonerees.	To	evaluate	 comparative	
“breadth	 of	 coverage,”	 I	 analyzed	 the	 corresponding	 Columns	 J,	
L,	O,	and	T	 in	Spreadsheet	1	and	excluded	 four	 states	with	 three	
190	 This	third	characteristic	is	not	independent	of	1	and	2,	but	a	function	of	them.
191	 The	“breadth	of	coverage”	analysis	excludes	two	very	important	features	of	
a	 just	state	compensation	program-the	speed	at	which	claims	are	decided	
following	post-conviction	relief	and	the	speed	by	which	successful	claims	are	
paid.
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exonerees	or	fewer.192
To	be	sure,	this	is	an	imperfect	comparative	exercise.	First,	
to	rank	order	the	states,	I	weighted	each	of	the	four	factors	equally.	
One	could	reorder	the	rankings	by	reweighting	the	factors.	Second,	
states	with	relatively	high	numbers	of	exonerees	not	filing	due	to	
short	 terms	 of	wrongful	 imprisonment	 (such	 as	 Texas),	 relatively	
high	numbers	of	premature	claims	(such	as	Texas	and	Wisconsin),	
and	 relatively	high	numbers	of	pending	 claims	 (such	as	Michigan	
and	New	York)	are	disadvantaged.	A	more	definitive	analysis	would	
wait	 for	 the	 statute	 of	 limitations	 to	 run	 and	 for	 all	 claims	 to	 be	
decided.	Yet,	the	number	of	exonerees	with	definitive	results	(either	
not	filing	or	filing	claims	that	have	been	decided)	is	large	enough	to	
draw	some	lessons.
One	of	them	is	that	of	the	twenty-nine	states	examined,	only	
six	states	were	above	the	national	average	with	respect	to	each	of	
these	four	characteristics:	Illinois,	Louisiana,	Minnesota,	Mississippi,	
Nebraska,	 and	Virginia.	Only	 two	of	 these	 states	 (Minnesota	 and	
Virginia)	got	a	grade	as	high	as	a	B-	in	generosity,	with	the	remainder	
earning	a	C	or	less.	Ironically,	the	states	with	the	best	“breadth	of	
coverage”	are	among	the	least	generous.
Chart	2	is	a	grade	sheet	reflecting	comparative	“breadth	of	
coverage”	when	weighing	each	characteristic	equally.	Two	states	tied	
for	first:	Mississippi	and	Nebraska.	For	reasons	that	are	not	easy	to	
explain,	Mississippi	 and	Nebraska	 share	 very	 high	 rates	 of	 filing,	
rates	of	award,	and	 lost	years	compensated.	They,	of	course,	both	
benefit	from	having	comparatively	few	exonerees,	but	so	do	many	
other	states	with	less	breadth	of	coverage.	Nebraska,	in	particular,	
may	benefit	in	this	analysis	by	an	odd	quirk:	of	its	nine	exonerees,	
six	(the	“Beatrice	6”)	were	wrongly	convicted	together	of	the	same	
crime.	It	is	reasonable	to	expect	that,	in	multi-exoneree	cases	of	this	
sort,	each	file	(if	any	of	them	do)	and	that	the	results	are	the	same.
192	 Hawaii,	Maine,	New	Hampshire,	and	Vermont.
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Chart 2 (Breadth of State Statutory Compensation 
Coverage)
Grade State
A+ Mississippi,	Nebraska
A Illinois,	Louisiana,	Connecticut
A- Virginia,	New	York	
B+ Massachusetts,	Ohio,	West	Virginia,	Utah,	Minnesota,	
Texas,	North	Carolina
B New	Jersey,	Oklahoma
B- Wisconsin	
C+ Tennessee,	District	of	Columbia,	Missouri
C Washington,	Florida
C- California
D+ Alabama,	Colorado,	Maryland
D Michigan	
D- Iowa
F Montana
As	someone	who	has	done	a	fair	amount	of	grading,	I	can	say	
with	 confidence	 that	 creating	 this	grading	 curve	was	not	difficult.	
This	 is	not	 a	narrow	bell	 curve;	 the	 spread	among	states	 is	wide,	
substantial,	and	troubling.	Of	course,	in	seventeen	states,	there	is	no	
statute	at	all,	but	for	the	rest,	the	reality	is	that	the	chances	of	seeking	
and	 receiving	 state	 statutory	 compensation	 turn	 substantially	 on	
fortuity-one’s	state	of	wrongful	conviction.	
As	 discussed,	 some	 of	 it	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 unnecessary	
disqualifying	statutory	provisions,	interpretations	of	those	provisions	
that	 disadvantage	 claimants	 and	 extreme	 ungenerosity.	 Some	 of	
it	may	 be	 due	 simply	 to	 numbers-perhaps	 it	 is	 unreasonable	 to	
expect	states	with	large	numbers	of	exonerees	to	have	high	filing,	
receipt,	and	years	 lost	coverage	rates	simply	due	to	size,	although	
Illinois	does.	States	with	smaller	numbers	of	exonerees	and	multiple	
co-defendant	 cases	 (like	 Nebraska)	 may	 post	 better	 percentage	
numbers	due	to	their	smaller	size.	
Whether	 the	 state	 statute	 requires	 the	 claimant	 to	 file	 in	
a	 trial	 court,	 a	 court	 of	 claims,	 directly	with	 the	 legislature	or	 an	
administrative	entity	seems	not	to	have	any	explanatory	power.	Nor	
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does	 the	 date	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 statute	 offer	 a	 compelling	
explanation	for	the	breadth	of	coverage	outcome.	Ultimately,	some	
of	the	variations	may	be	due	to	intangible	custom	and	local	culture.	
States	 with	 strong	 innocence	 programs,	 experienced	 and	 skilled	
attorneys	in	this	area	of	practice,	and	a	widespread	public	recognition	
and	understanding	of	accessible	state	compensation	programs	may	
perform	comparatively	better.	
The	 data	 show	 another	 concerning	 aspect	 of	 inter-state	
variation.	 Column	Q	 of	 Spreadsheet	 1	 shows	 the	 average	 annual	
amount	of	compensation	provided	per	state	to	prevailing	claimants.	
Because	most	state	statutes	contain	annual	or	overall	caps	or	both,	
one	might	expect	some	narrowing	in	the	variation	among	the	states.	
But,	that	is	not	reflected	in	Column	Q.	The	average	annual	award,	
for	example,	in	Wisconsin	is	just	over	$3,000	per	year	of	wrongful	
imprisonment	while	it	 is	over	$375,000	per	year	in	the	District	of	
Columbia.
The	 reason	 is	 obvious:	 D.C.	 had	 and	 partially	 still	 has	 an	
uncapped	statute,	while	Wisconsin	imposes	a	$5,000	per	year	cap,	up	
to	$25,000.	But,	the	point	is	that	there	is	no	conceivable	justification	
for	a	system	in	which	the	value	of	a	lost	year	of	liberty	is	119	times	
greater	 in	 one	 state	 than	 another.	 Fair-minded	 people	 can	 debate	
whether	breadth	of	coverage	or	generosity,	or	some	combination	of	
the	two,	better	reflect	shared	principles	of	fairness	in	an	environment	
of	 finite	 resources.	 Yet	 even	 if	 that	 debate	 is	 resolved	 differently	
in	 different	 states,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 dramatically	 narrow	 the	wide	
variations	in	average	annual	compensation	reflected	in	Column	Q.
Of	course,	that	is	easy	to	say	and	impossible	to	do,	at	least	
systematically	 since,	 of	 course,	 each	 state	 sets	 its	 compensatory	
parameters	and	process.	But,	 it	does	offer	an	additional	argument	
for	advocates	supporting	new	state	laws	in	states	without	them	and	
reforms	to	existing	statutes.	When	considering	whether	alternative	
legislative	 proposals	 are	 fair	 and	 just,	 states	 should	 consider	
the	 degree	 to	which	 the	 competing	 options	 treat	 exonerees	 fairly	
compared	to	other	states.	Kansas’	2018	statute	does	so.	House	Bill	
4838,	introduced	in	February	2018	in	the	South	Carolina	House	of	
Representatives,	which	would	have	awarded	up	to	$15,000	per	year	
of	wrongful	imprisonment	with	a	cap	of	$50,000,	did	not.193
193	 H.	4838,	2018	Gen.	Assemb.,	122d	Sess.	 (S.C.	2018),	§	24-13-2340(B)(1),	
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/4838.htm.	 See also 
Chelsea	Evans,	Constitutional Law: A Dime for Your Time: A Case for Compensating 
the Wrongfully Convicted in South Carolina,	 68	 S.C.	 L.	 Rev.	 539,	 566	 (2017)	
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B. Federal Civil Rights and Tort Litigation
As	explained,	eight	states,	most	notably	Texas,	bar	exonerees	
from	 seeking	 damages	 arising	 from	 wrongful	 conviction	 if	 the	
lawsuits	were	awarded	state	statutory	compensation.	For	those	not	
precluded,	exonerees	may	file	a	federal	civil	rights	suit	and/or	state	
tort	suit	 in	addition	to	or	instead	of	state	compensation.	Earlier,	I	
briefly	reviewed	the	bases	of	some	claims	of	this	sort	and	the	typical	
defenses	to	them.	Because	the	plaintiff	must	prove	unconstitutional	
misconduct	or	 tortious	negligence,	often	decades	after	 the	events,	
no	one	would	suggest	that	these	are	simple	cases.	To	the	contrary,	
the	difficulty	and	potential	expense	of	such	cases	is	a	reason	many	
give	 for	expanding	and	strengthening	no-fault	state	compensation	
statutes.194
Our	 study	 of	 state	 statutory	 compensation	 required	 us	 to	
look	 at	 a	 subset	 of	 our	 2,000-person	 database-those	 wrongfully	
convicted	in	states	with	compensation	statutes-and	added	a	layer	
of	complexity	because	these	statutes	were	adopted	over	time.	Civil	
rights	 and	 torts	 litigation	 involves	 no	 similar	 wrinkles-they	 can	
be	 filed	 by	 any	 person	 listed	 in	 the	 Registry	 not	 precluded	 from	
doing	so	under	state	law.	Even	so,	the	difficulty	of	these	cases,	their	
expense,	and	the	need	to	demonstrate	unconstitutional	misconduct	
or	negligence	supports	a	hypothesis	that	filing	and	prevailing	rates	
should	be	modest.195	The	empirical	reality	is	more	complicated.	Let’s	
review	 the	 nationwide	 numbers,	 which	 are	 also	 broken	 down	 by	
state	in	Spreadsheet	2.
1. Filing of Claims
Of	the	2,000	exonerees,	198	served	no	prison	time.	[Columns	
B	and	C].	To	keep	Spreadsheet	2	manageable,	the	remaining	columns	
deal	only	with	the	remaining	1,802	incarcerated	exonerees.	Of	those,	
808,	or	45%,	filed	civil	compensation	claims.	[Columns	H,	I].196	This	
number	 is	 likely	 to	 rise	 because	 74	 exonerees	 have	 “premature”	
claims	that	may	yet	be	filed.	[Column	F].
Column	G	shows	the	numbers	of	cases	filed	 in	each	state.	
(advocating	for	a	state	compensation	statute	in	South	Carolina).
194 See	Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	372	n.11	(citing	articles	making	this	point).
195	 Prevailing	means	that	the	civil	compensation	suit	resulted	in	some	recovery	
for	the	plaintiff.	In	the	substantial	majority	of	such	cases,	compensation	was	
paid	following	a	settlement	rather	than	following	trial.
196	 Of	 the	 1,802	 incarcerated	 exonerees,	 approximately	 138	were	 barred	 from	
filing	such	lawsuits	because	they	had	accepted	state	compensation.	Excluding	
this	group,	the	effective	filing	rate	was,	perhaps	surprisingly,	almost	50%.
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The	largest	number	of	cases	were	filed	by	those	wrongly	convicted	
in	Illinois	(146),	followed	by	New	York	(136).	Column	H	indicates	
the	percentage	of	incarcerated	filers	in	each	state.	Excluding	states	
with	four	or	fewer	exonerees,	the	data	show	a	substantial	variation	
among	the	states.	The	proportion	of	exonerated	filers	is	highest	in	
Illinois	(over	80%).	Part	of	that	might	be	explained	by	a	relatively	
ungenerous	state	statute	and	a	concentration	of	civil	rights	attorneys	
with	expertise	in	these	cases	centered	in	the	Chicago	area.	
In	 contrast,	 excluding	 the	 small	 states	 and	 states	 that	 bar	
civil	compensation	suits	following	receipt	of	state	statutory	awards,	
the	 proportion	 of	 exonerated	 filers	 for	 civil	 compensation	 was	
less	 than	 20%	 in	 Alabama,	 Georgia,	 Maryland,	 Minnesota,	 New	
Mexico,	Virginia	and	Wisconsin.	One	might	expect	the	likelihood	of	
civil	rights	and	torts	litigation	to	be	higher	in	states	without	state	
compensation	statutes	or	with	particularly	ungenerous	ones.	That	
turns	out	not	be	the	case.	Georgia,	for	example,	is	the	state	with	the	
second	largest	number	of	exonerees	without	a	statute	and,	yet,	a	low	
civil	compensation	filing	rate.197	Wisconsin	has	a	particularly	poor	
state	statute	and	a	low	civil	compensation	filing	rate,	although	it	also	
has	an	unusually	long	statute	of	limitations	for	Section	1983	claims	
and	some	claims	may	yet	be	filed.
As	 with	 state	 statutory	 compensation,	 we	 tested	 whether	
there	 was	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 likelihood	 of	 filing	 civil	
compensation	and	the	year	of	exoneration	and	amount	of	time	lost.	
We	found,	as	shown	in	Figure	4,	that	there	is	no	growth	in	seeking	
civil	 compensation	 over	 time.	 That	 finding	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 our	
intuition	that	increasing	percentages	of	these	cases	are	filed	over	time	
as	large	settlements	and	verdicts	are	publicized	and	more	attorneys	
develop	expertise	in	litigating	these	cases.	That	conclusion,	though,	
should	 be	 tempered	 by	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 statute	 of	 limitations,	
which	differs	from	state	to	state,	has	not	yet	run	for	relatively	recent	
exonerees.
As	we	found	with	state	statutory	compensation,	there	is	an	
obvious	association	between	seeking	civil	compensation	seeking	and	
years	lost.	Figure	5	accords	with	one’s	intuition	that	the	likelihood	
of	filing	rises	with	the	length	of	the	unjust	incarceration.
197	 However,	the	state	with	the	most	exonerees	but	without	a	state	compensation	
statute,	Pennsylvania,	has	a	civil	compensation	filing	rate	of	over	50%.
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Figure 4 (Civil Compensation Claims by Year of Extension)
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Figure 5 (Civil Compensation Claims by Years Lost)
Table	 7	 sets	 forth	 the	 percentages	 of	 civil	 compensation	
filings	and	recoveries	by	each	characteristic	examined.198 
Table 7 (Percentage of Exonerees with Each 
Characteristic Filing for and Receiving Civil 
Compensation)
Character-
istic
Civil	Case	
Compensation	
Filed
P	Value
Civil	Case	
Compensation	
Received
P	Value
CIU 66/240=27.50% <.0001 31/42=73.81% 0.3204
No	CIU 779/1760=44.26% 434/654=66.36%
GP 112/424=26.42% <.0001 73/93=78.49% 0.0101
No	GP 733/1576=46.51% 392/603=65.01%
IOA 253/400=63.25% <.0001 137/180=76.11% 0.0021
198	 The	 totals	 of	 the	 denominators	 in	 the	 “civil	 case	 compensation	 received”	
column	within	 each	 characteristic	 do	not	 add	up	 to	 the	numerators	 in	 the	
“civil	compensation	case	filed”	column	because	the	former	excludes	pending	
cases.
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Character-
istic
Civil	Case	
Compensation	
Filed
P	Value
Civil	Case	
Compensation	
Received
P	Value
No	IOA 592/1600=37.00% 328/516=63.57%
DNA	Ex. 194/346=56.07% <.0001 139/177=78.53% 0.0001
No	DNA	
Ex.
651/1654=39.36% 326/519=74.57%
DP 66/117=56.41% 0.0014 34/56=60.71% 0.3124
No	DP 779/1883=41.37% 431/640=67.34%
FC 164/248=66.13% <.0001 103/130=79.23% 0.0009
No	FC 681/1752=38.87% 362/566=63.96%
MWID 276/611=45.17% 0.0793 147/230=63.91% 0.2541
No	MWID 569/1389=40.96% 318/466=68.24%
F/MF 207/493=41.99% 0.892 117/178=65.73% 0.7228
No	F/MF 638/1507=42.34% 348/518=67.18%
P/FA 585/1109=52.75% <.0001 335/480=69.79% 0.0128
No	P/FA 260/891=29.18% 130/216=60.19%
OM 574/931=61.65% <.0001 326/462=70.56% 0.0031
No	OM 271/1069=25.35% 139/234=59.40%
Male 786/1814=43.33% 0.0023 436/646=67.49% 0.1697
Female 59/186=31.72% 29/50=58.00%
Murder 476/799=59.57% <.0001 268/381=70.34% 0.1364
Sexual	
Assault
118/301=39.20% 68/101=67.33%
Drugs 31/218=14.22% 14/22=63.64%
Child	Sexu-
al	Abuse
75/240=31.25% 42/70=60.00%
Robbery 30/105=28.57% 12/25=48.00%
Other	
Crime
115/337=34.12% 61/97=62.89%
Black 446/952=46.85% 0.0003 249/359=69.36% 0.23
Caucasian 286/771=37.09% 151/242=62.40%
Hispanic 102/240=42.50% 59/88=67.05%
Other 11/37=29.73% 6/7=85.71%
South 182/744=24.46% <.0001 83/152=54.61% <.0001
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Character-
istic
Civil	Case	
Compensation	
Filed
P	Value
Civil	Case	
Compensation	
Received
P	Value
West 151/330=45.76% 80/132=60.61%
Northeast 226/413=54.72% 149/188=79.26%
Midwest 282/506=55.73% 151/220=68.64
Red	State	
(2016) 332/1071=31.00% <.0001 151/270=55.93% <.0001
Blue	State	
(2016) 509/922=55.21% 312/422=73.93%
Let’s	 look	 first	 at	 the	 rates	 of	 filing	 and	 the	 associated	 p	
values	 in	 Columns	 1	 and	 2.	 Those	 whose	 exonerations	 resulted	
from	the	intervention	of	a	conviction	integrity	unit	were	much	less	
likely	to	file	for	civil	compensation	than	those	not	so	assisted.	One	
would	suspect	that	participation	of	a	CIU	and	the	imprimatur	of	that	
assistance	would	make	those	helped	more	likely	to	file.	As	previously	
noted,	however,	 a	 large	number	of	 these	 cases	 are	 the	drug	 cases	
from	Harris	County,	Texas.	So	far,	only	one	of	those	exonerees	has	
filed	a	 civil	 rights	 claim	(unsuccessfully),	presumably	because	 the	
lengths	of	 their	 incarcerations	were	 very	 short.	That	undoubtedly	
led	to	the	rather	low	rate	of	CIU	filers.
Those	 who	 falsely	 confessed,	 were	 sentenced	 to	 death,	 or	
who	were	wrongly	convicted	based	at	 least	 in	part	on	perjured	or	
false	 testimony	were	much	more	 likely	 to	file	 than	those	who	did	
not.	Those	who	pled	guilty	were	much	less	likely	to	file	than	those	
who	did	not,	perhaps	because	of	a	view	that	a	guilty	plea	undermines	
a	civil	 rights	case.	African-American	and	Hispanic	exonerees	were	
more	likely	to	seek	civil	compensation	than	white	exonerees.	Females	
filed	at	a	lower	rate	than	men.	Those	who	were	wrongly	convicted	of	
murder	filed	more	frequently	than	those	wrongly	convicted	of	other	
crimes;	drugs	were	the	least	frequent.	
Not	 surprisingly,	 those	 whose	 exonerations	 were	 aided	
by	 an	 innocence	 organization	 were	much	more	 likely	 to	 file	 civil	
compensation	cases	than	those	who	were	not.	As	one	might	expect,	
DNA	exonerees	were	more	likely	to	file	than	those	exonerated	for	
other	reasons.	Given	the	requirement	that	misconduct	be	found	to	
prevail	in	civil	rights	and	torts	cases,	one	would	expect	that	those	
wrongly	convicted	at	least	in	part	because	of	government	misconduct	
would	be	more	likely	to	file	than	those	who	were	not.	The	data	shows	
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that	to	be	true.	Geographically,	filing	rates	were	much	lower	in	the	
South	than	in	other	regions	of	the	country	and	much	lower	in	red	
states	than	blue	states.
Again,	 the	 usual	 caution	 is	 in	 order.	 Simple	 percentage	
comparisons	 do	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 differences	 can	 be	 attributed	
only	 to	 that	characteristic.	Other	characteristics	examined	(or	not	
examined)	 may	 explain	 some	 of	 those	 differences.	 Thus,	 as	 we	
did	 with	 state	 statutory	 compensation,	 a	 logistic	 regression	 was	
run	 to	 determine	 which	 characteristics	 were	 associated	 with	 the	
likelihood	of	filing	 for	civil	 compensation,	all	other	characteristics	
held	constant.	Again,	those	with	p	values	less	than	.05	showed	an	
association.	Table	8	sets	forth	the	results:
Table 8 (Logistic Regression Analyzing Civil 
Compensation Filing)
Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
CIU 0.3487 0.803 0.508 1.271
GP 0.7465 0.946 0.678 1.321
IOA 0.0011 1.641 1.218 2.211
DP 0.6866 1.105 0.68 1.795
DNA	Ex. <.0001 2.102 1.446 3.055
FC 0.0105 1.601 1.116 2.296
MWID 0.066 1.347 0.981 1.85
F/MF 0.0131 1.419 1.076 1.872
P/FA <.0001 1.791 1.349 2.377
OM <.0001 3.153 2.477 4.013
Sexual	Assault 0.0834 0.517 0.354 0.755
Drugs 0.7222 0.739 0.424 1.289
Child	Sexual	
Abuse
0.0496 0.504 0.348 0.729
Robbery 0.7103 0.63 0.373 1.064
Other	Crimes 0.1452 0.827 0.59 1.16
Asian 0.704 0.784 0.22 2.793
Caucasian 0.3474 0.803 0.622 1.035
Hispanic 0.1342 0.956 0.668 1.368
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Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
Native	
American
0.54 0.428 0.105 1.747
Other 0.3093 0.242 0.027 2.16
Female 0.801 0.95 0.635 1.419
Midwest <.0001 3.478 2.569 4.709
Northeast 0.0373 2.792 1.948 4.002
West 0.2365 2.567 1.749 3.767
Blue	State	(2016) 0.0001 1.726 1.31 2.276
Years	Lost <.0001 1.06 1.042 1.078
Is	there	a	statistical	association	between	the	characteristics	
and	the	 likelihood	of	filing	a	civil	compensation	case?	Here	again,	
interestingly,	there	is	no	statistical	correlation	between	race	or	gender	
and	the	likelihood	of	filing.	Nor	was	there	a	correlation	between	any	
of	the	worst	crimes	for	which	the	exoneree	was	wrongly	convicted	
and	the	likelihood	of	filing,	except	for	child	sex	abuse.	Those	wrongly	
convicted	of	that	crime	were	substantially	less	likely	to	file	a	suit	for	
civil	compensation.
As	with	state	statutory	compensation,	the	participation	of	an	
innocence	organization	and	DNA	exoneration	were	again	positively	
associated	with	the	likelihood	of	filing	a	civil	compensation	suit.	The	
odds	of	filing	a	civil	compensation	case	were	over	twice	that	in	DNA	
exoneration	cases	than	other	cases.	The	involvement	of	a	conviction	
integrity	unit	was	not	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	filing	a	civil	
case.
With	respect	to	the	“Contributing	Factors,”	the	existence	of	
a	 false	confession,	perjury	or	 false	allegations,	 false	or	misleading	
forensic	 evidence,	 and	 official	misconduct	were	 factors	 associated	
with	an	increased	likelihood	of	filing.	The	strongest	association	was	
to	 be	 expected-those	 exonerees	 who	 were	 wrongly	 convicted	 at	
least	 in	 part	 as	 a	 result	 of	 official	misconduct.	 The	 odds	 of	 filing	
were	over	three	times	greater	with	official	misconduct	than	without.	
Assuming	 that	 the	 Registry	 accurately	 codes	 cases	 with	 official	
misconduct,	this	suggests	that	civil	rights	lawyers	may	do	a	pretty	
good	job	in	case	selection.	
Exonerees	wrongly	convicted	in	the	Midwest	and	Northeast	
were	much	more	likely	to	file	for	civil	compensation	than	those	in	
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the	South.	There	was	a	positive	association	between	being	convicted	
in	a	blue	state	and	filing	for	civil	compensation.	The	odds	of	filing	in	
blue	states	were	1.7	times	greater	than	in	red	states.	And,	for	every	
year	lost,	the	odds	of	filing	for	civil	compensation	increased	by	6%.
2. Results of Filing
Let’s	turn	next	to	the	results	of	civil	compensation	litigation.	
Much	of	the	literature	repeats	the	narrative	that	litigating	federal	civil	
compensation	 or	 state	 tort	 cases	 is	 difficult,	 time-consuming	 and	
expensive.	While	true,	difficult	is	not	synonymous	with	unsuccessful.	
Surprising	 to	 us	 was	 the	 finding	 that,	 of	 the	 808	 cases	 filed	 by	
incarcerated	exonerees,	55%,	or	448	cases,	resulted	in	a	plaintiff’s	
verdict	or	settlement.	[Columns	I,	J].	That	number	is	likely	to	rise	
because	there	remain	143	pending	lawsuits.	[Column	L].	Recall,	by	
comparison,	that	the	rate	of	prevailing	in	state	compensation	cases	
is	73.5%.
That	 reasonably	 high	 rate	 of	 prevailing	 does	 not	mean,	 of	
course,	that	they	were	all	multi-million	dollar	verdicts.	Eighty-nine	
verdicts	were	less	than	$500,000.	The	average	award	for	prevailing	
formerly	 incarcerated	plaintiffs	was	over	$3.8	million.	A	high	rate	
of	 prevailing	 and	 recovery	 of	 high	 awards	 is,	 again,	 arguably	 an	
indication	that	skilled	attorneys	quite	accurately	screen	cases	with	
significant	monetary	 value.	Of	 the	 cases	 filed,	 217,	 or	 27%,	were	
dismissed	or	resulted	in	no	recovery	for	the	plaintiff.	[Column	M].	
	Wrongful	 conviction	 imposes	 enormous	 costs	 on	 society,	
not	the	least	of	which	is	the	harm	to	the	wrongly	convicted	and	their	
families	and	continued	opportunities	for	the	real	culprits	to	commit	
crimes.	The	total	amount	awarded	to	prevailing	plaintiffs	was	over	
$1.7	billion	 at	 the	 time	of	 this	writing.	 [Column	N].199	 This	 sum	
should	be	considered	in	proper	context.	It	reflects	a	nationwide	total	
spanning	nearly	thirty	years.
In	 that	 connection,	 geographic	 variation	 is	 enormously	
significant.	 Over	 53%	 of	 all	 civil	 compensation	 was	 awarded	 to	
formerly	 incarcerated	 exonerees	 in	 just	 two	 states-Illinois	 and	
New	 York-which	 together	 accounted	 for	 only	 22%	 of	 the	 1,802	
199	 I	 was	 unable	 to	 find	 settlement	 figures	 in	 22	 cases.	 [Column	O].	 I	 coded	
those	cases	as	ones	in	which	the	plaintiffs	prevailed,	but	could	not	record	the	
amount.	 That	will	 depress	 the	 total	 amount	 awarded	 somewhat.	However,	
the	total	number	of	years	lost	associated	with	these	22	cases	was	117.2	years.	
Many	of	these	cases	involved	relatively	short	terms	of	wrongful	imprisonment	
and,	likely,	fairly	modest	settlements.
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exonerees	 in	 the	database.	Although	a	number	of	exonerations	 in	
those	 states	 resulted	 from	 the	 discovery	 of	 patterns	 of	 repeated	
misconduct	by	a	small	number	of	police	officers,200	it	is	unlikely	that	
this	 alone	 accounts	 for	 this	 finding.	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 jury	 pools	
(or	perceived	 jury	pools)	 in	metropolitan	Chicago	 and	New	York,	
negotiations	that	account	for	the	history	of	prior	settlements,	and	
the	 substantial	 experience	 and	 expertise	 of	 specialized	 law	 firms	
practicing	 in	 those	 areas	 are	 undoubtedly	 contributing	 factors	 to	
explain	the	compensatory	dominance	of	these	two	states.	
The	 national	 average	 recovery	 per	 year	 of	 incarceration	 is	
almost	$305,000.	[Column	R].	The	volume	of	awards	in	Illinois	and	
New	York,	which	both	compensate	at	higher	than	the	national	average	
($426,741	 and	 $341,200,	 respectively)	 raise	 the	 national	 average.	
There	are	some	states	with	yet	higher	averages-Colorado,	Kansas,	
Kentucky,	 Maryland,	 Missouri,	 and	 Wyoming-but	 those	 can	 be	
explained	by	small	numbers	of	unusually	high	awards	to	exonerees	
in	states	with	few	of	them.	Here	again,	the	variation	among	states	
is	striking.	The	average	annual	award	is	lowest	in	Georgia,	less	than	
$15,000	per	year.	Georgia	also	lacks	a	state	compensation	statute,	
giving	it	the	unhappy	distinction	of	being	one	of	the	states	in	which	
exonerees	would	least	likely	be	compensated.
The	 average	 annual	 figure	 offers	 an	 important	 point	 of	
comparison	 to	 state	 compensation	 statutes.	 Every	 statute	 which	
imposes	a	cap	or	 limit	on	annual	or	 total	 recovery	 is	set	at	a	 rate	
substantially	 less	 than	$305,000.	Many	hover	around	the	$50,000	
per	year	standard	set	by	amendments	to	the	federal	compensation	
statute.201	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 $305,000	 per	 year	 of	 wrongful	
200	 A	 number	 of	 Chicago-area	 wrongful	 convictions	 are	 attributed	 to	 three	
officers	(Jon	Burge,	Reynaldo	Guevara,	and	Ronald	Watts).	Don	Babwin,	New 
wrongful convictions could pressure Chicago’s finances,	 StarTribune	 (June	 3,	
2018,	 11:40	 AM),	 http://www.startribune.com/new-wrongful-convictions-
could-pressure-chicago-s-finances/484420981/.	 Over	 a	 dozen	 Brooklyn	
wrongful	 convictions	 are	 tied	 to	 Louis	 Scarcella.	See	 Chelsia	Rose	Marcius	
and	James	Fanell,	Dirty Detective Louis Scarcella insists, “I’ve done nothing wrong,” 
despite sending 13 wrongfully convicted people to jail,	N.Y.	Daily	News	(May	20,	
2018),	 https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/law-punish-detective-louis-
scarcella-dirty-tactics-article-1.4000501.
201	 28	U.S.C.	§	2513(e)	(2012)	(statute	also	provides	for	$100,000	per	year	for	
those	sentenced	to	death);	see also Mich.	Comp	Laws	Ann.	§	691.1755(2)
(a)	 (West	 2019)	 ($50,000	 per	 year	 of	 incarceration);	 Wash.	 Rev.	 Code	
Ann.	§	4.100.060(5)(a)	(West	2019)	($50,000	per	year;	$100,000	per	year	if	
sentenced	to	death);	N.J.	Stat.	Ann.	§	52:4C-5	(West	2019)	(two	times	prior	
income	or	$50,000	per	year,	whichever	is	higher);	Cal.	Penal	Code § 4904 
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imprisonment	has,	over	time	and	over	hundreds	of	cases,	become	
a	just	or	fair	average	compensatory	metric,	it	is	clear	now,	if	it	was	
not	before,	that	the	$50,000	federal	standard	and	any	state	standard	
based	on	it	are	not	only	arbitrary	but	arbitrarily	low.
This	data	may	put	lawyers	representing	clients	in	particular	
states	to	a	difficult	choice.	Take,	 for	example,	 the	relatively	recent	
Texas	statute	and	more	recent	Connecticut	amendments	to	its	state	
compensation	 statute.	 Both	 are	 substantially	more	 generous	 than	
the	 national	 average.	 Texas’	 administrative	 claim	 process	 is	 also	
relatively	 prompt.	 In	 both	 states,	 though,	 accepting	 state	 money	
requires	a	waiver	of	one’s	right	to	file	a	federal	civil	rights	or	state	law	
tort	claim.	For	lawyers	with	clients	in	need	of	financial	support	and	
with	uncertain	prospects	of	winning	a	civil	rights	claim,	opting	for	
the	relatively	generous	no-fault	state	statute	is	the	conservative	and	
entirely	defensible	choice,	even	 if	 it	means	 foregoing	a	potentially	
larger	recovery	(and	attorney’s	 fees)	 from	a	civil	 rights	case.	That	
certainly	has	been	the	choice	 for	the	substantial	majority	of	Texas	
exonerees,	but	the	choice	would	be	more	difficult	in	states	with	less	
generous	and/or	less	efficient	state	compensation	schemes.
In	states	without	preclusion	provisions,	the	calculus	may	be	
different.	The	data	suggests	that	attorneys	should	seriously	consider	
pursuing	viable	civil	rights	and	torts	suits	after	successfully	resolving	
state	 claims,	 even	 in	 states	which	 require	 the	 repayment	 of	 state	
money	 if	 civil	 compensation	 is	 later	 awarded.	The	average	annual	
recovery	is	likely	to	be	higher	than	that	in	a	capped	state,	but	the	
potential	for	achieving	it	must,	of	course,	be	weighed	by	considering	
the	strength	of	the	case.
Finally,	 civil	 rights	 or	 torts	 recoveries	 were	 awarded	 to	
exonerees	whose	number	of	years	lost	was	32.1%	of	the	total	time	
lost	 by	 all	 exonerees	 in	 the	 database.	 [Columns	P	 and	Q].	Recall	
that	 state	 statutory	 compensation	 programs	 compensated	 more	
broadly-providing	money	to	exonerees	with	just	over	50%	of	the	
total	years	lost	in	states	with	statutes.
(West	2019)	($140	per	day	of	incarceration	=	$51,110	per	year);	Miss.	Code	
Ann.	§	11-44-7	(West	2019)	($50,000	per	year;	$500,000	cap);	N.C.	Gen.	
Stat.	Ann.	§	148-84	(West	2019)	($50,000	per	year;	$750,000	cap);	Fla.	
Stat.	Ann.	§	961.06	(West	2019)	($50,000	per	year;	$2	million	overall	cap).	
Interestingly,	Table	10	shows	that	the	average	annual	recoveries	in	death	and	
non-death	penalty	cases	are	not	significantly	different	and	Table	11	shows	that	
the	regression	analysis	shows	no	statistical	association	between	the	amount	
and	a	death/non-death	sentence.
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Looking	 at	 the	 second	 column	 of	 Table	 7	 gives	 a	 simple	
snapshot	regarding	characteristics	that	appear	to	be	associated	with	
the	 likelihood	 of	 prevailing	 in	 civil	 compensation	 claims.	 Those	
who	pled	guilty,	experienced	a	false	confession,	and	were	wrongly	
convicted	in	part	due	to	perjury	or	false	allegations	had	a	higher	rate	
of	prevailing	than	those	with	the	opposite	characteristics.	
Unsurprisingly,	 the	 percentage	 of	 prevailing	 claimants	
who	were	wrongly	 convicted	at	 least	 in	part	 as	 a	 result	of	official	
misconduct	was	 higher	 than	 those	without	 official	misconduct	 in	
their	 criminal	 cases.	 What	 is	 surprising,	 however,	 is	 that	 nearly	
60%	 of	 civil	 compensation	 cases	 tagged	 by	 the	 Registry	 as	 those	
not	involving	official	misconduct	nevertheless	resulted	in	an	award	
for	 the	plaintiff.	Since	 the	vast	majority	of	 those	awards	were	 the	
result	of	a	settlement	rather	than	verdict	and	since,	generally,	civil	
compensation	 cases	 require	proof	 of	 official	misconduct,	 the	high	
percentage	 is	difficult	 to	explain.	 It	may	suggest	 inaccuracy	 in	the	
Registry’s	coding,	differences	between	the	Registry’s	conception	of	
official	misconduct	and	that	required	in	these	cases,	or	a	desire	by	
some	defense	counsel	to	minimize	litigation	risks	by	settlement.
There	 was	 some	 greater	 likelihood	 of	 success	 of	 plaintiffs	
who	 were	 earlier	 aided	 by	 innocence	 organizations	 and	 those	
who	were	not.	DNA	exonerees	had,	 as	 expected,	 a	 higher	 rate	 of	
prevailing	 than	non-DNA	exonerees,	 but	 the	difference	was	quite	
small.	 The	 prevailing	 rates	 for	 African-Americans,	 whites,	 and	
Hispanics	were	roughly	the	same.	The	likelihood	of	prevailing	was	
higher	in	the	Northeast	than	in	other	parts	of	the	county	and,	thus,	
not	surprisingly,	the	percentage	of	exonerees	successfully	filing	for	
civil	compensation	in	blue	states	was	significantly	higher	than	in	red	
states.
The	logistic	regression	analysis	helps	narrow	the	number	of	
characteristics	associated	with	higher	rates	of	prevailing	by	holding	
all	other	variables	constant.	Table	9	displays	the	results:
776 Gutman and Sun
Table 9 (Logistic Regression Analyzing Receipt of Civil 
Compensation)
Characteristic P Value Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
CIU 0.7043 0.854 0.379 1.926
GP 0.0125 2.135 1.177 3.87
IOA 0.0077 1.883 1.182 2.999
DP 0.3269 0.714 0.365 1.399
DNA	Ex. 0.0002 3 1.691 5.325
FC 0.3842 1.269 0.742 2.173
MWID 0.3701 0.799 0.489 1.305
F/MF 0.9175 0.977 0.631 1.513
P/FA 0.2234 1.34 0.837 2.146
OM 0.005 1.81 1.196 2.74
Sexual	Assault 0.7347 0.713 0.375 1.359
Drugs 0.8116 0.871 0.308 2.461
Child	Sexual	
Abuse
0.567 0.672 0.356 1.271
Robbery 0.6361 0.652 0.252 1.687
Other	Crimes 0.7009 0.861 0.484 1.532
Asian 0.9479 1.986 0.205 3.767
Caucasian 0.9361 1.065 0.696 1.631
Hispanic 0.9318 0.847 0.473 1.514
Native	
American
0.9713 >999.999 <0.001 >999.999
Other 0.9596 >999.999 <0.001 >999.999
Female 0.3223 0.71 0.361 1.399
Midwest 0.8299 1.389 0.844 2.285
Northeast 0.0001 2.64 1.425 4.889
West 0.0386 0.891 0.456 1.742
Blue	State	(2016) 0.0015 2.141 1.338 3.425
Years	Lost 0.544 1.009 0.981 1.037
As	has	become	familiar,	the	regression	analysis	shows	that	
receiving	assistance	from	an	innocence	organization	and	having	been	
exonerated	by	DNA	are	positively	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	
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prevailing	on	civil	compensation	claims.	The	odds	of	receiving	civil	
compensation	are	three	times	greater	for	DNA	exonerees	than	non-
DNA	exonerees.	Interestingly,	but	difficult	to	explain,	is	that	pleading	
guilty	to	a	crime	one	did	not	commit	is	positively	associated	with	the	
likelihood	of	prevailing	on	a	civil	compensation	claim,	as	it	was	with	
state	statutory	compensation	claims.
When	the	Registry	determines	that	official	misconduct	has	
contributed	to	the	wrongful	conviction,	the	exoneree	is	more	likely	
to	prevail	than	those	whose	cases	did	not	involve	official	misconduct.	
The	odds	of	prevailing	are	1.8	times	greater	for	those	victimized	by	
official	misconduct	than	those	not.	Those	wrongly	convicted	in	the	
Northeast	are	more	likely	to	prevail	than	in	the	South.	The	odds	of	
prevailing	on	a	 civil	 compensation	 case	 are	2.1	 times	greater	 in	 a	
blue	state	than	in	a	red	state.
Again,	there	was	no	statistical	association	between	gender	or	
race	and	the	likelihood	of	prevailing	in	civil	compensation.	Nor	was	
there	an	association	between	the	crime	for	which	the	exoneree	was	
wrongly	convicted	or	the	years	lost	and	the	likelihood	of	prevailing	
on	a	civil	compensation	claim.
3. Average Annual Civil Compensation
Finally,	 we	 tried	 to	 determine	 whether	 there	 was	 any	
correlation	 between	 the	 characteristics	 we	 examined	 and	 the	
amounts	prevailing	 civil	 compensation	plaintiffs	 received	per	 year	
of	 incarceration.	 One	 important	 caveat	 is	 in	 order.	 This	 recovery	
metric-award	 divided	 by	 years	 lost-is	 the	 only	 practical	 and	
objective	measurement	available	for	analysis.	But,	framing	it	in	this	
way	implies	that	damages	end	on	the	day	of	release	from	incarceration.	
In	reality,	many	exonerees	suffer	from	ongoing	medical	conditions	
contracted	 in	 prison,	 continued	 psychological	 harm,	 reduced	 life	
expectancy,	 and	ongoing	 lost	wages.202	Unless	 it	 is	 specifically	 set	
forth	in	a	court	judgment,	as	it	was	Odom v. District of Columbia203	and	
Tribble v. District of Columbia,204	it	is	impossible	to	determine	whether	
an	award	by	verdict	or	settlement	accounts	for	post-release	harms.	
202	 David	Cloud,	On Life Support: Public Health in the Age of Mass Incarceration,	Vera	
Inst.	Just.	(Nov.	2014),	https://www.vera.org/publications/on-life-support-
public-health-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration.
203	 Odom	v.	District	of	Columbia,	No.	2013	CA	3239,	2015	D.C.	Super.	LEXIS	2,	
at	*3	(D.C.	Super.	Ct.	Feb.	27,	2015).
204	 Tribble	v.	District	of	Columbia,	No.	2013	CA	3237,	2016	D.C.	Super.	LEXIS	4,	
at	*81	(D.C.	Super.	Ct.	Feb.	26,	2016).	These	cases	were	discussed	at	length	
in	Gutman,	supra	note	11,	at	376–79,	380–82.
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If	 they	 do,	 the	 metric	 we	 use	 here	 by	 necessity-average	 annual	
amounts	per	year	of	incarceration-are	effectively	overstated.
First,	we	tried	to	determine	whether	there	was	a	relationship	
between	years	lost	and	average	annual	recoveries.	In	theory,	exonerees	
should	receive	the	same	average	amount	of	civil	compensation	per	
year	of	wrongful	imprisonment	regardless	of	the	length	of	the	term.	
In	practice,	 lawyers	 in	 these	 cases	understand	 that	 the	metric	 for	
compensation	depends	on	many	other	variables,	such	as	the	extent	
and	severity	of	the	official	misconduct,	the	exoneree’s	life	story,	the	
degree	of	harm	experienced	in	prison	and	following	release,	lost	wage	
calculations	and	dozens	of	other	factors.	And,	of	course,	settlements	
reflect	a	compromise	that	accounts	for	ranges	of	predicted	damages	
and	likelihoods	of	prevailing	on	many	issues.
	We	found,	as	shown	in	Figure	6,	somewhat	surprisingly,	that	
the	average	annual	award	generally	slopes	downward	over	time.205	It	
is	uncertain	how	much	to	read	into	that	other	than	it	may	conform	to	
an	uncomfortable	and	often	unstated	intuition	that	those	in	prison	
adapt	to	their	lack	of	freedom,	learn	measures	of	self-protection	and,	
thus,	experience	less	physical	and	psychological	harm	over	time.
 
Figure 6 (Amount of Civil Award Per Year Lost by Group of 
Year Lost (Two-Year Bands))
Second,	 we	 turned	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 average	 annual	
205	 There	is	one	large	exception	in	the	32–34	range	involving	a	particularly	large	
recovery	for	a	single	individual.
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compensation	 awards	 obtained	 by	 exonerees	 with	 each	 of	 the	
characteristics	we	studied.	The	objective	was	to	determine	whether	
there	was	 a	 correlation	between	particular	 characteristics	 and	 the	
amount	 of	 recovery.	 Table	 10	 lists	 the	 average	 annual	 amounts	
received	 in	civil	compensation	 litigation	by	prevailing	plaintiffs	by	
characteristic.
Table 10 (Average Annual Amounts of Civil Compensation 
by Characteristic)
Amount	Total Years	Lost	Total
Amount	Per	
Year
All	Exonerees $1,717,529,707 5612 $306,046
Females $49,325,133 187.8 $262,647
Males $1,668,204,574 5424.2 $307,549
Caucasians $519,591,416 1616.3 $321,470
Blacks $976,647,133 3397.5 $287,461
Hispanics $215,361,264 544.9 $395,231
Other	 $5,929,894 53.3 $163,873
CIU $195,245,000 537 $363,585
No	CIU $1,522,284,707 5075 $299,958
GP $218,995,460 651.8 $335,986
No	GP $1,498,534,248 4960.2 $302,112
IOA $714,339,000 2119.3 $337,064
No	IOA $1,003,190,707 3492.7 $287,225
DNA	Ex. $686,194,113 1973.3 $347,739
No	DNA	Ex. $1,031,335,594 3638.7 $283,435
DP $178,244,083 519.9 $342,843
No	DP $1,539,285,624 5092.1 $302,289
FC $486,765,083 1377 $353,497
No	FC $1,230,764,624 4235 $290,617
MWID $508,637,173 1846 $275,535
No	MWID $1,208,892,535 3766 $321,002
F/MF $461,627,045 1636.7 $282,047
No	F/MF $1,255,902,662 3975.3 $315,927
P/FA $1,360,799,467 4114.6 $330,725
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Amount	Total Years	Lost	Total
Amount	Per	
Year
No	P/FA $356,730,241 1497.4 $238,233
OM $1,251,265,923 4028.6 $310,596
No	OM $466,263,785 1583.4 $294,470
Murder $1,309,410,126 3935.1 $332,751
Sexual	Assault $235,749,280 890.8 $264,649
Drugs $2,842,501 28.2 $100,798
Child	Sexual	
Abuse
$72,121,000 392.6 $183,701
Robbery $16,737,000 76.3 $219,358
Other	Crimes $80,669,800 289 $279,134
Midwest $658,976,031 1737.8 $379,201
Northeast $647,797,045 1962.1 $330,155
South $218,971,265 1087 $201,446
West $191,785,367 816 $235,031
Blue	State	
(2016) $1,313,828,649 3770.6 $348,440
Red	State	
(2016) $403,701,058 1832.3 $220,325
Table	10	reveals	a	number	of	interesting	and	sobering	findings.	
Especially	noteworthy	is	the	substantial	variation	of	average	annual	
awards	between	men	and	women,	particularly	given	the	much	longer	
average	 lost	years	 for	men	than	women.	 Interestingly,	 the	average	
annual	awards	 for	whites	were	$34,000	more	than	 for	blacks,	but	
the	 average	 annual	 award	 for	Hispanics	was	nearly	$74,000	more	
than	for	whites.
Although,	 in	theory,	the	crime	for	which	the	exoneree	was	
wrongly	 convicted	 should	 have	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	 annual	 civil	
compensation,	 the	 data	 shows	 that	 those	 convicted	 of	 murder	
received	the	largest	average	annual	awards-over	three	times	those	
convicted	of	drug	offenses.	Perhaps	there	is	a	gender	aspect	to	this.	
According	to	the	Registry,	 the	worst	crime	of	wrongful	conviction	
was	murder	 for	40%	of	men,	but	only	 for	29%	of	women.	Sexual	
assault	was	almost	non-existent	for	women,	while	it	was	the	worst	
crime	for	15%	of	men.	Twenty-four	percent	of	females	were	wrongly	
convicted	of	drug	crimes	while	only	10%	of	men	were.	Child	sexual	
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abuse	was	the	worst	crime	for	about	17%	of	women,	but	only	11%	
of	men.206
Those	aided	by	a	conviction	 integrity	unit	or	an	 innocence	
organization,	and	those	exonerated	by	DNA	or	sentenced	to	death	
received	 significantly	 more	 annually	 than	 those	 without	 those	
characteristics.	There	were	also	significant	variations	geographically.	
Average	annual	awards	were	highest	in	the	Midwest	and	Northeast	
and	 dramatically	 lower	 in	 the	 South	 and	 West.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 not	
surprising	that	the	average	annual	civil	compensation	award	in	blue	
states	was	more	than	50%	higher	than	in	red	states.
Again,	 causation	 cannot	 be	 inferred	 from	 these	 simple	
percentages.	The	data	 in	Table	11	do	not	permit	a	conclusion,	 for	
example,	that	women	receive	less	per	year	than	men	because	of	their	
gender.	Other	characteristics	may	explain	that	observation.	Thus,	we	
ran	a	linear	regression	analysis	which	examined	each	characteristic	
against	its	opposite	or	others	in	the	same	category	(crime,	region,	
race),	holding	other	characteristics	fixed.	The	results	are	set	forth	in	
Table	11.
Table 11 (Linear Model207 Result of Average Annual Amount 
of Civil Compensation)208
Characteristic Estimates P Value
Conviction	Integrity	Unit $23,7610 0.8021
Guilty	Plea -$25,356 0.7141
Innocence	Organization	Aid $58,820 0.2823
Death	Penalty -$61,150 0.5029
DNA	Exoneration $110,797 0.0895
False	Confession $52,635 0.4006
Mistaken	Witness	Identification -$44,212 0.4984
False/Misleading	Forensics -$73,152 0.2268
206 Nat’l	Registry	of	Exonerations,	supra note	57.
207	 Here,	we	want	to	explain	the	relationship	between	the	average	annual	amount	
of	 civil	 compensation	 and	 all	 the	 characteristics.	 Because	 the	 response	
variable-amount	 of	 compensation-is	 a	 continuous	 variable,	 we	 used	 a	
linear	model	instead	of	logistic	model.
208	 Estimates	of	a	linear	regression	model	show	the	impact	of	the	corresponding	
characteristics	on	the	response	variable.	More	specifically,	estimates	represent	
the	 difference	 in	 the	 predicted	 value	 of	 outcome	 (average	 annual	 amount	
of	 civil	 compensation	here)	 for	 each	one	unit	 change	 in	 the	 corresponding	
characteristic	while	all	other	characteristics	in	the	model	remain	constant.
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Characteristic Estimates P Value
Perjury/False	Accusation -$4,006 0.9527
Official	Misconduct $81,637 0.169
Sexual	Assault -$19,292 0.814
Drugs -$387,865 0.0213
Child	Sexual	Abuse -$187,477 0.0443
Robbery -$179,398 0.2399
Other	Crimes -$186,713 0.0269
Asian -$26,891 0.923
Caucasian $302 0.9958
Hispanic $182,327 0.017
Other -$117,397 0.8074
Female -$81,427 0.4567
Midwest $172,451 0.0215
Northeast $37,170 0.6668
West -$3,644 0.9706
Blue	State	(2016) $76,279 0.2356
Years	Lost -$14,226 <.0001
In	 Table	 10,	 fairly	wide	 differences	 in	 annual	 average	 civil	
compensation	awards	are	observed	within	the	studied	characteristics.	
The	 final	 question	 addressed	 was	 whether	 the	 characteristic	 can	
explain	 the	 difference-that,	 for	 example,	 the	 average	 annual	
compensation	award	for	blacks	is	lower	than	whites	because	of	that	
racial	 difference,	 or	whether	 that	 difference	 is	 explained	 by	 other	
characteristics.	
As	 it	 turns	 out,	 relatively	 few	 variables	 we	 tracked	 are	
statistically	 associated	 with	 average	 annual	 civil	 compensatory	
outcomes.	 The	 wrongful	 conviction	 of	 drug,	 child	 sexual	 abuse	
and	 “other”	 crimes	 is	 associated	with	 substantially	 lower	 awards.	
Interestingly,	 those	 wrongly	 convicted	 and	 prevailing	 in	 civil	
compensation	 claims	 in	 the	Midwest	 are	 associated	 with	 average	
annual	compensation	awards	of	over	$172,000	per	year	more	than	
those	in	the	South,	all	other	factors	being	fixed.	For	every	year	lost,	
the	annual	award	drops	by	over	$14,000	per	year.	For	reasons	hard	
to	explain,	Hispanics	were	associated	with	over	$182,000	per	year	
more	compensation	compared	to	African-Americans.
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As	 interesting	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 correlation	 between	 all	 other	
factors	 and	 civil	 compensatory	 outcome.	 There	 is	 no	 correlation	
between	being	white	or	black	and	compensatory	outcome.	There	is	
no	 association	 between	 average	 awards	 and	 gender,	 conviction	 in	
red	or	blue	states,	any	of	the	tags,	or	any	of	the	wrongful	conviction	
factors.	The	percentage	differences	we	saw	 in	Table	10	are	simply	
not	explained	by	any	particular	characteristic	we	studied.	
4. The Overall Landscape and Conclusions
In	the	end,	we	should	view	the	compensatory	landscape	from	
the	 perspective	 of	 those	 exonerees	 who	 attended	 the	 Innocence	
Network	conference.	Their	narratives	often	begin	with	 the	 truism	
that	no	amount	of	money	can	compensate	them	for	their	lost	liberty	
and	profound	suffering.	Given	that	reality,	there	should	be	a	route	to	
compensation	guided	by	several	principles,	of	which	two	are	absent	
from	 this	 analysis.	 First,	 compensation	 and	 non-compensatory	
social	services	should	be	provided	quickly	after	exoneration.	Second,	
the	 amount	 of	 compensation	 should	 be	 large	 enough	 to	 permit	
the	 exoneree	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 compensated	 and	 to	 incentivize	
improvements	 in	 policy	 and	 procedure	 to	 reduce	 the	 incidence	
of	 future	wrongful	 convictions	without	 being	 so	 large	 as	 to	 deter	
states	and	municipalities	 from	cooperating	 in	the	effort	to	surface	
wrongful	 convictions	 and	 from	 settling	meritorious	 cases	 seeking	
compensation.
The	 remaining	 principles	 have	 been	 a	 focus	 of	 our	 study.	
There	should	be	a	breadth	of	coverage-a	compensatory	framework	
that	 results	 in	 high	 rates	 of	 filing	 claims	 or	 suits	 and	 awarding	
compensation	while	targeting	those	higher	rates	to	exonerees	with	
the	most	time	lost.	Compensatory	generosity	and	breadth	of	coverage	
should	not	be	widely	variant	among	states;	how	an	exoneree	fares	
in	their	quest	 for	compensation	should	not	depend	on	geographic	
circumstance.	
Spreadsheet	2	offers	some	insight	into	the	full	compensatory	
picture,	 including	 breadth	 of	 coverage	 and	 inter-state	 variability.	
Combining	together	state	statutory	claims	and	federal	civil	rights	and	
state	tort	lawsuits,	1,210	of	1,802	formerly	incarcerated	exonerees,	
or	67%	sought	at	least	one	remedy.	[Columns	S,	T].	Column	V	shows	
that	628,	or	35%,	obtained	one	form	of	relief	or	the	other	while	218	
obtained	both	state	and	civil	compensation	[Column	W].	Thus,	846	
of	 1,802	 or	 42.3%	 received	 some	 compensation.	 [Columns	V,	W,	
X].	This	covered	just	under	60%	of	the	lost	time,	indicating,	as	we	
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showed,	 higher	 rates	 of	 filing	 and	 prevailing	 by	 those	with	more	
years	lost.	[Column	Z].	Put	differently,	over	40%	of	the	years	lost	to	
exonerees	in	our	database	were	uncompensated.
In	September	2018,	the	Registry	noted	the	passage	of	a	tragic	
benchmark.	At	 that	point,	 the	years	 lost	 to	both	state	and	 federal	
exonerees	crossed	20,000,	the	equivalent	of	the	full	lifetimes	of	250	
people.	Our	 study	 concludes	 that	 those	 experiencing	 some	 8,000	
of	those	years	of	wrongful	incarceration	received	no	compensation	
from	the	state	or	any	governmental	entity	or	actor.	The	study	also	
shows	that	 these	absences	of	compensation	are	not	evenly	spread	
throughout	the	United	States.	The	state	of	wrongful	conviction	is	a	
very	important	explanatory	variable.
The	 percentages	 by	 state	 of	 1)	 exonerees	 seeking	
compensation,	2)	exonerees	receiving	some	form	of	compensation,	
and	 3)	 years	 lost	 for	 which	 some	 compensation	 was	 paid	 varies	
widely.209	 With	 respect	 to	 all	 exonerees	 in	 the	 database,	 both	
incarcerated	and	not,	out	of	states	with	more	than	four	exonerees,	
West	Virginia,	Ohio,	 and	Mississippi	had	 the	highest	 percentages	
of	 exonerees	 seeking	 compensation;	 New	 Mexico,	 Montana,	 and	
Rhode	Island	were	by	far	the	lowest,	with	roughly	a	fifth	of	the	filing	
rates	of	the	highest	states.	West	Virginia,	Nebraska,	and	Mississippi	
had	 the	highest	percentages	of	 claimants	obtaining	an	award,	but	
Alaska,	New	Mexico,	and	South	Carolina	had	none.	The	exonerees	
in	five	states	received	compensation	for	over	80%	of	the	years	lost	
in	those	states:	Mississippi,	Nebraska,	Virginia,	Massachusetts,	and	
Illinois.	 In	 contrast,	 twelve	 states	with	more	 than	 four	 exonerees	
compensated	less	than	30%	of	the	years	lost.210
Weighting	each	of	 these	three	 factors	equally,	we	conclude	
with	a	state-by-state	grade	sheet	on	breadth	of	coverage,	counting	
both	state	statutory	and	civil	compensation,	excluding	the	ten	states	
and	territories	with	less	than	five	exonerees.
209	 In	Spreadsheet	2,	 the	percentages	are	 shown	 in	Columns	T,	X,	 and	Z.	The	
discussion	in	the	text	that	follows,	however,	reflects	the	percentages	associated	
with	all	2,000	exonerees,	rather	than	those	incarcerated.
210	 Alabama,	Alaska,	Arizona,	Arkansas,	Indiana,	Kentucky,	Nevada,	New	Mexico,	
Oregon,	Puerto	Rico,	South	Carolina,	and	Tennessee
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Chart 3 (Overall Breadth of Coverage)
Grade State
A+ Mississippi,	West	Virginia
A Illinois,	Nebraska	
A- Massachusetts,	Virginia,	New	York,	Ohio,	Louisiana,	
Connecticut
B+ North	Carolina
B Washington,	Oklahoma,	California,	District	of	
Columbia	
B- Utah,	New	Jersey	
C+ Minnesota,	Michigan,	Kansas,	Missouri,	Iowa,	Nevada,	
Texas
C Colorado,	Wisconsin,	Indiana,	Kentucky,	Puerto	Rico
C- Pennsylvania,	Tennessee,	Maryland,	Florida,	Georgia	
D+ Alabama,	Montana
D Arkansas,	Oregon,	Rhode	Island,	Alaska
D- Arizona,	South	Carolina
F New	Mexico
Mississippi	is	hardly	the	most	generous	state,	but	generosity	
is	not	 the	only	 feature	of	a	 compensatory	system	that	may	define	
its	 fairness.	 Breadth	 of	 coverage-the	 prospect	 of	 at	 least	 some	
compensation	 encompassing	 as	 many	 years	 lost	 to	 wrongful	
incarceration	 as	 is	 possible-serves	 as	 a	 competing	 measure	 of	
fairness.	If	we	adopt	that	perspective,	we	can	answer	the	question	
we	started	with:	why	it	is	that	Mississippi	is	the	best	state	in	which	
to	be	exonerated.
786 Gutman and Sun
Spreadsheet 1
787Vol. 11, No. 2 Northeastern University Law Review
788 Gutman and Sun
Spreadsheet 2
789Vol. 11, No. 2 Northeastern University Law Review
